

AL-TAWHĪD

A Quarterly Journal of Islamic Thought and Culture

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
Forough Jahonbakhsh

The End of Islamic Spain: Dates, Names and Places

T. B. Irving

Vol. VIII, No. 3, Rajab — Ramadān, 1411

(February — April 1991)



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بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

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the Merciful, the Compassionate*

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Editorial

The basic characteristic of *kufr*, as we said in an earlier editorial, is that it tries to cover and conceal the truth with falsehood (in fact the English word 'cover' seems to be related in its origin to the Arabic '*kufr*'). This characteristic of *kufr* is nowhere so prominent as in the present slogan of global *kufr* regarding human rights, which embodies perhaps the biggest hypocrisy in the history of *kufr* to appear on an international level.

To explain, the U.S. and its allies in Western Europe, the self-appointed defenders of the so-called 'human rights', have been the greatest enemies of real human rights in recent history. We need not discuss here the crimes perpetrated against humanity by the self-styled 'civilized' countries of the West in the past centuries. We need not mention the world-wide banditry performed by these countries, signified by such terms as 'colonialism' and 'imperialism', which, despite the horrible reality they signify, are still euphemisms. We need not mention the horrendous crimes perpetrated against the Indian peoples of North and South Americas and the genocides and massacres faced by them at the hands of the ancestors of some of the present defenders of human rights. We need not describe the tragic abduction, trade and slavery of millions of African human beings, the ancestors of the present Black Americans who constitute at the present a considerable proportion of the population of the American continents. We need not mention the tragedies that befell the people of Asia, Africa and the American continents at the hands of the European savages, the most dangerous savages that history has seen, because savagery is never so dangerous as when equipped with the tools and weapons of civilization.

All that we need discuss is the savage record of these countries in this century itself. We see that the evil exploitive legacy of 19th century colonialism has continued until today in disguised forms. The industrialized West continues its ruthless domination over the world's resources and raw materials, as well as over the world's markets. The nations which have been robbed and continue to be robbed, reduced to debt and penury, are further forced to live under extreme political pressures put on them by dictatorial regimes installed by the West's spies and supported by its statesmen and diplomats. The people of Palestine have been robbed of even their own homeland by the Zionists and servile Jews. The rape of Palestine, the genocide, imprisonment, exile and torture of its brave sons continue unabated under the direct patronage and support of the self-styled defenders of human rights. The same Jews who have faced the savagery of Europe throughout

last centuries, from the Middle Ages up to the Third Reich and the excesses of Adolf Hitler, have been turned into ruthless instruments of genocide, injustice and plunder in an Islamic country by turning a scriptural passage into a U.S. colony.

The self-styled defenders of human right in the U.S. continue to deprive the Indians, the original masters of the land, of their human rights and to rob them of their land, dignity and identity. The Black people of the U.S. continue to remain second class citizens in their country and if a Black man is made chief-of-staff of the armed forces, that is because the erstwhile slaves now form the real spearhead of the country's fighting capability and the Black commander serves as a convenient mask for the White man in the White House. The terrible state of affairs in the U.S. prisons and the rising crime rates in the cities are eloquent indicators of the extent to which the self-styled defenders of human rights have been able to promote respect for human rights in their own homes and streets. Women, particularly, in the West have been shorn of their human dignity and converted into sex-objects by its obscene culture. And yet all this was done under the label of 'women's liberation.' Legalized abortion in Western countries has deprived even the defenceless human being in its mother's womb of the security of life and hundreds of tons of the flesh of the aborted fetuses are used by the cosmetic industry to produce cosmetics for the mothers.

The flames of the greed and ambition of the self-styled defenders of human rights reach the stars and eat up the globe's atmosphere. Its poison has filled the world's rivers and oceans. Neither the child in its mother's womb nor the fish in the ocean depths nor the birds in the sky are secure from the poisons exhumed by the infinite, infernal greed of the self-styled defenders of human rights and freedom. Neither the name of the noblest human being who has ever walked over this wretched globe, the Messenger of Allah, is secure from their venom, nor the honour of Jesus and his virgin mother are beyond the reach of their blasphemous malice.

Their perfidious press and media are engaged all the time in killing awareness and awakening, in killing all that is most precious and noble in man, in projecting devils as gentlemen, in well-tailored suits and faces well groomed for the TV camera, and in making saints and human beings struggling against injustice, oppression and usurpation of human rights appear as savages and terrorists.

The self-styled defenders of human rights have fought the two most destructive wars of this century and have been the direct or indirect cause of dozens of other lesser wars and conflicts. Almost everywhere that there is conflict and bloodshed in the world, their vested interests, tactical or strategic, are at stake and the dirty and

bloody hands of their spies and agents are at work.

However, if the vilest forces of our times and the enemies of mankind can dare to style themselves as defenders of humanity and its rights, that is because of the prevailing lack of awareness amongst the oppressed masses of humanity today, which continue to be misled by the propaganda of the devils in well-tailored business suits, as well as due to the slavish and mercenary character of most intellectuals, politicians and leaders. However, this gloomy scene has begun to change, and more rapidly in the Muslim part of the world of the oppressed than anywhere else.

The glorious Islamic Revolution in Iran was the first clear sign of this historical change, which holds the promise of a new world order free from the domination of the enemies of man and his rights. Despite the eight-year war imposed on this awakened Islamic country, despite the myriads of plots hatched against it, and despite the relentless propaganda offensive launched against it by the self-styled defenders of human rights, the Islamic Republic of Iran remains committed to the struggle for the emancipation of the oppressed from the domination of tyrannical anti-human powers led by the U.S., and to the achievement of their legitimate rights usurped by the big powers.

* * *

The issue of the complete liberation of Palestine and the holy Quds from the occupation of the Zionists, the agents of the self-styled defenders of human rights, remains the topmost problem of the Islamic world. As Āyatullāh Khāmene'ī has pointed out in his address to the delegates to the First Islamic International Conference on Palestine held at Tehran, the problem of Palestine is the most important and the most basic issue of the Islamic world. It is the religious duty of every individual Muslim, wherever he may live, to support his brethren in Palestine with all the means at his disposal. He pointed out that every Muslim has the duty of defensive *jihād* whenever an Islamic land is attacked or occupied by aggressors. This is a duty which has been recognized and stressed by all the fuqahā' of Islam throughout history, irrespective of sect or school of law. Nevertheless, an obvious duty such as this has been neglected by Muslims. If the Muslims had been aware of their duties, and responsive to the call of the duties made obligatory on them by God, no anti-Islamic power could succeed in carrying out an inhuman assault on a Muslim land and its people and their rights, as happened in Palestine.

However today, Āyatullāh Khāmene'ī pointed out, the Muslims of Palestine have risen to recover their legitimate rights. He called the Intifāḍah a great Divine blessing for the Islamic world that has driven a terror into the hearts of the creators and supporters of the Zionist regime. The world's Muslims should thank God for this great blessing,

he said, and the right manner of expressing this gratitude is that the Muslims, in every corner of the world, should extend all out political, moral, military and propaganda support to their heroic brethren in Palestine.

The leader of the Islamic Revolution said that it was a big mistake to put hopes in the U.S. and its allies, who are all out supporters of the Zionist aggressors, to take steps for the liberation of Palestine. He pointed out that those who nourish the Zionist regime or support it or advocate negotiations with it stand in a single front with Israel and against the Islamic world. To struggle for the obliteration of the Zionist entity is a duty, and any compromise with it is treason, he pointed out.

He said that it was the duty of Muslim intellectuals, writers, artists and journalists throughout the world to employ all the means at their disposal to bring the unexemplary oppression of the Palestinian people to the attention of the world's public opinion.

Ayatullāh Khāmene'ī, in this speech, called attention to the new world-wide campaign against Islam that has been launched since the victory of the Islamic Revolution, which made the enemies of Islam more serious and determined in their assaults. He referred to the issue of Bābrī Masjid in India as a campaign instigated by the enemies of Islam who have made Hindu fanatics an instrument for the harassment of the Muslims and assault against their Islamic identity. He assured the Muslims of India that they had the support of the entire Muslim Ummah in their struggle for safeguarding their Islamic identity and rights.

* * *

The fascist Hindu organizations of India, such as the Vishva Hindu Parishad, the R.S.S., Shiv Sena and Bharatya Janata Party (B.J.P.), in league with the Zionist and Western intelligence agencies, have launched a campaign aimed at destruction of the Islamic identity of Muslims in India. The so-called Hindu-Muslim riots in India, which are often projected by the dominant Hindu press as well as the international news agencies as clashes between two religious communities, are in fact no more than pre-planned attacks on the lives and property of Muslims executed by Hindu organizations of a quasi-military nature and made to appear as clashes between two 'hostile' communities.

The truth is that Muslims and other minorities, as well as the Dalits — the so-called untouchables — and the Backward Castes, are common sufferers under a system dominated by a small minority, the so-called higher caste Hindus, who constitute a small minority of 15% the country's population. During the prime ministership of Mr. V.P. Singh, the government decided to implement the proposals of the Mandal Commission regarding reservations of seats in government jobs for the Backward Castes to ameliorate the backwardness of a

considerable section of the Indian society (35%) which has been deprived of its human rights for centuries and treated as a sub-human mass at the fringes of Hinduism by high caste Hindus. Mr. V. P. Singh's government decided to correct this major dislocation and historical injustice by implementing the recommendations of the Mandal Commission. However, there were protests by high caste Hindus against the government's measure, especially in the country's north. As a result, Mr. V. P. Singh's government was forced to leave after putting the Mandal Commission measures in cold storage by handing over the matter to the Supreme Court to consider the constitutionality of its proposals. However, Mr. V. P. Singh's government had taken the lid off Hinduism's Pandora's box and was blamed of causing division and conflict within the 'Hindu community' by politicians in league with the interests of the higher castes, India's ruling class.

After withdrawing its support from Mr. V. P. Singh's government, the B. J. P. swiftly moved on to cement the 'rifts' that had appeared in the body of the so-called Hindu community with the blood of Muslims. The so-called Hindu-Muslim riots are considered by Hindu fascist organizations as an essential means for the unity of the Hindu community, a politico-legal assembly of contrary and contradictory elements officially put together on the basis of a negative definition in the constitution and lacking any unifying aspect. The hatred of Muslims, to them, is its unifying cement. These attacks on Muslims are envisaged to serve a number of objectives: to demoralize the Muslims, who have already been made to consider themselves second-class and third-class citizens in a secular democracy; to destroy their economic capacity, when they have already been weakened economically and politically as a result of constant discrimination since the independence and most of them now belong to the lower economic strata of society; to dissipate the Muslims' energies uselessly by involving them in problems created artificially — such as Bābri Masjid issue now or the uniform-civil-code issue earlier and so on — so that they are kept from attending to the vital problems of the Ummah and of themselves as its inseparable part; to create mutual resentment and suspicion between Muslim and non-Muslim communities and to build emotional barriers between Islam and the oppressed and humiliated sections of Indian society, called the Backward Castes, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, many of whom refuse to be called 'Hindu' and who see Islam as the only way to recovering their human dignity and equality denied to them for centuries by Brahminism.

The Indian government has been incapable of protecting Muslims and safeguarding their rights. Unless Muslims have proportionate representation in the government services at all levels as well as in the Parliament and the central and state governments, there can be no guarantee

for the security of Muslims and their political, economic, social and cultural interests. Although the Muslims constitute 15% of the population, the proportion of Muslims employed under the central government in Class I grade is 1.61%, in Class II 3%, in Class III 4.41%, and in Class IV 5.12%. The situation of the Backward Castes and the Dalits, too, who together are said to constitute 65% of India's population, cannot be bettered without proportionate representation. Within the present setup, which is only to the benefit of a 15% ruling minority, the higher caste Hindus, there is no hope of achieving the very first declared objective of the Indian constitution: "to secure to all citizens justice — social, economic and political." The deteriorating plight of the under-privileged sections of Indian society since the last four decades since independence bears enough testimony to this fact.

Rights are not something to be given. They have to be taken. The high caste Hindus will not relinquish any of their present privileges, as was proved by the fate of the Mandal Commission proposals and the fall of Mr. V.P.Singh's government. Muslims and other under-privileged masses of India, who constitute 85% of the population, will have to struggle together, hand in hand, for this objective. They must be vigilant of the divide-and-rule policies implemented by what the internationally known and respected editor of *Dalit Voice* Mr. V.T. Rajshekar, himself a Dalit, has labelled as the Hindu Nazis. Unless the Muslim masses and the Backward Classes and the Dalits become aware of their situation vis-à-vis the oppressors, they will continue to remain in slavery and cheated by the Hindu Nazis of their legitimate rights.

As the Muslims have recurringly seen in the course of the experience of the last four decades, it is wishful thinking and self-deception to expect others to protect them. They must take care of their own defence. Self-defence is not only their right but also one of the most basic duties of every individual Muslim, man and woman, the young and the old, imposed upon him/her by the Shari'ah. Self-defence is so much emphasized and glorified by Islam that one who dies defending his life, property or honour is considered a martyr by it.

The Prophet (S) has said:

مَنْ قَاتَلَ دُونَ نَفْسِهِ حَتَّى يُقْتَلَ فَهُوَ شَهِيدٌ وَمَنْ قُتِلَ دُونَ مَالِهِ فَهُوَ شَهِيدٌ وَمَنْ قَاتَلَ
دُونَ أَهْلِهِ حَتَّى يُقْتَلَ فَهُوَ شَهِيدٌ وَمَنْ قُتِلَ فِي جَنْبِ اللَّهِ فَهُوَ شَهِيدٌ.

Whoever fights in self-defence until he is killed is a martyr. Whoever is killed defending his property is a martyr. Whoever fights in the defence of his family until he is killed is a martyr. And whoever is killed for the sake of seeking nearness to God is a martyr.

(*Kanz al-'ummāl*, iv, 420, ḥadīth 11236).

Al-'Imām 'Ali ibn al-Husayn (A) said:

مَنْ اعْتَدِيَ عَلَيْهِ فِي صَدَقَةِ مَالِهِ فَقَاتَلَ فَقَتِلَ فَهُوَ شَهِيدٌ.

One whose property is assaulted and he fights until he is killed is a martyr.
(*Wasā'il al-Shi'ah*, xi, 93, ḥadīth 11)

Al-'Imām al-Ṣādiq (A) has said:

مَنْ قَتِلَ دُونَ عِيَالِهِ فَهُوَ شَهِيدٌ.

Whoever is killed in the defence of his family is a martyr.
(*Wasā'il al-Shi'ah*, xi, 92, ḥadīth 5)

And the Holy Prophet (S) has said about martyrdom and the martyr:

مِمَّنْ أَحَدٌ يَدْخُلُ الْجَنَّةَ يُحِبُّ أَنْ يَرْجِعَ إِلَى الدُّنْيَا وَلَهُ مَا عَلَى الْأَرْضِ مِنْ شَيْءٍ إِلَّا الشَّهِيدُ، فَإِنَّهُ يَتَمَنَّى أَنْ يَرْجِعَ إِلَى الدُّنْيَا فَيُقْتَلَ عَشْرَ مَرَّاتٍ لِمَا يَرَى مِنَ الْكِرَامَةِ.

Of the people who enter paradise, there is not one who would wish to return to the world even if everything on the earth were offered to him — except the martyr, who on experiencing the nobility of martyrdom wishes to return to the world and to be killed ten times.
(*Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, iv, 26)

Death is inevitable, but the best death is the 'death' of the martyr, which is not death at all. Hence the Qur'an commands Muslims not to call those who have 'died' a 'death' of martyrdom as dead.

وَلَا تَقُولُوا لِمَنْ يُقْتَلُ فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ أَمْوَاتٌ...

And call not those who are slain in the way of Allah "dead". Nay, they are living, though you perceive not. (2:154)

The Muslims who are assaulted and killed because they are followers of Islam and take pride in being Muslims, are martyrs, and martyrdom is the highest virtue and the highest good that a faithful human being may hope to attain. And the Noble Prophet (S) has said:

فَوْقَ كُلِّ ذِي بَرٍّ بَرٌّ حَتَّى يُقْتَلَ فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ فَإِذَا قُتِلَ فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ فَلَيْسَ فَوْقَهُ بَرٌّ.

For every virtue agreeable to God there is a virtue that is higher to it. But there is no piety or virtue higher than being killed in the way of God.
(*Wasā'il al-Shi'ah*, xi, 10, ḥadīth 21)

The enemies of Islam and Muslims imagine that by assaulting

Muslims and shedding their blood, they will bring down their morale and weaken their spirit. Little do they know that a Muslim is one for whom it is the greatest of rewards to be killed by the swords of the enemies of God and man. Hence we read in one of the prayers of al-'Imām al-Sajjād (A):

حَمْدًا نَسَعْدُ بِهِ فِي السَّعْدَاءِ مِنْ أَوْلِيَائِهِ وَنَصِيرُهُ فِي نَظْمِ الشَّهَدَاءِ بِسُيُوفِ أَعْدَائِهِ إِنَّهُ
وَلِيُّ حَمِيدٌ.

(We praise God) with a praise whereby we may attain to the felicity of His falicitous friends (*awliyā'*) and find way into the ranks of the martyrs killed by the swords of His enemies. Verily, He is the Most Praiseworthy Lord. (*al-Sahīfah al-Sajjādiyyah*, Du'ā' No.1)

Aside from physical defence, it is also the duty of the Muslims to defend, safeguard and promote their spiritual ethos and culture. The corrosive and destructive influences of their environment must be opposed and resisted. The degenerate products of domestic and foreign film industries are aimed to serve as the opiate of the masses, to destroy their moral sensitivities, to separate them from the realities of the real world, to distort their sense of reality, and to deprive them of the awareness of the real problems of their society so that they neither identify the real problems nor their solutions. Hence they should adamantly oppose and resist all perverse means of "entertainment" that corrupt the morals, paralyze one's sense of reality and cloud one's vision and view of the real world.

The Hindu Nazis, too, if they have any modicum of sympathy for India, must understand that the Muslims and their Islamic heritage are part and parcel of the Indian heritage and one of the most valuable assets of the country. Their campaign against the Muslims and their Islamic identity and culture is a war declared against Islam and a challenge to the world-wide Muslim Ummah, which cannot remain indifferent to the plight of their brethren in any country. The more than 100 million Muslims of India are well capable of defending themselves and their faith against any kind of danger and aggression. Even if they are forced to offer a million martyrs, they will never abandon their faith, as the brave Muslims of Palestine have demonstrated for the last forty years. The assaults of the Hindu Nazis will only increase their determination and attachment to their sanctities, and if once their wrath is aroused no earthly force, to say nothing of the Zionist and imperialist intelligence agencies, will protect the tyrants from Divine wrath in the shape of a wrathful Islamic Ummah.

Tehran,
1 Jamādī al-Thānī, 1411.

The Qur'ān and the Nature of Life

by Martyr Murtaḍā Muṭahharī — quddisa sirruh

Translated from the Persian by Shahīd Naqawī.

Here we intend to carry out a Qur'ānic study of the problem of life to find out the specific viewpoint of the Qur'ān about life. In particular, we intend to study the view that the Qur'ān takes of the relation between life and the supranatural world and Divine will.

The Noble Qur'ān recurringly mentions life. In many of its verses, the coming to life of creatures, the different stages of life, the system involved in the creation of living creatures, the effects of life such as intelligence, consciousness, perception, hearing, sight, guidance, inspiration, instinct and the like are mentioned as the 'signs' indicative of Divine wisdom and design. Each of these constitutes an interesting subject in itself, but here we do not intend to discuss them.

One of the themes discussed by the Qur'ān in relation to life is that life is in the hands of God; it is God Who gives and takes away life. By this, the Noble Qur'ān means that life is not within the control of anyone except God; no one else can give life or take it away. The issue that we now intend to discuss is this.

In the *Sūrat al-Baqarah*, the Qur'ān quotes Abraham (A) as saying to a tyrant of his time:

... رَبِّيَ الَّذِي يُحْيِي وَيُمِيتُ ...

My Lord is He Who gives life and causes to die. (2: 258)

*This is the second of a series of three related articles by Martyr Murtaḍā Muṭahharī on topics relating to soul, life, and evolution and published in a collection entitled *Maqālāt-e falsafī* (Philosophical Essays). The Persian titles of these essays are: "Aṣālat-e rūḥ", "Qur'ān wa ḥayāt," and "Tawḥīd wa takāmul". There are three more essays in this collection entitled: "Pursishhā-ye falsafī-ye Abū Rayḥān az Bū 'Alī," "Aṣl-e taḍādd dar falsafah-ye Islāmī," and "Baḥth-e ḥarakat."

Martyr Murtadā Muṭahhari

In the *Sūrat al-Mulk*, God is described in these words:

الَّذِي خَلَقَ الْمَوْتَ وَالْحَيَاةَ...

...*He Who created death and life. (67:2)*

There are many verses in the Qur'an which consider God as the sole giver of life (*Muḥyi*) and death (*Mumīt*), and the giving and taking away of life is directly attributed to God and considered His exclusive prerogative. Also, in the verses where some of the prophets are described as bringing the dead to life, the Qur'an is careful to point out that such a thing could occur only with God's permission (*idhn*). An example is verse 3:49.

وَرَسُولًا إِلَىٰ بَنِي إِسْرَائِيلَ يَلِيَّ أَنِي قَدْ جِئْتُكُمْ بِبَيِّنَاتٍ مِّن رَّبِّكُمْ أَنِّي أَخْلُقُ لَكُمْ مِنَ الطِّينِ كَهَيْئَةِ الطَّيْرِ فَأَنْفُخُ فِيهِ فَيَكُونُ طَيْرًا بِإِذْنِ اللَّهِ وَأُبْرِئُ الْأَكْمَهَ وَالْأَبْرَصَ وَأُحْيِي الْمَوْتَىٰ بِإِذْنِ اللَّهِ...

...*a Messenger to the Children of Israel saying, "I have come to you with a sign from your Lord. I will create for you out of clay as the likeness of a bird, then I will breathe into it, and it will be a bird, by the leave of God. I will also heal the blind and the leper, and bring to life the dead, by the leave of God (3:49)*

On the whole, it is one of the points of difference between the theists (*ilāhiyyūn*) and the materialists that whereas the theists consider the origin and source of life and its Creator as transcending matter, the materialists consider matter itself to be the creator of life. However, something which is significant in this regard is that there is a subtle but enormous difference between the logic of the Qur'an and the usual logic of the theists regarding the thesis that God is the creator of life. This subtle difference is another of the miraculous characteristics of this noble scripture. We believe that if theistic thinkers become familiar with this logic, they can, once for all, release themselves from the harassment of the materialists and also liberate those poor creatures too from the clutches of their fancies and error.

* * *

Ordinarily, when (theistic) thinkers want to relate the matter of life to God and Divine will, they bring up the problem of origin of life on the earth and the question regarding the cause of the first emergence of life. Conclusive scientific evidence indicates that life had a definite beginning on the surface of the earth, that none of the various types of living creatures, including animals and plants, have always existed since eternity. This is because the earth itself has a limited age. Moreover, it

was not in its estimated life of several million years always fit for life.

We observe that each individual of a species is always born from another individual belonging to that species. Wheat comes from wheat, barley from barley, horse from horse, camel from camel, and man from man. It is not the practice of nature that an animal or plant, for instance, should come into existence from a mass of sheer dust. Always, the origin of a living creature is traceable to another living creature from which it separates in the form of a seed or sperm and grows in a suitable location.

Now, how did life start in the beginning and through what means? Does every one of these innumerable species end in an individual living creature that is the source of its particular species? If that is the case, how did that first creature come into existence, for nature seems to disallow the emergence of a living creature without a seed, sperm or something that should have separated from a living creature? Hence, (they point out), we must admit that an exception to the rule must have occurred. In other words, a miracle had occurred and the Divine hand had emerged from the hidden to create that first living creature.

Or is it possible that all these species have had a single source and root, and are members of a family of species? On the basis of this hypothesis, too, we confront the same problem. That is, even if we suppose all the species to have been derived from a single unicellular organism, the same question emerges as to how that first living creature came into existence. Isn't it the case that science has proved that a living creature cannot come into existence except from another living creature? Hence, was there an exception to the rule and a miracle, in that the will of God interfered to create instantaneously a living cell?

It is here that the adherents of the materialist outlook are forced to put forward certain hypotheses which are incredible to themselves. The theists, on the contrary, consider it as an evidence for the existence of a creator and state that a supernatural power did interfere to create the first living creature, and that it was the will of God that led to its emergence. Such was the view of Darwin, who was personally a theist. After having solved the problem of the branching out of species for himself, he arrives at one or several living creatures who first emerged on the earth's surface without having been reproduced by another living creature. He says regarding them: 'As for these, they came to life through the Divine breath.'

Crissy Morrisen, in the book "The Secret of Man's Creation", says in this regard:

Some say that the corpuscles of life escaped from one of the planets and after wandering in the atmosphere for ages and consecutive centuries descended on the earth's surface. Such a belief is not acceptable, because it is

impossible that they should have survived the space's absolute cold, and even if, supposedly, they could survive that danger, the cosmic rays that are scattered in space would have destroyed them. Even if they could pass through this stage, they must have come down accidentally in a very favourable point such as oceanic depths, where several conditions existed simultaneously and a suitable environment was created for them. After all these problems, the question still arises about the origin of life and as to how it did emerge in other planets. Today it has been proved for certain that no environment however favourable and conducive to life can create it. Similarly, no kind of chemical synthesis or combination can create a life corpuscle. The problem of life still remains one of the unsolved problems of science.

Some say that a miniscule particle of matter, of a microscopic size, coagulating with a large number of particles of atomic size, disturbed their equilibrium and assumed the form of life through their inclusion and exclusion. Nonetheless, no one has claimed until now that he has produced life with the means of chemical action and reaction.

By this discussion Crissy Morrisen intends to prove that the hand of a creator is involved in the origin and beginning of life, because it cannot be explained by material or natural causes. Concerning the origins of man and the great metamorphosis that resulted in the emergence of an intelligent creature with an extraordinary capacity for discursive thought and a power that could create the sciences, he says: "The emergence of man as an intelligent and thoughtful creature is too profound to be considered an effect of material changes in which a creator's hand was not involved." This was a sample of the mode of thought and argument of this group in relation to life and the Divine will. There is no need to cite more or less similar statements of others that do not differ essentially from the passage quoted.

As we know, till now man has not been able, despite all his efforts, to produce with scientific means the substance that makes up the living creatures. For instance, he has been unable to produce with chemical substances an artificial wheat grain possessing the properties of a living grain, which may grow into a plant when sown and develop ears. Nor has he been able to produce artificially the sperm of an animal or man with the capacity to develop into an animal or man. Nevertheless, scientists have not ceased in their efforts, and as yet it has not become conclusively clear for them whether they would be able to do so in the future or if this matter lies beyond man's scientific and technical capacities.

This topic too, which relates to the future has, like the problem of the origin of life, created a controversy throughout the world. Inevitably, that group of theists who, with their above-mentioned approach and logic, say that the creation of life is in the hands of God, are of the opinion that, in this question too, man's efforts in the field are bound to be fruitless. Since man has no control over life, which is

exclusively subject to the Divine will, man cannot create life anytime at his will with the scientific and technical means at his disposal. The prophets who raised the dead were able to do so with the leave of God. It is not possible for anyone to perform such an act without the permission of God. And should anyone want to do such a thing with the leave of God, it would mean that such a man has joined the ranks of the prophets and performed a miracle, and, of course, God does not carry out a miracle except at the hands of His prophets and *awliyā'*.

This group of theists consider man's present incapacity in this regard as the proof of their claim. When they observe that man has produced wheat grains that do not differ in any way in their chemical composition from natural wheat but are devoid of the characteristics of life, they point out that that is because life depends exclusively on the will of God and the creation of life requires God's permission, which He does not give to anyone except His apostles.

* * *

We said that the Noble Qur'an explicitly affirms that life lies in the hands of God and that it negates the role of anyone else in the creation of life. However, the Qur'an never refers to the matter of the origin of the human species or the beginning of life in order to affirm this point. On the contrary, it points as evidence to the present empirical order and considers the current, ongoing system of life as the system of creation, becoming and development. But when it wishes to describe God's creatorhood in relation to life, it does not make recourse to the first day. In this respect, it makes no distinction between the first day and the subsequent days. Rather, it points to the present orderly changes of life as the changes of creation. For instance, in the blessed *Sūrat al-Mu'minūn* it states:

وَلَقَدْ خَلَقْنَا الْإِنْسَانَ مِنْ سُلَالَةٍ مِنْ طِينٍ ﴿١٢﴾ ثُمَّ جَعَلْنَاهُ نُطْفَةً فِي قَرَارٍ مَكِينٍ ﴿١٣﴾ ثُمَّ خَلَقْنَا
النُّطْفَةَ عَلَقَةً فَخَلَقْنَا الْعَلَقَةَ مُضْغَةً فَخَلَقْنَا الْمُضْغَةَ عِظْمًا فَكَسَوْنَا الْعِظْمَ لَحْمًا ثُمَّ
أَنْشَأْنَاهُ خَلْقًا آخَرَ فَتَبَارَكَ اللَّهُ أَحْسَنُ الْخَالِقِينَ ﴿١٤﴾

We created man of an extraction of clay, then We set him, a drop, in a receptacle secure, then We created of the drop a clot, then We created of the clot a tissue, then We created of the tissue bones, then We garmented the bones in flesh; thereafter We produced him as another creature. So blessed be God, the fairest of creators! (23:12-14)

This noble verse mentions the systematic transformation and changes that occur in the embryo and considers these developments as a developing series of creations. In the *Sūrat Nūh*, it states:

Martyr Murtaḍā Muṭahhari

مَا لَكُمْ لَا تَرْجُونَ لِلَّهِ وَقَارًا ﴿١٣﴾ وَقَدْ خَلَقَكُمْ أَطْوَارًا ﴿١٤﴾

What ails you, that you look not for majesty in God, seeing He created you by stages? (71:13-14)

In the *Sūrat al-Zumar*, it states:

... يَخْلُقُكُمْ فِي بُطُونِ أُمَّهَاتِكُمْ خَلْقًا مِّنْ بَعْدِ خَلْقٍ فِي ظُلُمَاتٍ ثَلَاثٍ ...

He creates you in your mothers' wombs creation after creation in threefold shadows. (39:6)

In the *Sūrat al-Baqarah*, it is stated:

كَيْفَ تَكْفُرُونَ بِاللَّهِ وَكُنْتُمْ أَمْوَاتًا فَأَحْيَاكُمْ ثُمَّ يُمِيتُكُمْ ثُمَّ يُحْيِيكُمْ ثُمَّ
إِلَيْهِ تُرْجَعُونَ ﴿٢٨﴾

How do you disbelieve in God, seeing you were dead and He gave you life, then He shall make you dead, then He shall give you life, then unto Him you shall be returned. (2:28)

In the *Sūrat al-Hajj*, it states:

وَهُوَ الَّذِي أَحْيَاكُمْ ثُمَّ يُمِيتُكُمْ ثُمَّ يُحْيِيكُمْ ...

It is He Who gave you life, then He shall make you dead, then He shall give you life. (22:66)

There are many verses on this theme and all of them consider the present current order as the system of creation. The splitting of the grain and the seed under the ground, the growth of plants and herbs, the greening of the trees in spring-time — all of these are mentioned as part of the ever-new and perpetual Divine creativity. In no place does the Qur'ān consider the role of Divine creativity and will in the creation of life as relating exclusively to the first man or the first living creature that emerged upon the earth's surface, or consider only that organism or grain as the creature of God and the product of the Divine will.

The Noble Qur'ān also mentions the creation of Adam, but not for the purpose of affirming monotheism (*tawhīd*), or for the sake of the argument that since Adam was the first man, that proves that creation did occur and that 'God's hand emerged from its sleeve' to create human life. God's hand has never been concealed within a sleeve.

There is a strange point worthy of notice in this regard. The Qur'ān makes use of the story of Adam to convey many teachings of a moral

and educative character, such as: man's capacity for attaining to the station of God's vicegerency; his abundant capacity for knowledge; the angels' humility in front of knowledge; man's capacity for attaining superiority over the angels; the harm of greed, the harms of pride, the effects of sin in causing man's decline from the sublimest of stations; the role of penitence in man's salvation and his return to the station of proximity to God; warnings against the danger of misleading satanic insinuations, and the like. But it never relates the special and exceptional situation of Adam in his creation to the subject of *tawhīd* and theology, for the objective behind its mention of Adam's story was a moral and educative one. It was not intended as an evidence in favour of *tawhīd*. Moreover, it confines itself to mentioning Adam, and says nothing about how the life of the other animal species originated on the earth.

We have mentioned earlier the customary approach of the theists who when confronted with the absence of an explanation for the beginning of life in the first living creature say, "It was the Divine breath which brought it into existence." But the Qur'an considers the life of other human beings also to be the result of the Divine breath, in the same way as it considers the life of Adam as being due to the Divine breath.

In one place the Qur'an relates God as saying to angels regarding Adam:

وَإِذْ قَالَ رَبُّكَ لِلْمَلَائِكَةِ إِنِّي خَلِيقٌ بَشَرًا مِّنْ صَلْصَلٍ مِّنْ حَمَلٍ مَّسْنُونٍ ﴿٢٨﴾ فَإِذَا سَوَّيْتُهُ وَنَفَخْتُ فِيهِ مِن رُّوحِي فَقَعُوا لَهُ سَاجِدِينَ ﴿٢٩﴾

(And when thy Lord said to the angels, 'See, 'I am creating a mortal of clay of mud moulded.) When I have shaped him, and breathed My spirit in him, fall you down, bowing before him!'" (15:28-29)

In another place it says:

وَلَقَدْ خَلَقْنَاكُمْ ثُمَّ صَوَّرْنَاكُمْ ثُمَّ قُلْنَا لِلْمَلَائِكَةِ اسْجُدُوا لِآدَمَ...

We created you, then We shaped you, then We said to the angels: 'Bow yourselves to Adam.' (7:11)

It is clear that, in this verse, creation, the blowing of the Divine breath and the veneration of angels is ascribed to all human beings in general. The Qur'an states in the *Sūrat Alif lām sajdah*:

الَّذِي أَحْسَنَ كُلَّ شَيْءٍ خَلَقَهُ وَبَدَأَ خَلْقَ الْإِنسَانِ مِن طِينٍ ﴿٧﴾ ثُمَّ جَعَلَ نَسْلَهُ مِن سُلَالَةٍ مِّن

مَاءٍ مَّهِينٍ ۝ ثُمَّ سَوَّاهُ وَنَفَخَ فِيهِ مِنْ رُوحِهِ ۝ وَجَعَلَ لَكُمُ السَّمْعَ وَالْأَبْصَارَ وَالْأَفْئِدَةَ قَلِيلًا
مَا تَشْكُرُونَ ۝

...Who has created all things well and He originated the creation of man out of clay, then He fashioned his progeny of an extraction of mean water, then He shaped it, and breathed His spirit in it. And He appointed for you hearing and sight, and heart; little thanks you show. (32: 7-9)

As pointed out by the exegetes and as indicated by the context itself, the pronoun in *sawwāhu* (he shaped it) relates to *sulālah* (progeny), not to *al-'insān* (man).

* * *

Here it is essential to discover the reason why ordinarily the theists refer to the origin and beginnings of life when relating life to the Divine will, and to discover as well the reason why the Noble Qur'an has never taken this path in its effort to affirm monotheism, considering as it does life and biological developments absolutely the direct result of God's will, without making any distinction whatsoever between the beginning of life and its continuation.

The truth is that this difference arises from a more fundamental difference between the logic of the Qur'an and all other approaches. It lies in this that a group of theists ordinarily see God from the negative, not the positive, aspect of their knowledge. That is, when faced with a failure to overcome something unknown, they bring in God. They always seek God amid the mass of things unknown to them. That is, they always go after things whose natural causes are unknown to them. When in a certain case they encounter something whose natural cause is unknown to them, they immediately proclaim: "This was brought into existence by God's will." Inevitably, the more the number of things whose natural causes are unknown to them, the more their evidence of God's existence, and the more the number of things known and explained, the lesser evidence they seem to have for God's existence. For a group of theologians and adherents of monotheism, the supernatural realm is a storehouse of their unknowns. Whenever they fail to understand and know something and to discover its natural cause, they immediately relate it to the supernatural. They see the role of the supernatural as lying in, what appears to them as, exceptions to the natural order and violations of the course of nature. When they do not find a natural cause in a certain case, they substitute it with a supernatural one, unmindful of the fact that, firstly, the supernatural realm has its own order and law; secondly, they forget that if a cause takes the place of a material and natural cause, the substitute cause must itself be a material and natural cause on a par with matter and nature. It does not

remain a supranatural cause. The natural and supranatural exist on separate planes and not the same plane. Neither a natural cause can take the place of a supranatural cause, nor a supranatural cause the place of a natural cause.

The Holy Qur'an never relies for the evidence of the existence of the One God on cases where the system of natural law and order appears to have been violated. It relies in this regard on cases whose preliminaries and natural causes are known to the people, and it cites this order itself as a testimony to God's existence.

In the case of life, the logic of the Qur'an rests on the view that life is absolutely an emanation (*fayḍ*) higher and above the horizon of the physical and the sensible. Whatever the character of the laws involved in it, its source lies on a plane higher than that of sensible matter. Hence, the developments of life are the developments of creation. From the viewpoint of this logic, it makes no difference whether life was created instantaneously, in a single moment, or in the form of a gradual evolution, with one creation following another.

This logic rests on the principles that sensible matter is essentially devoid of life and that life is a light and emanation that must come from a higher source. Hence the laws of life, whatever form they may have, are the same as the laws of creation.

The difference between the existential degrees and planes of matter and life is a scientific and proved principle. Should we want to discover the supranatural source of life through the difference of existential planes between matter and life, it has to be on the basis of the positive aspects of our knowledge, not its negative aspects. Thereby we would be searching for God in what is known to us, not in what is unknown to us. Then we would not be compelled to bring down the supranatural from its plane as a substitute for a natural cause that we may fail to discover. Rather, we would assume that a natural cause is definitely involved though the frontiers of scientific knowledge have not yet reached it.

Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn (Mullā Ṣadrā), in the part of his book *al-'Asfār* concerning the soul, severely attacks Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī precisely for this reason. He says: "I am amazed at this man and the likes of him who, whenever they want to prove the doctrine of *tawḥīd* or some other religious doctrine, look for instances where the natural cause involved has not been recognized and where according to their belief the order of the world has been violated and laws have been broken."¹

* * *

From the body of verses cited above it can be inferred that creation is not an instantaneous process from the viewpoint of the Noble Qur'an. An animal or human being passes through various evolutionary stages and is always in the process of creation. Rather, basically, the world

is always in the process of creation and in the state of perpetual coming into being.

There is an opposite viewpoint which considers creation to be something instantaneous. Whenever its proponents want to discuss the world's creation, they go after 'the first moment' when the world was created and brought out from the cover of nothingness. They imagine that if they were not to make such an assumption, the world could no longer be regarded as a creation and as something that came into being. Similarly, whenever they want to discuss life as a Divine creation, they go after 'the first moment' when life began.

This kind of thinking is peculiarly a Jewish one:

وَقَالَتِ الْيَهُودُ يَدُ اللَّهِ مَغْلُولَةٌ غُلَّتْ أَيْدِيهِمْ وَلَعْنُوا إِمَّا قَالُوا...

The Jews have said: 'God's hand is fettered'. Fettered are their hands, and they are cursed for what they have said. (5:64)

That mode of thinking about the relation of life to the Divine will that always goes back to the beginning of life in order to relate it to God's will is the offspring of this Jewish outlook. This Jewish outlook gradually became prevalent and has spread everywhere. Regrettably, Islamic theologians too come under its influence. However, as pointed out, the idea of a 'first moment' is foreign to the teachings of the Noble Qur'an.

* * *

As indicated earlier, a problem that is discussed in our times is whether man would ever be capable of making a living organism. Would he, for instance, be able to make an artificial human spermatozoon which when deposited in the womb or some other suitable environment be able to develop into a complete human being? We said that a group of theists, whose mode of thinking concerning the relation of life to the Divine will always turns to cases of exception and the first beginnings of life, emphatically negates such a possibility. But on the basis of the teachings that we have received from the Qur'an, we may say, there is nothing that stands in the way of such a possibility. This matter needs elaboration and must be examined from two aspects.

Firstly, we must examine the amount of structural complexity of a living organism to see whether or not some day man would be able to discover all the secrets that go into the material composition of the parts of a cell and the natural law responsible for the emergence of a living cell. We cannot say anything from this aspect, for the issue lies outside the scope of our competence. This is what the experts in the field have said: "That which is more significant and higher than the creation of the earth, the planets of the solar system and the whole universe is the substance of the protoplasm."

Secondly, if man one day succeeds in discovering the law of creation of living organisms, in the same way as he has discovered the laws relating to other creatures, and discovers all the conditions and material constituents of living organisms, and succeeds in preparing substances exactly like those of living organisms, will that artificial being possess life? The answer is that it will definitely possess life, for it is impossible that the conditions for the existence of an emanation should exist completely without the realization of that emanation. Isn't it the case that the One, Self-Sufficient and absolutely perfect Divine Essence is the absolute source of all emanations? Isn't the Necessary Being-by-Essence, necessary in all aspects and ways?

Here the doubt may possibly arise in some minds that if such be the case, what will become of the principle that life is exclusively in the hands of God and that others have no role in the giving and taking away of life? We said earlier that this is something acknowledged by the Noble Qur'an, and the answer to this question becomes clear after a review of what has been said. Should man attain such a capacity one day, all that he would have done is to be able to prepare the conditions of life, not the ability to create life. Man cannot give life, but he can complete the capacity of matter for receiving life. In other words, man is the agent of motion (*fā'il-e ḥarakat*) not the source of being.

Should man succeed in doing such a thing, surely he would have made an important achievement from the viewpoint of scientific discovery. But from the viewpoint of a role in creation of life his role would be the same as that of the parents in reproduction and procreation of offspring or of the peasant in creating life in wheat grains. In none of these cases is man the creator of life. All that he accomplishes is to prepare the conditions of a substance for receiving life. The Noble Qur'an has described this matter in the best possible manner in the blessed *Sūrat al-Wāqī'ah*:

أَفَرَأَيْتُمْ مَا تَحْرُثُونَ ﴿٦٣﴾ أَأَنْتُمْ تَزْرَعُونَهُ أَمْ نَحْنُ الزَّارِعُونَ ﴿٦٤﴾

Have you considered the soil that you till? Do you yourselves make the plants grow or are We the one who makes them grow? (56:63-64)

أَفَرَأَيْتُمْ مَا تُمْنُونَ ﴿٥٨﴾ أَأَنْتُمْ تَخْلُقُونَهُ أَمْ نَحْنُ الْخَالِقُونَ ﴿٥٩﴾

Have you considered the seed that you spill? Do you yourselves create it, or are We the creators? (56:58-59)

As to the miracles performed by the prophets, their miraculous character lies in that man is incapable of performing such acts with his ordinary knowledge and power. The prophets too had not attained that

knowledge and capacity through the ordinary means. An extraordinary power and knowledge that accompanied them had raised them over the plane of physical nature, which made it possible for them to become a source of such a prodigious performance. Should man one day succeed in this achievement (i.e. 'artificial' creation of life), it would not mean that he has succeeded in doing something which the prophets did with the leave of God. The prophets used to give life and take it away with the leave of God. But if ordinary human beings some day attain such a capacity, that would be the capacity to prepare the conditions for life, in the same way as today they are capable of causing death by destroying the conditions of life, without possessing the capacity to take away life. The giving and taking of life will remain in God's hands even if man, through the discovery of the laws of emanation and withdrawal of life, prepares or destroys the capacities of a substance for possessing life.

* * *

We said that man cannot create life and that creation of life lies outside the scope of his capacities. The giving and withdrawal of life is in God's hands, although man can prepare the conditions necessary for life to exist.

This must not lead us to conclude that there is some kind of division of work: that there are some activities that pertain to man without pertaining to God and that there are other activities that pertain to God without pertaining to man. Our sole objective is delimitation of the scope of man's activity, not delimitation of God's acts. That which characterizes the Divine aspect is absolute freedom (*iṭlāq*) and absence of limits; the limits and bounds are from the side of the creature. This matter needs an elaborate treatment and I request the reader to refer to the fifth volume of *Uṣūl-e falsafeh wa rawish-e riyālism*.

NOTES:

1. See *Uṣūl-e falsafeh wa rawish-e riyālism*, iii, 220.

The Glorious Qur'ān as an Everlasting Miracle *Part 2*

by Sayyid Mujtabā Mūsawī Lārī

Translated from the Persian by Dr. Hāmid Algar

The Relationship of the Qur'ān to Modern Science:

The Qur'ān deserves to be evaluated from different points of view. One topic for examination is the artistic and verbal beauty of the Qur'ān and its style which is neither poetry nor prose. It does not have the characteristics of poetry, which may be thought as giving free flight to the imagination and indulging in poetic exaggeration, and equally it does not exemplify conventional prose, for it is imbued with a distinctive rhythm and melody that are the means for it to exert a powerful and unique spiritual attraction on all who make its acquaintance.

Then the intellectual and scientific content of the Qur'ān also calls for examination. It is true that it is not the aim of the Noble Qur'ān to uncover and expound scientific phenomena, to set forth all the natural motions and events that occur within the system of being in accordance with a specific set of laws, or to explain the properties and mode of operation of nature.

We should not expect the Qur'ān to discuss, in an organized manner, the various branches of science and to analyze the topics connected with each of those branches, or to solve the various problems that are encountered in different fields of research. The ability to experiment and to conduct scientific research has been made inherent in man's nature, and he can obtain the knowledge and the arts he needs in his life by means of thought and reflection. He makes valuable advances through his unceasing efforts to gain control over the forces of nature. Concerns such as these are alien to a book of moral edification.

The aim pursued by the Qur'ān is the training of man as a being conscious of his duties; it reinforces and accelerates his spiritual ascension, together with all of his qualities, toward a state of true loftiness and the dignity of which man is worthy.

The emergence of such a being requires a comprehensive reform of man, involving various changes such as the negation of false values and meaningless criteria deriving from the Age of Ignorance and the creation and fostering of a creative energetic spirit within him. The Qur'ān can thus be said to melt the spirits of men and pour them into a new mould, where they acquire a different, richer and more valuable form.

Although this may be said to be the principal aim of the Qur'ān, it summons man insistently, at the very same time, to reflect and to ponder, and to acquire a realistic view of the world; it guides him on to the path of thought, of teaching and learning.

In the very first verses of the Qur'ān to be revealed, we encounter praise and ennobling of the pen, of the acquisition of knowledge and of the study of nature as one of the principal sources of cognition; a profound awareness of nature may lead to the boundaries of the supranatural realm. Through the inspiration given by the Qur'ān and as a result of the scientific movement launched by Islam, a vital and active people blossomed into maturity, uniquely gifted with knowledge and virtue. The viewpoint of Islam on science represented a major development that prepared the way for subsequent developments.

Iqbal, the well-known Indo-Muslim thinker, says:

The birth of Islam, as I hope to be able presently to prove to your satisfaction, is the birth of inductive intellect.

The constant appeal to reason and experience in the Qur'ān, and the emphasis that it lays on Nature and History as sources of human knowledge, are all different aspects of the same idea of finality.

Inner experience is only one source of human knowledge. According to the Qur'ān, there are two other sources of knowledge — Nature and History; and it is in tapping these sources of knowledge that the spirit of Islam is seen at its best.¹

All forms of scientific endeavour are necessarily based on respect for the intellect and for the development of man and on freedom of thought from all kinds of fetters. The principal advances and developments in the natural sciences are all due to these premises.

Contemporary man is the heir to the knowledge and the researches of millions of thinkers and scholars who in their investigations discovered the foundations of the various sciences, and who gained access to some of the mysteries of being by means of their intellectual originality and creativity and their untiring efforts.

In the age when the Qur'ān was revealed — an age known as the Age of Ignorance — creative and innovative thought, marked by the comprehensive spirit of science, was non-existent, and no one was able to discern the mysteries of the vast, unknown universe.

When expounding the mysteries of creation, the Qur'ān is clear and explicit whenever clarity and explicitness are desirable. In cases where the perception of complex truths was difficult for the people of that age, the Qur'ān contents itself with making allusions, so that in the course of time as men's intellects and knowledge developed and the mysteries of nature came more clearly to the fore these matters would become more easily comprehensible.

* * *

In expounding the contents of the Qur'ān, Muslim scholars have continually put forward different views, as a result both of their own researches, investigations and reflections, and of the vast spiritual richness of the Qur'ān. Given this spiritual richness, it is inconceivable that such a great and infinite source of truth could have been produced by the talent and intellectual genius of man.

If something takes place by way of natural causation, it should be possible for people living either at the time of its first occurrence or in a later age to produce something similar. But if a phenomenon takes place outside the natural course of things, so that natural laws and criteria are suspended, people will be unable at all times to attempt its replication.

In the case of the Qur'ān, we see that all conventional criteria and principles were violated; the entirety of the book represents a transcendence of all norms.

We have said that the Qur'ān refers allusively to scientific truths, almost as secondary matters serving as a preliminary to the attainment of a greater and more glorious goal. We cannot therefore regard it as a technical work of specialization that discusses matters only from the viewpoint of science.

The Qur'ān refers to certain aspects of the life of man, the earth, the heavens and the plants, but it would be entirely wrong to imagine that it does so with the intention of elucidating the natural sciences or resolving dubious points connected with them. The purpose of the Qur'ān is rather to expound truths that are relevant to the spiritual life of man and the exaltation of his being and conducive to his attaining a life of true happiness.

Furthermore, when expounding scientific truths which might be couched in a different terminology in every age, the Qur'ān does not make use of technical terms. For although scientific truths and the laws governing all phenomena enjoy stability and immutability, and although they have always existed and always will exist, it is possible that scientific terminology might change from one age to the next and appear in a totally different form from before.

Discussions in the Qur'ān concerning the world of creation relate to a series of truths and principles that are not situated in the sensory

realm. Man can grasp these matters only by recourse to particular scientific instruments.

Dr. Bucaille, the French scientist, writes as follows:

A crucial fact is that the Qur'ān, while inviting us to cultivate science, itself contains many observations on natural phenomena and includes explanatory details which are seen to be in total agreement with modern scientific data. There is no equal to this in the Judeo-Christian Revelation.

These scientific considerations, which are very specific to the Qur'ān, greatly surprised me at first. Up until then, I had not thought it possible for one to find so many statements in a text compiled more than thirteen centuries ago referring to extremely diverse subjects and all of them totally in keeping with modern scientific knowledge.

A thorough linguistic knowledge is not in itself sufficient to understand these verses from the Qur'ān. What is needed along with this is a highly diversified knowledge of science. A study such as the present one embraces many disciplines and is in that sense encyclopedic. As the questions raised are discussed, the variety of scientific knowledge essential to the understanding of certain verses of the Qur'ān will become clear.

The Qur'ān does not aim at explaining certain laws governing the Universe, however; it has an absolutely basic religious objective. The descriptions of Divine Omnipotence are what principally incite man to reflect on the works of Creation. They are accompanied by references to facts accessible to human observation or to laws defined by God who presides over the organization of the universe both in the sciences of nature and as regards man. One part of these assertions is easily understood, but the meaning of the other can only be grasped if one has the essential scientific knowledge it requires.

The hypothesis advanced by those who see Muhammad as the author of the Qur'ān is quite untenable. How could a man, from being illiterate, become the most important author, in terms of literary merit, in the whole of Arabic literature? How could he then pronounce truths of a scientific nature that no other human being could possibly have developed at the time, and all this without once making the slightest error in his pronouncements on the subject?

The ideas in this study are developed from a purely scientific point of view. They lead to the conclusion that it is inconceivable for a human being living in the seventh century A.D. to have made statements in the Qur'ān on a great variety of subjects that do not belong to his period and for them to be in keeping with what was to be known only centuries later. For me, there can be no human explanation to the Qur'ān.²

Let us briefly examine a few examples of this kind of topic.

1. The best-known theory concerning the emergence of the solar system is the hypothesis of Laplace, some of whose views were later refuted by certain scientists as a result of further research.

Although there are other views concerning the factors that caused the emergence of the solar system, all scientific circles in the world today are agreed that the planets were originally composed of a mass of sodium gas: first the heavens and the earth were joined together as a single entity and then they separated from each other.

Centuries ago, the Qur'an alluded to this scientific theory. It says, when describing the creation of the heavens:

ثُمَّ اسْتَوَىٰ إِلَى السَّمَاءِ وَهِيَ دُخَانٌ ...

Then God turned to the creation of the heavens (the planets), when they were but a smoky substance. (41:11)

أَوَلَمْ يَرِ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا أَنَّ السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضَ كَانَتَا نَارًا تَوْاحٍ فَفَنَقْنَهُمَا جَعَلْنَا مِنَ الْمَاءِ كُلَّ

شَيْءٍ حَيٍّ أَفَلَا يُؤْمِنُونَ ﴿٢٠﴾

Do the unbelievers not see that the heavens and the earth were joined together before We separated them, and that We brought all living things into existence from water? Why do they still not believe in God? (21:30)

The well-known scientist Gamof says:

As we know, the sun came into being out of cumulative gases, and the sun then emitted a series of gases from itself that came into being after the separation from it of the planets. How did this burning mass of planetary matter come into being and what forces were involved in its origination? Who assembled the materials needed for their construction?

These are questions which confront us with respect to the moon as well as every other planet in the solar system; they form the basis of all cosmological theories and are riddles that have preoccupied astronomers for centuries.³

James Jeans an English scientist writes:

Millions of centuries ago, a planet was passing in the vicinity of the sun and created an awesome tidal effect, so that matter separated from the sun in the shape of a long cigarette. Then this matter was divided: the weightier portion of the cigarette became the great planets, and the lighter portions brought the lesser planets into being.⁴

The words used by the Qur'an in the verse quoted above, attributing the origin of the heavens to smoke (=gas), indicate the profundity with which this divine book treats matters. All scientists are of the opinion that sodium is a gas mixed with ferrous materials, and the word smoke/gas may be taken to include both gas and iron. The word "smoke" is, then, the most scientific expression that might be employed in the context.

Thus the Qur'an unveils one of the great mysteries of nature: the separation of the planets from a huge object and then their separation from each other. Since at the time of the revelation of the Qur'an the general level of knowledge and science was extremely low, does this not

constitute a proof of the heavenly nature of the Qur'an?

Does not the exposition of these matters by the Qur'an, in a manner conforming to quite recent discoveries made by astronomers, prove that the voice speaking in the Qur'an belongs to one who is acquainted with all the mysteries and truths of existence?

Dr. Bucaille makes the following open admission:

At the earliest time it can provide us with, modern science has every reason to maintain that the Universe was formed of a gaseous mass principally composed of hydrogen and a certain amount of helium that was slowly rotating. This nebula subsequently split up into multiple fragments with very large dimensions and masses, so large indeed, that specialists in astrophysics are able to estimate their mass from 1 to 100 billion times the present mass of the Sun (the latter represents a mass that is over 300,000 times that of the Earth). These figures give an idea of the large size of the fragments of primary gaseous mass that were to give birth to the galaxies.

It must be noted however, that the formation of the heavenly bodies and the Earth, as explained in verses 9 to 12, sura 41... required two phases. If we take the Sun and its subproduct the Earth as an example (the only one accessible to us), science informs us that their formation occurred by a process of condensation of the primary nebula and then their separation. This is exactly what the Qur'an expresses very clearly when it refers to the processes that produced a fusion and subsequent separation starting from a celestial 'smoke'. Hence there is complete correspondence between the facts of the Qur'an and the facts of science.

Such statements in the Qur'an concerning the Creation, which appeared nearly fourteen centuries ago, obviously do not lend themselves to a human explanation.

* * *

2. One of the subtlest problems in science concerns the expansion of the universe, its tendency constantly to extend its boundaries. This was something completely unknown to man until the last century. This mystery is, however, mentioned by the Qur'an in the following terms, which again bear witness to its remarkable profundity when discussing such matters:

وَالسَّمَاءَ بَنَيْنَاهَا بِأَيْدٍ وَإِنَّا لَمُوسِعُونَ ﴿٤٧﴾

We created the heavens with Our strength and power, and constantly expand them. (51:47)

This verse speaks in categorical terms of the expansion of the universe, its constellations and galaxies, although not more than a century has passed since the discovery of the expansion of the universe.

The well-known scholar Baresht (?) writes as follows:

Astronomers gradually became aware that certain regular motions were under-

way in the most distant galaxies that were barely visible to their telescopes. Those distant galaxies appear to be moving away both from the solar system and from each other.

The regular flight of these galaxies, the closest of which is five hundred light-years away from us, is completely different from the placid motion of attraction exerted by bodies close to us. Those distant motions may have an effect on the curvature of the universe. The universe is not, then, in a state of immobility and balance; it is more like a soap bubble or a bellows in its constant expansion.⁶

Another scholar, John Pfeffer, writes as follows:

The universe is expanding. Wherever we look, we see the galaxies becoming more distant from each other; the distance between them is constantly growing. The most distant galaxies are becoming ever more removed from us, at the greatest conceivable speed. For example, while you have been reading this sentence, some of the galaxies will have become 250,000 miles farther removed from the earth.

The parts of the universe are becoming farther removed from each other. It is as if a bullet had exploded in the air, the galaxies corresponding to the particles of the bullet as they hasten farther and farther apart. The theory of the big bang is based on precisely such a comparison.

According to this theory, there was a time when all the matter in the universe was gathered together into a single dense mass. It was a substance suspended in space, with a volume hundreds of times greater than the sun, and resembled a bomb ready to explode. Then, about ten billion years ago, the explosion took place with a blinding flash, and the huge ball of matter became scattered in space. Its components are still being scattered forth in every direction, in a process of unceasing expansion — gases, rays, galaxies.⁷

The Glorious Qur'an draws men's attention to the splendour inherent in the ordering of the universe and the complexity of its creation, and it reminds them that the signs of the Creator's workmanship are so numerous in the universe that if man reflects aright he will inevitably come to believe in the eternal power of God, the source of all being. Then he will bow humbly before His magnificence.

We read in *Sūrah Āl 'Imrān*:

إِنَّ فِي خَلْقِ السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ وَاخْتِلَافِ اللَّيْلِ وَالنَّهَارِ لَآيَاتٍ لِّأُولِي الْأَلْبَابِ ﴿١١٠﴾
الَّذِينَ يَذْكُرُونَ اللَّهَ قِيَمًا وَقُعُودًا وَعَلَىٰ جُنُوبِهِمْ وَيَتَفَكَّرُونَ فِي خَلْقِ السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ رَبَّنَا
مَا خَلَقْتَ هَذَا بَطْلًا سُبْحَانَكَ فَقِنَا عَذَابَ النَّارِ ﴿١١١﴾

Certainly in the creation of the heavens and earth and in the alternation of night and day there are clear signs for the intelligent, those who at all times make remembrance of God and constantly reflect on the creation of the heavens and the earth and say: 'O Creator! You have not created this expanse of splendour and magnificence in vain; You are pure and transcendent, so

preserve us through Your favour from the torment of the fire.' (3:190—191)

* * *

3. The Qur'ān describes as follows the factor that keeps each of the heavenly bodies on its appointed course:

اللَّهُ الَّذِي رَفَعَ السَّمَوَاتِ بِضُرِّ عَمَدٍ تَرَوْنَهَا ثُمَّ أَسْتَوَىٰ عَلَى الْعَرْشِ وَسَخَّرَ الشَّمْسَ وَالْقَمَرَ كُلٌّ يَجْرِي لِأَجَلٍ مُّسَمًّى يُدَبِّرُ الْأُمُورَ يُفَصِّلُ الْآيَاتِ لَعَلَّكُمْ بِلِقَاءِ رَبِّكُمْ تُوقِنُونَ ﴿١٣﴾

God it is Who raised up the heavenly bodies on invisible pillars and then took repose on the Throne. He has subjected the sun and the moon to you, and each of them continues to rotate for a fixed time. Thus God regulates all the affairs of the universe and He explains in detail His signs, so that you may believe with certainty in the Day of Resurrection and the meeting with your Lord. (13:2)

We know that before the time of Newton, that great scientific personality, no one was aware of the force of gravity. Although Newton made many discoveries in different branches of science, he is world-famous above all for the discovery of gravity. His achievement has been described as follows:

Newton proved that the falling of objects to earth, the rotation of the moon and Venus, the motions of the planets and other instances of attraction are all subject to a single law, the law of universal gravity.⁸

One of the most difficult problems Newton encountered was how to prove that the gravitational force exerted by a globular body is the same as it would be if we were to regard the whole of the body as concentrated in its centre. As long as this remained unproven, the theory of universal gravitation would represent a kind of inspiration, not based on precise calculations or mathematical proofs.

In the verse quoted above, the fixing of the heavenly bodies in space and their rotation in a fixed course are attributed to a factor designated as "invisible pillars." Are these unseen pillars, which prevent the planets from colliding with each other or falling, anything other than the mysterious and invisible force of universal gravity, a law to which the Creator of the universe has subjected all of the heavenly bodies?

* * *

4. In conveying this scientific truth, the Qur'ān has used an expression that is comprehensible for the men of all ages.

The Eighth Imam, upon whom be peace, spoke as follows to one of his companions concerning this Qur'ānic expression:

Did God not say in the Qur'an, "without a pillar that you may see"?

The companion answered, "yes," whereupon the Imam added, "In that case there is a pillar, but it cannot be seen."⁹

In the course of refuting the materialist view that man is destined to utter annihilation, the Qur'an describes the evolutionary movement of the universe by saying:

أَفَلَا يَنْظُرُونَ إِلَى السَّمَاءِ فَوْقَهُمْ كَيْفَ بَنَيْنَاهَا وَزَيَّنَّاهَا وَمَا لَهَا مِنْ فُرُوجٍ ﴿٦﴾

أَفَعِينَا بِالْخَلْقِ الْأَوَّلِ بَلْ هُمْ فِي لَبْسٍ مِنْ خَلْقٍ جَدِيدٍ ﴿١٥﴾

Do the deniers not look at the heavens above them and see how We have placed them on a firm foundation, adorned them with the stars, and made them immune to all flaws?

Were We tired by their first creation (so that We might experience difficulty in creating them anew)? They (the unbelievers) are themselves clothed every instant in a new garment of creation. (50: 6,15)

In other words, those who because of their shortsightedness and narrowness of vision imagined the world to be stagnant and stationary are in error, because they are themselves in a state of constant motion, together with the entire universe. The motion of man is connected to the general motion of the universe, and after death too his spiritual motion will continue, through the appearance of the Promised Day and the fulfilment of the divine promise; his motion will never be cut short by death.

In expounding this precise scientific truth, the Qur'an does not restrict itself to the dry philosophical aspects of the matter. By entrusting the discussion of the matter to the Prophet, a person who had never studied, who had grown up in a spiritually dark environment with no philosophical tradition, the Qur'an simultaneously puts forward a truth that is of vital significance to man. That truth is the immortality of the spirit, the existence of resurrection and judgement, with all that implies for the responsibilities of man while still alive.

The Qur'an also refers to the internal motion of the earth when it says:

تَوَدَّى الْجِبَالُ تَحْسَبُهَا جَامِدَةً وَهِيَ تَمُرُّ مَرَّ السَّحَابِ صُنِعَ اللَّهُ الَّذِي أَنْقَضَ كُلَّ شَيْءٍ إِنَّهُ خَيْرٌ لِمَا

تَفْعَلُونَ ﴿٨٨﴾

You look at the mountains and imagine them to be solid and stable. But they are engaged in inward motion and growth, just like the clouds. This inward motion is of God's creation and making: He has fashioned all things in a

correct way, and He is well aware of your conduct and deeds. (27:88)

This verse calls attention to the inward dynamic motion of mountains. It says, in effect: Although you imagine the mountains to be solid and without inward movement and growth, this is not the case. The mountains that seem stagnant and stationary to you are inwardly growing and changing, just like the clouds the motion of which is visible to you. The firm structure and development of all things are ensured by that same motion, the law of motion which is of God's creation and making. It prevails over all the particles and phenomena of nature, and it ensures their order and stability.

The choice of this particular wording in the Qur'an goes back, no doubt, to the fact that mountains are a symbol of bulkiness and stability, and it enables the verse to lay particular stress on the ability of the Creator to do all things.

* * *

5. Not more than three centuries have passed since Galileo presented to the world of science the theory of the motion of the earth, in a clear fashion and accompanied by adequate proof. In an age not too far removed from us, when geocentricity and the immobility of the earth were regarded as indubitable scientific principles, his theory met with a wave of furious opposition. By contrast, in the dark atmosphere of the Age of Ignorance, the Qur'an had already referred to certain aspects of the earth's motion and the mysterious qualities of mountains. This was an exposition of complex scientific truths, taking place already in that age. Thus the Qur'an says:

الَّذِي جَعَلَ الْأَرْضَ مَهْدًا ۖ وَالْجِبَالَ أَوْتَادًا ﴿٧﴾

Have We not made the earth as a cradle and the mountains like pegs? (78:6—7)

... وَالْقَى فِي الْأَرْضِ رَوًى أَنْ تَمِيدَ بِكُمْ ...

God has placed mountains on the earth to prevent its uneven motion. (31:10)

The Qur'an compares the earth to a cradle because a cradle is a place of rest that is engaged in motion. In another verse, a different comparison is offered:

هُوَ الَّذِي جَعَلَ لَكُمْ الْأَرْضَ ذُلُولًا فَامشُوا فِي مَنَاكِبِهَا ...

I have created the earth for you like a tamed camel that with its gentle and smooth motion does not vex its rider. (67:15)

The Qur'an referred to the motion of the earth at a time when the Ptolemaic theory of geocentricity and the immobility of the earth had been ruling for centuries over the minds of the learned. It was the heavenly book of Islam that refuted that fantastic view of the world, almost a thousand years before Galileo.

In one of the verses just quoted, the mountains have been subtly and delicately compared to pegs that hold the earth in place and prevent it from becoming scattered. This is because the crust of the earth is covered with a soft layer of soil and sand, and were the earth to be deprived of firm and heavy mountains, it would undoubtedly lose its stability because of the pull exerted by the moon. It would fall prey to convulsion and shaking, and destructive tides would overwhelm the globe and destroy it.

The mountains serve as highly resistant pegs that play an essential role in preserving the earth from dissolution and destruction. The slight tremblings and convulsions that sometimes occur are not on a scale to deprive human life of all tranquillity and stability.

Furthermore, the massive bulk of great mountains is able to neutralize and control, to a considerable extent, the powerful waves of molten materials and buried gases that emanate from within the earth. Were the mountains not to rear up their heads over our globe, the surface of the earth would be in constant ferment because of the pressure of molten substances, and its whole nature would change.

Therefore, bearing in mind that mountains are like pegs implanted in the earth, we realize that our tranquil and undisturbed existence on the globe is ensured precisely by the mountains.

The Qur'an similarly alludes to the earth being globular in shape, in the following verse:

فَلَا أُقْسِمُ بِرَبِّ الْمَشَارِقِ وَالْمَغْرِبِ...

I swear by the Lord of the easts and the wests. (70:40)

It is obvious that a multiplicity of easts and wests implies the globularity of the earth, because as the earth rotates, there will be numerous easts and wests — points at which the sun rises and sets. Every point on the globe is, at some moment, the east for a certain group of people, and the west for another group of people.

Do truths such as these not serve to make us better acquainted with the profound truths this heavenly book contains?

* * *

6. The Qur'an describes the factors which give rise to milk in animals in a way that is entirely compatible with the data of modern science. This is what God's book has to say:

وَإِنَّ لَكُمْ فِي الْأَنْعَامِ لَعِبْرَةً لَتُنْفِكُنَّ مِمَّا فِي بُطُونِهِمْ مِنْ بَيْنِ فَرْثٍ وَدَمٍ لَنَا خَالِصًا يَأْتِي الشَّرْبَ مِنْ

There is in truth for you a lesson in your animals and flocks. We give you to drink a pure milk derived from that which is contained in their bodies, from the merging of what is held in their intestines with blood. The drinking of that is then made easy for those who would drink it. (16:66)

Dr. Bucaille writes in his book:

From a scientific point of view, physiological notions must be called upon to grasp the meaning of this verse.

The substances that ensure the general nutrition of the body come from chemical transformations which occur along the length of the digestive tract. These substances come from the contents of the intestine. On arrival in the intestine at the appropriate stage of chemical transformation, they pass through its wall and towards the systemic circulation. This passage is effected in two ways: either directly, by what are called the 'lymphatic vessels', or indirectly, by the portal circulation. This conducts them first to the liver, where they undergo alterations, and from here they then emerge to join the systemic circulation. In this way everything passes through the bloodstream.

The constituents of milk are secreted by the mammary glands. These are nourished, as it were, by the product of food digestion brought to them via the bloodstream. Blood therefore plays the role of collector and conductor of what has been extracted from food, and it brings nutrition to the mammary glands, the producers of milk, as it does to any other organ.

Here the initial process which sets everything else in motion is the bringing together of the contents of the intestine and blood at the level of the intestinal wall itself. This very precise concept is the result of the discoveries made in the chemistry and physiology of the digestive system. It was totally unknown at the time of the Prophet Muhammad and has been understood only in recent times. The discovery of the circulation of the blood, was made by Harvey roughly ten centuries after the Qur'anic Revelation.

I consider that the existence in the Qur'an of the verse referring to these concepts can have no human explanation on account of the period in which they were formulated.¹⁰

* * *

7. It is only recently that researchers have become aware of fertilization in plants and learned that every living being comes into existence as the result of the merging of a male and a female cell.

Before the invention of the microscope, which gave man access to the world of atoms and enabled him to study microscopic beings, no one was aware of the action and reaction among male and female cells, certainly not in the Age of Ignorance, and indeed not until the codification of classical botany.

The numerous experiments and investigations by scientists in this field have proven that reproduction is impossible without fertilization, except in certain plants where reproduction takes place by way of the division of cells.

The first person to analyze this scientific fact in a clear and straightforward fashion was the well-known Swedish scientist, Charles Leine (1707—1787).

Scientific information shows that reproduction among plants generally takes place through fertilization with microscopic particles, and the agents of fertilization are insects, flies, bees and so forth, together with the most effective and widespread agent of all — the wind, which lifts up nearly weightless particles and scatters them in the air.

In verses that are totally free of ambiguity, the Noble Qur'an sets forth clearly the principle of gender in the vegetable world, together with the existence of male and female cells in plants, something which was completely unknown until quite recently. It says, with the utmost eloquence:

أَوَلَمْ يَرَوْا إِلَى الْأَرْضِ كَمَا أَنْبَتْنَا فِيهَا مِنْ كُلِّ زَوْجٍ كَرِيمٍ ﴿٧﴾

Do they not look at the earth, where We have created the plants in pairs?
(26:7)

... وَأَنْزَلَ مِنَ السَّمَاءِ مَاءً فَأَخْرَجْنَا بِهِ أَزْوَاجًا مِنْ نَبَاتٍ شَتَّى ﴿٥٣﴾

We sent down water from the heavens, and made to grow thereby pairs of different species of plants. (20:53)

سُبْحَانَ الَّذِي خَلَقَ الْأَزْوَاجَ كُلَّهَا مِمَّا تُنْبِتُ الْأَرْضُ وَمِنْ أَنْفُسِهِمْ وَمِمَّا لَا يَعْلَمُونَ ﴿٣٦﴾

Pure and transcendent is the God who created all contingent things in pairs — plants, human beings, and other forms of creation unknown to you. (36:36)

After setting forth the principle of two genders in man, the animals and the plant world, the Qur'an enlarges the scope of the principle to the degree of embracing all parts of existence. It is a general rule and law to which nothing that can be called existent forms an exception. The Qur'an says:

وَمِنْ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ خَلَقْنَا زَوْجَيْنِ لَعَلَّكُمْ تَذَكَّرُونَ ﴿١٩﴾

We have created of all things their pair, in order that you may remember God. (51:49)

Given the profound knowledge at man's disposal in the present age, he has come to realize that all substances in the world can be reduced, in the final analysis, to their smallest structural unit, the atom. This infinitely small unit itself comprises a duality: that of positive and

negative electricity.

Although these two forces are identical with respect to their existential nature, one of them carries a positive electrical charge and the other a negative one. It is this opposition that attracts them to each other.

Attraction toward the opposite pole is inherent in both of them, and once the mutual attraction is exerted, a third entity comes into being — a force which is neutral in its electrical charge.

It is very remarkable that the pairing of all things should have been mentioned in the Qur'ān, which was, after all, revealed in an environment dominated by ignorance. The attraction that exists between two bodies each bearing a different kind of electric charge makes entirely appropriate the use of the word "pair," for it is entirely similar to the attraction between the two opposite genders. "Pair" was an extremely effective way of describing this scientific reality, given the limited thoughts of men at that time and even later, for it is not until recently that clear and definite information about the physical nature of this matter became available.

So if we generalize the phenomenon of the pair to include the inner structure of atoms, we may conclude that the material structure of the world is indeed based on pairing, and that nothing in the material universe is exempt from the operation of this comprehensive principle.

Paul Ruybruck, an English scholar, says:

Each particle of matter is confronted by an opposing particle, as was proven in 1955. Using an atom breaker, physicists were able to discover counter-protons, counter neutrons, and anti-matter. They became convinced that the structure of the world of anti-matter corresponds exactly to that of the world of matter, and that the two always accompany each other.¹¹

As Max Planck, another twentieth century scientist, puts it: Every material body is compounded of electrons and protons.¹²

One of the findings of the natural and chemical sciences, proven by laboratory experiments, is that the roots of plants increase the volume of the earth.

When water penetrates into bubbles inside the earth, the air that had accumulated there is driven further inside the earth, so that the depths of the earth begin to seethe in agitation.

When rainfall penetrates the depths of the earth the roots of plants begin to move and advance through the soil. It is obvious that numerous smaller and more delicate roots branch forth from the original roots, moving out in every direction. For example, the capillary roots of maize, each one square centimetre thick, may reach a total of 4200.

Scientists are of the opinion that roots derive 95% of their needs from the air and only 5% from the soil. Hence the amount of space occupied in the earth by roots is considerably expanded in its volume, so that the earth as a whole swells and becomes more capacious as a result of the growth of roots within it.

Let us look now at verse 5 of *Sūrat al-Hajj* in the Noble Qur'an:

وتَرَى الْأَرْضَ هَامِدَةً فَإِذَا أَنْزَلْنَا عَلَيْهَا الْمَاءَ اهْتَزَّتْ وَرَبَتْ وَأَنْبَتَتْ مِنْ كُلِّ زَوْجٍ بَهِيجٍ ﴿٥﴾

Look at the earth: first it is dry and devoid of vegetation, then We send rain down upon it, and it begins to stir and to swell, and all kinds of beautiful plants start growing in it. (22:5)

This forms another example of the agreement of the Qur'an with modern science.

* * *

8. The Qur'an also mentions the role and operation of another factor in the bringing of things to fruition, the wind.

وَأَرْسَلْنَا الرِّيحَ لَوَاقِحَ فَأَنْزَلْنَا مِنَ السَّمَاءِ مَاءً ...

We have sent the winds as a means of insemination and impregnation, and then sent down rain from the heavens. (15:22)

In this verse, the Qur'an unveils another great mystery of creation, the fundamental role played by the wind in the fertilization of clouds.

Using complex instruments and electrical means, civilized man has made great progress in recent years resulting in the establishment of the discipline known as meteorology. Specialists in this discipline point out the following:

It must be recognized that the obtaining of two conditions — the existence of vapour in the air and its distillation to the point of saturating the air — is not enough to cause the formation of clouds and the occurrence of rainfall. A third condition is also necessary, which we may call fertilization.

Science confirms that wind is also a contributory factor in the fertilization of plants.

In the appearance of natural phenomena, a kind of friction and delay always exists. For example, if water is pure and stationary, it is possible that its temperature be reduced to below zero (at low pressures) without its solidifying and that it not begin to boil (under high pressures) until its temperature is much higher than 100°. Also, vapour may not

begin to condense even though it has reached a point of saturation, and once it has condensed, its globulets may be so minute that they do not fall, remaining instead suspended in the air so that no rainfall occurs. It is necessary for the wind to provide invisible particles of salt, picked up from the surface of the oceans, that then form nuclei of attraction and precipitation. More importantly, the moisture in the air has to accumulate around the crystallized snowflakes that have formed at higher altitudes and are then scattered by the wind.

Finally, the minute initial drops of rain merge with each other as a result of the collision and intermingling of the winds until they gradually grow in size and fall through cloud masses as a result of their relatively great weight.

As a result of their friction with features of the earth and with bodies suspended in the air, cloud masses acquire opposing electrical forces. The release of this electricity is accompanied by intense friction of the particles in the air and the formation of nitrogen. This process contributes considerably to the merging and growing of raindrops and the occurrence of rainfall.

In short, the formation and strengthening of clouds, and the occurrence of rainfall and snow, cannot take place without a form of fertilization, accomplished through the intervention of an outside factor.

Artificial rainfall likewise depends on artificial fertilization, carried out in the following way: an airplane scatters "water dust" (pulverized and crystallized ice) in air that has the potentiality of cloud formation but is in a state of delayed equilibrium.

Discussing the rich treasury of knowledge contained in the Qur'an, Dr. Bucaille writes:

Whereas monumental errors are to be found in the Bible, I could not find a single error in the Qur'an. I had to stop and ask myself: if a man was the author of the Qur'an, how could he have written facts in the Seventh century A.D. that today are shown to be in keeping with modern scientific knowledge? There was absolutely no doubt about it: the text of the Qur'an we have today is most definitely a text of the period, if I may be allowed to put it in these terms (in the next chapter of the present section of the book I shall be dealing with this problem). What human explanation can there be for this observation? In my opinion there is no explanation; there is no special reason why an inhabitant of the Arabian Peninsula should, at a time when King Dagobert was reigning in France (629-639 A.D.), have had scientific knowledge on certain subjects that was ten centuries ahead of our own.¹³

To be continued — inshā' Allāh

NOTES:

1. Allama Muhammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in*

Islam, ed. M. Saeed Sheikh, Lahore, 1986, pp. 101–102.

2. Bucaille, *The Bible, Qur'ān and Science*, pp. 115–116, 119, 121–122, 125.

3. *Sarguzasht-e zamīn*, p. 43.

4. *Nujūm bi-teliskūp*, p. 83.

5. Bucaille, *op. cit.*, pp. 143–144, 147, 150.

6. *Jahān wa Einstein*, p. 112.

7. *Az kahkashān tā insān*, p. 47.

8. *Dānishmandān-e buzurg-e jahān-e 'ilm*, 49.

9. *Tafsīr al-burhān*, vol. ii, p. 278.

10. Bucaille, *op. cit.*, pp. 196–197.

11. *Majalleh-ye Dānishmand*, vol. ix, no. 4.

12. *Taṣwīr-e jahān dar fizīk-e jadīd*, p. 95.

13. Bucaille, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ
وَمَا تُنْفِقُوا مِنْ شَيْءٍ فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ يُوَفَّ إِلَيْكُمْ وَأَنْتُمْ لَا تُظْلَمُونَ

In the Name of Allah, the Compassionate the Merciful

... And whatsoever ye spend in the way of Allah, it will be repaid to you in full and ye will not be wronged. (8:60)

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Forty Ḥadīth: An Exposition Part 23

by Imām Rūḥullāh al-Mūsawī al-Khumaynī – quddisa sirruh

Translated from the Persian by 'Alī Qulī Qarā'i

TWENTY-SECOND ḤADĪTH: On the Aversion for Death:

بِالسَّنَدِ الْمَتَّصِلِ إِلَى رُكْنِ الْإِسْلَامِ وَثِقَتِهِ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ يَعْقُوبَ الْكَلَيْنِيِّ، عَنْ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ
يَحْيَى، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدٍ، عَنْ بَعْضِ أَصْحَابِهِ، عَنِ الْحَسَنِ بْنِ عَلِيِّ بْنِ أَبِي عَثْمَانَ، عَنْ
وَاصِلٍ، عَنِ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ: «جَاءَ رَجُلٌ إِلَى أَبِي ذَرٍّ فَقَالَ: يَا أَبَا ذَرٍّ مَا لَنَا
نَكْرَهُ الْمَوْتَ؟ فَقَالَ: لِأَنَّكُمْ عَمَّرْتُمُ الدُّنْيَا وَأَخْرَجْتُمُ الْآخِرَةَ، فَتَكْرَهُونَ أَنْ تُنْقَلُوا
مِنْ عَمْرَانٍ إِلَى خَرَابٍ، فَقَالَ لَهُ: فَكَيْفَ تَرَى قَدْ وَمَنَا عَلَى اللَّهِ؟ فَقَالَ: أَمَا الْمُحْسِنُ
مِنْكُمْ فَكَالْغَائِبِ يَتَقَدَّمُ عَلَى أَهْلِهِ؛ وَأَمَا الْمُسِيءُ مِنْكُمْ فَكَالْآبِقِ يُرَدُّ عَلَى مَوْلَاهُ.
قَالَ: فَكَيْفَ تَرَى حَالَنَا عِنْدَ اللَّهِ؟ قَالَ: إِعْرِضُوا أَعْمَالَكُمْ عَلَى الْكِتَابِ، إِنَّ اللَّهَ
يَقُولُ: «إِنَّ الْأَبْرَارَ لَفِي نَعِيمٍ * وَإِنَّ الْفُجَّارَ لَفِي جَحِيمٍ» قَالَ: فَقَالَ الرَّجُلُ: فَأَيْنَ
رَحْمَةُ اللَّهِ؟ قَالَ: رَحْمَةُ اللَّهِ قَرِيبٌ مِنَ الْمُحْسِنِينَ.»

قال أبو عبد الله عليه السلام: «وَكَتَبَ رَجُلٌ إِلَى أَبِي ذَرٍّ رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ: - يَا أَبَا ذَرٍّ:
أظرفني بشيءٍ من العلم. فَكَتَبَ إِلَيْهِ: إِنَّ الْعِلْمَ كَثِيرٌ وَلَكِنْ إِنْ قَدَرْتَ أَنْ لَا تُسِيءَ
إِلَى مَنْ تُحِبُّهُ فَأَفْعَلْ. فَقَالَ لَهُ الرَّجُلُ: وَهَلْ رَأَيْتَ أَحَدًا يُسِيءُ إِلَى مَنْ يُحِبُّهُ؟ فَقَالَ
لَهُ: نَعَمْ، نَفْسُكَ أَحَبُّ الْأَنْفُسِ إِلَيْكَ فَإِذَا أَنْتَ عَصَيْتَ اللَّهَ فَقَدْ أَسَأْتَ إِلَيْهَا.»

With my continuous *sanad* reaching up to the pillar of Islam and its reliable authority, Muḥammad ibn Ya'qūb al-Kulaynī, from Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad, from some of his teachers, from al-Ḥasan ibn 'Alī ibn Abī 'Uthmān, from Wāsil, from 'Abd Allāh ibn Sinān, from Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) that he said: "A man came to Abū Dharr and said to him, 'O Abū Dharr what is wrong with us that we abhor death?' Abū Dharr replied, 'That is because you have built and cultivated your world and ruined your Hereafter. So you hate to be moved from prosperity towards desolation.' He was asked, 'How do you see our entry into God's presence?' Abū Dharr

replied, 'As to the good-doer amongst you, he is like someone returning to his family after a (long) absence. As to the evil-doer amongst you, he is like an absconding slave being returned to his master.' He was asked, 'How do you see our situation before God?' Abū Dharr replied, 'Evaluate your deeds in view of the Qur'ānic criterion. Verily God says, "Surely the pious shall be in bliss, and the profane shall be in a fiery furnace" ' (82:12,13). The Imam (A) added: "Thereat the man said, 'Then where is the mercy of God?' Abū Dharr replied, 'The mercy of God is near to the good-doers.' "

Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) continued: "A man wrote to Abū Dharr, may God be pleased with him: 'O Abū Dharr, teach me something new of knowledge.' Abū Dharr wrote to him, 'Knowledge is vast. However, if you can abstain from wronging someone that you love, do so.' The man asked him, 'Have you seen anyone wrong someone that he loves?!' Abū Dharr replied, 'Yes. Your own self is the dearest of all things to you. And when you disobey God you have wronged it.' "

Exposition:

One should know that people differ in their fear and abhorrence of death and the reasons that underlie their abhorrence. That which Ḥaḍrat Abū Dharr — may Allāh, the Exalted, be pleased with him — has described, relates to the state of the middle ones (*mutawassitūn*) and we will briefly describe here the condition of the deficient (*nāqiṣūn*) as well as that of the perfect (*kāmilūn*).

It should be known that the fear and abhorrence of ours, the deficient (*nāqiṣūn*), for death is on account of a cause that was referred to in the course of exposition of some of the foregoing traditions. It lies in this that man, in accordance with his original and God-given nature, loves life and survival and hates death and extinction. This love is related to absolute survival and immortal, everlasting life, a survival free from extinction and a life that knows no end. Some of our honoured predecessors used to prove the necessity of Resurrection on the basis of this human nature, and a description of their arguments here is outside the aims of our present discourse. Now, since this love and that hate lie in human nature, man comes to love that which he reckons to be the enduring realm of life and hates that which he regards as being contrary to it. Since we have no faith in the realm of the Hereafter and our hearts have no conviction in immortal life and eternal survival, we are attached to this world and abhor death in accordance with that nature.

We have mentioned earlier that rational judgement and perception is different from the faith and conviction of the heart. In accordance with our rational apperception, or judgement based on traditional belief (*taqlīd*), we affirm that death — which is a transition from the dark, lowly sphere of corporeal (*mulkī*) existence to the radiant world of immortal life and the everlasting higher sphere of incorporeal (*malakūtī*)

existence — is a reality. However, our hearts do not partake of this knowledge and are oblivious of it. Rather, our hearts cling to earthly nature and the corporeal realm and consider life to be exclusively confined to the lower corporeal mode of animal life. They do not believe in the life and immortality of the other world, which is the world of Hereafter and the realm of (pure) life. Hence we put total reliance in this world and regard the other world with fear, repulsion and resentment. All the misfortunes of ours are on account of this lack of faith and conviction. Had we even a tenth of what faith we have in this world's life and living, its existence and survival, in the world of the Hereafter and its eternal, everlasting life, our hearts would have been more attached to it and we would have devoted some effort to building it. But, alas, the springs of our faith are dry and the edifice of our faith rests on water. Inevitably, we fear death, extinction and end. The exclusive and definite remedy for this malady is cultivation of faith in the heart through beneficial reflection and remembrance as well as sound knowledge and works.

However, as to the fear and abhorrence of the *mutawassitūn* — that is, those who have inadequate faith in Hereafter — that is because the attention of their hearts is turned to the cultivation of the world and they are neglectful of cultivating the Hereafter. Therefore, they are not inclined to move from a well-built and prosperous place to one which is a desolation, as pointed out by Ḥaḍrat Abū Dharr, may God be pleased with him. This attitude is also on account of inadequate faith and conviction. Otherwise, with a complete faith it is not possible that one should confine his efforts to the base mundane affairs to the neglect of the Hereafter. On the whole, these fears, anxieties and hatreds arise from unwholesomeness of deeds, waywardness and opposition to one's Master (*mawlā*). Otherwise, had our evaluation been a correct one and had we critically examined ourselves we would not have been fearful of God's reckoning. For there, the reckoning is just and the judge is a just one. Hence our fear of the reckoning is due to our own inequity and our self-deceptive and fraudulent evaluation of our own selves.

In the noble *al-Kāfī* the following *muṣnad* tradition of Ḥaḍrat Mūsā ibn Ja'far (A) is recorded:

قال: لَيْسَ مِنَّا مَنْ لَمْ يُحَاسِبْ نَفْسَهُ فِي كُلِّ يَوْمٍ، فَإِنْ عَمِلَ حَسَنًا اسْتَرَادَهُ اللَّهُ وَإِنْ عَمِلَ سَيِّئًا اسْتَغْفَرَ اللَّهُ مِنْهُ وَتَابَ إِلَيْهِ.

The Imam (A) said: "One who does not examine and evaluate himself every day is not one of us (i.e. he is not a follower of the Prophet and the Ahl al-Bayt). (A person who examines himself every day), if he does a good deed, he beseeches God to increase him (in virtue), and if he has perpetrated a vice, he seeks God's forgiveness for it and is penitent before Him."²

Hence if you have been taking account of yourself, you shall have no fear of the time of reckoning, for the perils and tribulations of that world are subject to the works performed in this. For instance, had you walked in this world on the straight path of prophethood and the straight path of *wilāyah* without deviating or swerving from the path of the *wilāyah* of ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, upon whom be peace, there will be no fear on you when passing over the *Ṣirāṭ*. For the reality of the *Ṣirāṭ* is the inward form of the *wilāyah*, as it has been mentioned in *aḥādīth* that Amir al-Mu’minin (A) is the *Ṣirāṭ*.³ In another tradition, the Imams of the Ahl al-Bayt are reported to have stated: “We are the *Ṣirāṭ*.”⁴ In the blessed *al-Ziyārat al-jāmi‘ah*, it is stated:

أَنْتُمْ السَّبِيلُ الْأَعْظَمُ وَالصَّرَاطُ الْأَقْوَمُ.

You (the Ahl al-Bayt) are the greatest path (*sabīl*) and the firmest way (*ṣirāṭ*).⁵

Whoever moves on this path steadily without stumbling, his feet will not stagger on that *Ṣirāṭ* too, and he will pass over it in a moment as short as the stroke of lightning. Similarly, should his morals and habits be equitable and radiant, he will be immune from the darkness and horrors of the grave, of the Barzakh and the Resurrection, and there will be no fear upon him in those realms. Hence, here, we are ourselves responsible for the malady, and its remedy is in our own hands, as pointed out by Ḥaḍrat Amir al-Mu’minin in verses ascribed to him:

دَوَائِكَ فَيْكَ وَمَا تَشْفُرُ وَدَوَائِكَ مِنْكَ وَمَا تُبْصِرُ

The remedy lies in you and you perceive not;
The malady arises from you and you discern not.⁶

And the noble *al-Kāfī* records the following *musnad* tradition of al-‘Imām al-Ṣādiq (A):

قَالَ لِرَجُلٍ: إِنَّكَ قَدْ جُعِلْتَ طَبِيبَ نَفْسِكَ، وَتُبِّينَ لَكَ الدَّاءُ، وَعُرِّفَتْ آيَةُ الصَّحَّةِ،
وَدُلِّمَتْ عَلَيَّ الدَّوَاءِ، فَانظُرْ كَيْفَ قِيَامِكَ عَلَى نَفْسِكَ.

The Imam (A) said to a man: “Verily, you have been made your own doctor. The malady has been described to you, the sign of health has also been made known to you, and the medicine has been shown to you. Hence look how you attend your own soul.”⁷

You are afflicted with corrupt beliefs, morals and behaviour. The signs of health are contained in the prescriptions of the prophets and the

illuminations of (primordial) nature and the intellect. The remedy for the soul's sickness lies in taking steps for its removal. This is the condition of the *mutawassiṭūn*. However, as to the condition of the perfect and those of convinced faith, they have no abhorrence of death, although they may regard it with fear and anxiety on account of their awe of the Majesty of God, the Exalted, and the dignity of that Sacred Essence. And hence the Messenger of Allāh (S) used to say;

فَأَيْنَ هَوْلِ الْمُطَّلَعِ؟

So where is the terror of him who knows?

And Ḥadīrat Amir al-Mu'minin (A) had a terrific fear and horror on the night of the nineteenth of Ramadān (the night of his assassination), although he used to say:

وَاللَّهِ لَأَبْنُ أَبِي طَالِبٍ أَنَسٌ بِالْمَوْتِ مِنَ الْقَلْبِ بِثَدِي أُمِّهِ .

By God, the son of Abū Ṭālib is more intimate with death than the infant with his mother's breast.⁸

Their fear is on account of other matters and is not like the fear of those like us who are in the chains of desires and hopes and are enamoured to the transitory world. The hearts of the *awliyā'*, too, greatly differ from one another. Their difference cannot be encompassed by any description or writing, and we will refer briefly to some of their points of difference. The hearts of the *awliyā'* differ in their capacity to receive the irradiations (*tajalliyāt*) of the Divine Names. The hearts of some of them are characterized with love and yearning and God Almighty is manifested in them through the Names of Beauty (*jamāl*). Such an irradiation brings an awe suffused with yearning, and the fear in their terror is on account of the manifestation of Divine Majesty and its vision. The lover's heart palpitates with fear and anxiety as the time of meeting the beloved approaches, but this anxiety and terror is different from the ordinary kinds of fear.

The hearts of some of them are characterized with trepidation and grief and God Almighty is manifested in them through the Names of Majesty and Glory. Such a *tajallī* creates an intense yearning suffused with dread and a wonder and an awe suffused with grief. And it is related in ḥadīth that once Ḥadīrat Yaḥyā (John), upon whom be peace, noticed Ḥadīrat 'Isā (Jesus), upon whom be peace, laughing. Angrily, he said to the latter, "It appears as if you are immune of God's chastisement!" Ḥadīrat 'Isā retorted, "It appears as if you have despaired of God's mercy and beneficence!" God Almighty revealed to them that,

“Whoever of you has a better opinion of Me is the dearer to Me.”

Since God manifested Himself in the heart of Ḥaḍrat Yaḥyā (A) through the Names of Majesty, he always dwelt in dread and awe and showed his displeasure to Ḥaḍrat ‘Isā (A), who gave him a reply in accordance with the *tajalliyāt* of Divine Mercy and Compassion.

The Reality of Heaven and Hell:

The literal meaning of the ḥadīth where it says: *عَمَّرْتُمُ الدُّنْيَا وَخَرَّبْتُمُ الْآخِرَةَ* (you have built the world and ruined the Hereafter) is that the abodes of the Hereafter and paradise are places already built and flourishing that are turned into ruins by our works. But it is obvious that the intent is parallelism of expression. Since the term *ta‘mīr* (building) was used in relation to the world, the parallel term *takhrīb* (destruction) was used in relation to the Hereafter. Although the realms of hell and paradise are creations (of God), the building agency of paradise and the material of hell is subject to the deeds of their inhabitants.⁹ And this interpretation is in accordance with demonstrative proof as well as mystic intuition (*kashf*). Hence some of the researchers among the mystics have said:

Let it be known to you — may God preserve you and us from error — that hell (*Jahannam*) is one of God’s great creations, and it is God’s prison in the Hereafter. It is called ‘*Jahannam*’ because of the remoteness of its pit. Hence a well with a deep pit is called *bi‘r jahnām*. It contains heat and bitter cold. Its coldness reaches the extreme degree of cold and its heat the extreme degree of hotness. A distance of seven hundred and fifty years’ journey separates its uppermost and lowermost parts. The people disagree as to whether it is a creation or not, and similarly they disagree concerning paradise. However, in our opinion and that of our companions and the mystics, they are and are not creations. When we say that they are creations, it is like saying of a man building a house and who has built only its boundary walls that “he has built a house.” However, on entering one sees nothing but an area and space surrounded by a wall. It is only afterwards that its inner quarters shall be built with rooms, compartments, storerooms and water tanks in accordance with the needs of those who shall come to live therein.

And it is mentioned in ḥadīth that when the Messenger of Allah (S) went on his noble ascent (*mi‘rāj*), he saw certain angels in paradise who would for some time engage in constructing buildings and for some time stopped their work. The Prophet (S) asked Gabriel (A), “What is the reason behind this?” Gabriel (A) replied, “The material for this building is made up of the remembrance of the individuals of the Ummah. Whenever they engage in remembrance, the material becomes available for building and the angels too resume their building work. But when they cease in their remembrance, these angels too stop their

work.”¹⁰ The physical form of heaven and hell is made up of the forms of the good and evil works and deeds of the Children of Adam, which return to them in that world. This has also been referred to in the noble verses of the Qur’ān, as in the following utterance of God Almighty:

... وَوَجَدُوا مَا عَمِلُوا حَاضِرًا ...

And they shall find all they wrought present. (18:49)

And

إِنَّمَا هِيَ أَعْمَالُكُمْ تُرَدُّ إِلَيْكُمْ .

Indeed, these are your own works that are being returned to you.¹¹

It is possible that the worlds of heaven and hell are two independent realms and abodes towards which the Children of Adam journey through substantial motions (*ḥarakāt-e jawharī*) and voluntary spiritual (*malakūtī*) movements derived from their behaviour and character, where they receive their share of the Hereafter in the shape of the forms of their works.

The heaven is the higher *malakūtī* realm, being an independent sphere by itself towards which the felicitous spirits are directed, and the hell is the nether *malakūtī* realm towards which the spirits of the wretched make their journey. But that which each of them encounters in its own sphere are the fair and blessed or painful and dreadful forms of their own deeds. This description reconciles the literal meanings of the Book and the traditions — which are apparently contradictory — and is also in agreement with philosophical proofs as well as the teaching of the *urafā’*.

It is obvious that this saying of Ḥaḍrat Abū Dharr, may God be pleased with him, consists of a comprehensive and firm command which every human being must observe with due care. Thereafter Ḥaḍrat Abū Dharr says that one should examine his deeds in the light of the Book of God. And God says: Mankind consist of two groups: the pious, who are in bliss, and the wayward, who are in hell. The man (who questioned Abū Dharr) made an attempt to cling to Divine mercy when he said, “If that is so, then where is the mercy of God Almighty?” Abū Dharr replied: God’s mercy is not extravagant; it is near to the good-doers.

You should know that the accursed Satan and the vicious self that incites man to evil deceive the human being in many ways and drive him towards eternal damnation. The last arrow in their quiver is to deceive man through hope in Divine mercy and to keep man from

(virtuous) action by the means of this deception, for this kind of reliance on Divine mercy is one of Satanic snares and deceits. The evidence of it is that we never put any trust in the mercy of God, the Exalted, in our mundane affairs, and we consider natural and apparent means as being independent and effective, to the extent of believing that there is no efficient agency in the world except the apparent causes. However, in matters relating to the Hereafter we imagine ourselves to be reliant on Divine mercy while we neglect the commands of God and His Messenger, upon whom and whose progeny be God's benedictions, as if God had given us no power to act and had not shown us the paths of (spiritual) health and sickness.

In the matters of the world we follow the creed of *tafwīd* (the belief that God has delegated complete freedom to man), while in relation to the matters of the Hereafter we follow the creed of *jabr* (fatalism), forgetting that both of them are wrong, void and contrary to the teachings of the prophets, may God's benedictions be upon them, and the abiding path of the Imams of guidance and the *awliyā'* near to God, whose faith was greater than all others and all of whom had convinced faith in Divine mercy. Notwithstanding it, they did not neglect their duties and did not leave off effort and endeavour for a single moment.

Brother! Study the book of their works! Read the supplications of Sayyid al-Sājīdīn Zayn al-'Abīdīn, may peace be upon him. Look carefully and see how he approaches God in the station of servanthood (*'ubūdiyyah*). See how he attends to the duties of slavehood. Despite it all, when he studies the book of works of the Master of the Pious, Amīr al-Mu'mīnīn, may peace be upon him, he expresses his regret and his incapability! Does it mean that, *na'ūdhu billāh*, we should question their veracity and say that they did not, like us, possess faith and conviction in Divine mercy? Or should we doubt our own veracity and understand once for all that all that we say are no more than snares of Satan and deceits of the carnal self, which scheme to deviate us from the straight path? We take refuge in God, the Exalted, from their malice!

And so, my dear, knowledge is extensive, as remarked by Ḥaḍrat Abū Dharr to that man, but the beneficial piece of knowledge for the likes of us is to abstain from doing ourselves this extent of wrong. We must understand that the commands of the prophets and the *awliyā'*, may peace be upon them, contain certain truths which are concealed from us. They, who know what kind of forms and consequences these corrupt words and evil acts of ours possess and what kind of blessed *malakūti* forms the noble morals and good deeds have, have described all the maladies and their remedies. You — should you have any love for yourself — should not pass by these prescriptions. Decide to cure your afflictions and diseases. Should we move in this

condition of ours from this world to the next, God knows what afflictions, calamities and pains await us! And all praise is God's at the beginning and the end.

To be continued — inshā' Allāh

NOTES:

1. *Al-Kāfi*, ii, "kitāb al-'imān wa al-kufr", "bāb muḥāsabat al-'amal", ḥadīth no. 20.
2. *Ibid.*, ḥadīth no. 2.
3. *Tafsīr al-burhān*, i, 46.
4. *Ibid.*, 51.
5. *Man lā yaḥḍuruḥu al-faqīh*, ii, 613; *Mafātīḥ al-jinān*, "al-Ziyārat al-jāmi'ah al-kabīrah."
6. The *Dīwān* ascribed to Amīr al-Mu'minīn, 57.
7. *Al-Kāfi*, ii, "kitāb al-'imān wa al-kufr", "bāb muḥāsabat al-'amal," ḥadīth no. 6.
8. *Nahj al-balāghah*, Khutbah no. 5.
9. *Al-Ṣadūq, al-'Amālī*, majlis no. 69, p. 405.
10. *Bihār al-'anwār*, xviii, 292.
11. *Al-Majlisī, 'Ilm al-yaqīn*, ii, 884.

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A Selection From Uṣūl al-Kāfi Part 11

Chastity:

— عَلِيٌّ بْنُ اِبْرَاهِيْمَ ، عَنْ اَبِيهِ ، عَنْ حَمَادِ بْنِ عَيْسَى ، عَنْ حَرِيْزٍ ، عَنْ زُرَّارَةَ ، عَنْ اَبِي جَعْفَرٍ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ : مَا عُبِدَ اللّٰهُ بِشَيْءٍ اَفْضَلَ مِنْ عِقَّةِ بَطْنٍ وَفَرْجٍ .

199/1635: 'Alī ibn Ibrāhīm, from his father, from Ḥammād ibn 'Isā, from Ḥarīz, from Zurārah:

Abū Ja'far (A) said: "God has not been served with anything more meritorious than chastity (*iffah*) in respect of livelihood and sex relations."

— مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ يَحْيَى ، عَنْ اَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدٍ ، عَنْ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ اِسْمَاعِيْلَ ، عَنْ حَنَّانِ بْنِ سَدِيْرٍ ، عَنْ اَبِيهِ قَالَ : قَالَ اَبُو جَعْفَرٍ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ : اِنَّ اَفْضَلَ الْعِبَادَةِ عِقَّةُ الْبَطْنِ وَالْفَرْجِ .

200/1636: Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad, from Muḥammad ibn Ismā'il, from Ḥannān ibn Sadīr, from his father:

Abū Ja'far (A) said: "The best of worship is chastity in regard to livelihood and sex relations."

— عِدَّةٌ مِنْ اَصْحَابِنَا ، عَنْ اَحْمَدَ بْنِ اَبِي عَبْدِ اللّٰهِ ، عَنْ اَبِيهِ ، عَنِ النَّضْرِ بْنِ سُوَيْدٍ ، عَنْ يَحْيَى بْنِ عِمْرَانَ الْحَلْبِيِّ ، عَنْ مُعَلَّى أَبِي عُثْمَانَ ، عَنْ اَبِي بَصِيْرٍ قَالَ : قَالَ رَجُلٌ لَّابِي جَعْفَرٍ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ : اِنِّي ضَعِيْفُ الْعَمَلِ قَلِيْلُ الصِّيَامِ وَلِكِنِّي اَرْجُو اَنْ لَا اَكُلَ اِلَّا حَلَالًا ، قَالَ : فَقَالَ لَهُ : اَيُّ الْاِجْتِهَادِ اَفْضَلُ مِنْ عِقَّةِ بَطْنٍ وَفَرْجٍ .

201/1638: A group of our companions, from Aḥmad ibn Abī 'Abd Allāh, from his father, from al-Nadr ibn Suwayd, from Yaḥyā ibn 'Imrān al-

Ḥalabī, from Mu'allā Abī 'Uthmān,¹⁸³ from Abū Baṣīr:

Abū Baṣīr says: "A man said to Abū Ja'far (A), 'I am feeble of deeds and my fasts are few. However, I try to eat nothing but that which is lawful.' The Imam (A) said to him, 'What endeavour is better than the effort to remain chaste in respect of one's livelihood and sex relations?'"

— مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ يَحْيَى ، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدٍ ، عَنْ عَلِيِّ بْنِ الْحَكَمِ ، عَنْ سَيْفِ بْنِ عَمِيرَةَ ، عَنْ مَنْصُورِ بْنِ حَازِمٍ ، عَنْ أَبِي جَعْفَرٍ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ : مَا مِنْ عِبَادَةٍ أَفْضَلُ عِنْدَ اللَّهِ مِنْ عِفَّةِ بَطْنِي وَفَرْجِي .

202/1642: Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad, from 'Alī ibn al-Ḥakam, from Sayf ibn 'Amīrah, from Mansūr ibn Ḥāzim:

Abū Ja'far (A) said: "No act of worship is more meritorious to God than the exercise of chastity in respect of one's livelihood and sex relations."

Constancy in Deeds:

— عَلِيُّ بْنُ إِبْرَاهِيمَ ، عَنْ أَبِيهِ ، عَنْ حَمَادِ بْنِ عِيسَى ، عَنْ حَرِيزِ بْنِ زُرَّارَةَ ، عَنْ أَبِي جَعْفَرٍ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ : قَالَ : أَحَبُّ الْأَعْمَالِ إِلَى اللَّهِ عَزَّوَجَلَّ مَا دَامَ عَلَيْهِ الْعَبْدُ وَإِنْ قَلَّ .

203/1655: 'Alī ibn Ibrāhīm, from his father, from Ḥammād ibn 'Īsā, from Ḥarīz, from Zurārah:

Abū Ja'far (A) said: "The choicest of deeds near God, Almighty and Exalted, are those which one performs perpetually, even if insignificant."

— أَبُو عَلِيٍّ الْأَشْعَرِيُّ ، عَنْ عِيسَى بْنِ أَيُّوبَ ، عَنْ عَلِيِّ بْنِ مَهْزَبَارٍ ، عَنْ فَضَالَةَ بْنِ أَيُّوبَ ، عَنْ مُعَاوِنَةَ بْنِ عَمَّارٍ ، عَنْ نُجَبَةَ قَالَ : عَنْ أَبِي جَعْفَرٍ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ : مَا مِنْ شَيْءٍ أَحَبُّ إِلَى اللَّهِ عَزَّوَجَلَّ مِنْ عَمَلٍ يُدَاوِمُ عَلَيْهِ وَإِنْ قَلَّ .

204/1656: Abū 'Alī al-'Ash'arī, from 'Īsā ibn Ayyūb,¹⁸⁴ from 'Alī ibn Mahziyār,¹⁸⁵ from Faḍālah ibn Ayyūb, from Mu'āwiyyah ibn 'Ammār, from Najabah:¹⁸⁶

Abū Ja'far (A) said: "Nothing is dearer to God, Almighty and Exalted, than an act that is performed perpetually, even if insignificant."

— عَنْهُ، عَنْ فَضَالَةَ بْنِ أَيُّوبَ، عَنْ مُعَاوِيَةَ بْنِ عَمَّارٍ، عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ: كَانَ عَلِيُّ بْنُ الْحُسَيْنِ صَلَوَاتُ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِمَا يَقُولُ: إِنِّي لِأَحِبُّ أَنْ أَدَاوِمَ عَلَى الْعَمَلِ وَإِنْ قَلَّ.

205/1657: From him (i.e. 'Alī ibn Mahziyār, through the chain of transmission given above), from Faḍālah ibn Ayyūb, from Mu'āwiyah ibn 'Ammār:

Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) said: " 'Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn, may God's blessings be upon both of them, used to say: 'I love to perform an act perpetually, even if it should be insignificant.' "

— عَنْهُ، عَنْ فَضَالَةَ بْنِ أَيُّوبَ، عَنِ الْعَلَاءِ، عَنْ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ مُسْلِمٍ، عَنْ أَبِي جَعْفَرٍ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ: قَالَ كَانَ عَلِيُّ بْنُ الْحُسَيْنِ صَلَوَاتُ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِمَا يَقُولُ: إِنِّي لِأَحِبُّ أَنْ أَقْدَمَ عَلَى رَبِّي وَعَمَلِي مُسْتَوٍ.

206/1658: From him, from Faḍālah ibn Ayyūb, from al-'Alā', from Muḥammad ibn Muslim:

Abū Ja'far (A) said: "Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn, may God's blessings be upon both of them, used to say, 'I would love to meet my Lord in a state wherein my deeds are equal (i.e. when the deeds of every day are not less than those of the preceding day).'"

Intention:

— عِدَّةٌ مِنْ أَصْحَابِنَا، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدٍ، عَنِ ابْنِ مَجْبُوبٍ، عَنْ هِشَامِ بْنِ سَالِمٍ، عَنْ أَبِي بَصِيرٍ، عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ: إِنَّ الْعَبْدَ الْمُؤْمِنَ الْفَقِيرَ لَيَقُولُ: يَا رَبِّ ارزُقْنِي حَتَّى أَفْعَلَ كَذَا وَكَذَا مِنَ الْبِرِّ وَوُجُوهِ الْخَيْرِ، فَإِذَا عَلِمَ عَزَّوَجَلَّ ذَلِكَ مِنْهُ بِصَدَقِ نِيَّةِ كَتَبَ اللَّهُ لَهُ مِنَ الْأَجْرِ مِثْلَ مَا يَكْتُبُ لَهُ لَوْ عَمِلَهُ، إِنَّ اللَّهَ وَاسِعٌ كَرِيمٌ.

207/1669: A group of our companions, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad, from Ibn Maḥbūb, from Hishām ibn Sālim, from Abū Baṣīr:

Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) said: "When a *mu'min* who is poor says, 'My Lord, provide me so that I can perform such and such acts of virtue', and God Almighty knows his intentions to be sincere, God writes for him a reward similar to what He would have written had he actually done that. Indeed, God is All-embracing, All-generous."

Worship and Moderation:

— مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ يَحْيَى؛ عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ عَيْسَى؛ عَنِ ابْنِ مَجْبُوبٍ؛ عَنِ الْأَخْوَالِ؛ عَنْ

سَلَامِ بْنِ الْمُسْتَنِيرِ؛ عَنْ أَبِي جَعْفَرٍ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ : قَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَآلِهِ وَسَلَّمَ :
أَلَا إِنَّ لِكُلِّ عِبَادَةٍ شِرَّةً ثُمَّ تَصِيرُ إِلَى فِتْرَةٍ فَمَنْ صَارَتْ شِرَّةُ عِبَادَتِهِ إِلَى سُنَّتِي فَقَدْ اهْتَدَى
وَمَنْ خَالَفَ سُنَّتِي فَقَدْ ضَلَّ وَكَانَ عَمَلُهُ فِي تَبَابٍ ، أَمَا إِنِّي أَصَلِّي وَأَنَا مُ وَأَصُومُ وَأَفْطِرُ
وَأُضْحِكُ وَأَبْكِي فَمَنْ رَغِبَ عَنِّي مِنْهَا جِي وَسُنَّتِي فَلَيْسَ مِنِّي . وَقَالَ : كَفَى بِالْمَوْتِ مَوْعِظَةً
وَكَفَى بِالْيَقِينِ غِنًى وَكَفَى بِالْعِبَادَةِ شُغْلًا .

208/1672: Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Isā, from Ibn Maḥbūb, from al-'Aḥwal, from Sallām ibn al-Mustanīr:

Abū Ja'far (A) said: "The Messenger of Allah (S) said, "There is a phase of enthusiasm for every kind of worship, after which it inclines to abate and cool down. Whenever someone's devotional enthusiasm leads him to my Sunnah, he has been rightly guided. But whoever opposes my Sunnah has been misguided and his acts are doomed. As to myself, I pray (in the nights) and sleep, I fast (on some days) and break my fast (on other days); I cry and I laugh. So whoever abandons my path and my Sunnah, does not belong to me.' And the Imam (A) said: 'Death is sufficient as a counsel; conviction is sufficient to make one wealthy; and worship is sufficient for being occupied.' "

— عَلِيُّ بْنُ إِبْرَاهِيمَ ، عَنْ أَبِيهِ ، وَمُحَمَّدُ بْنُ إِسْمَاعِيلَ ، عَنِ الْفَضْلِ بْنِ شَاذَانَ جَمِيعًا ، عَنِ
ابْنِ أَبِي عُمَيْرٍ ، عَنْ حَفْصِ بْنِ الْبَخْتَرِيِّ ، عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ : لَا تُكْرَهُوا إِلَى
أَنْفُسِكُمُ الْعِبَادَةَ .

209/1675: 'Alī ibn Ibrāhīm, from his father, and Muḥammad ibn Ismā'il, from al-Faḍl ibn Shādhān, both of them from Ibn Abī 'Umayr, from Ḥafṣ ibn al-Bakhtarī:

Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) said: "Don't make worship loathsome to yourself."

— مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ يَحْيَى ، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ عِيسَى ، عَنْ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ إِسْمَاعِيلَ ، عَنِ
حَنَانِ بْنِ سَدِيرٍ قَالَ : سَمِعْتُ أَبَا عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ يَقُولُ : إِنَّ اللَّهَ عَزَّ وَجَلَّ إِذَا أَحَبَّ عَبْدًا
فَعَمِلَ [عَمَلًا] قَلِيلًا جَزَاهُ بِالْقَلِيلِ الْكَثِيرَ وَلَمْ يَتَعَاظَمَهُ أَنْ يَجْزِيَ بِالْقَلِيلِ الْكَثِيرَ لَهُ .

210/1676: Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Isā, from Muḥammad ibn Ismā'il, from Ḥannān ibn Sadīr:

Ḥannān ibn Sadīr says: "I heard Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) say: 'Verily, when God, Almighty and Exalted, loves a servant He rewards his meagre deeds with a mighty reward and it is not at all difficult for Him to recompense meagre deeds with a plenteous reward.' "

— عِدَّةٌ مِنْ أَصْحَابِنَا، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدٍ؛ عَنِ ابْنِ فَضَالٍ، عَنِ الْحَسَنِ بْنِ الْجَهْمِ،
عَنْ مَنْصُورٍ، عَنْ أَبِي بَصِيرٍ، عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ: مَرَّبِي أَبِي وَأَنَا بِالطَّوَافِ وَأَنَا
حَدَّثْتُ وَقَدْ اجْتَهَدْتُ فِي الْعِبَادَةِ فَرَأَنِي وَأَنَا أَتِصَابُ عَرَقًا، فَقَالَ لِي: يَا جَعْفَرُ يَا بُنْتِي إِنَّ اللَّهَ
إِذَا أَحَبَّ عَبْدًا أَذْخَلَهُ الْجَنَّةَ وَرَضِيَ عَنْهُ بِالْيَسِيرِ.

211/1677: A group of our companions, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad, from Ibn Faḍḍāl, from al-Ḥasan ibn al-Jahm,¹⁸⁷ from Mansūr, from Abū Baṣīr:

Abū ‘Abd Allāh (A) said: “I was young and I used to be diligent in worship. Once when I was performing the circumambulation (*ṭawāf*) of the Ka‘bah, my father saw me. I was sweating heavily. He said to me, “Ja‘far, my son, when God loves a servant He makes him enter paradise and is satisfied with him for a modest amount of works.”

— عَلِيُّ بْنُ إِبْرَاهِيمَ، عَنْ أَبِيهِ، عَنِ ابْنِ أَبِي عُمَيْرٍ، عَنْ حَفْصِ بْنِ الْبَخْتَرِيِّ وَغَيْرِهِ، عَنْ
أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ: اجْتَهَدْتُ فِي الْعِبَادَةِ وَأَنَا شَابٌّ، فَقَالَ لِي أَبِي عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ:
يَا بُنْتِي دُونَ مَا أَرَاكَ تَصْنَعُ، فَإِنَّ اللَّهَ عَزَّوَجَلَّ إِذَا أَحَبَّ عَبْدًا رَضِيَ عَنْهُ بِالْيَسِيرِ.

212/1678: ‘Alī ibn Ibrāhīm, from his father, from Ibn Abī ‘Umayr, from Ḥafṣ ibn al-Bakhtarī and others:

Abū ‘Abd Allāh (S) said: “I was young and I used to be diligent in worship. My father (noticing it) said to me, ‘My son, take it a bit easy, for when God, Almighty and Glorious, loves a servant He is pleased with him for a modest amount of works.’”

Patience:

— عَلِيُّ بْنُ إِبْرَاهِيمَ، عَنْ أَبِيهِ، عَنْ حَمَادِ بْنِ عِيسَى، عَنْ رِئَعِيِّ بْنِ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ، عَنْ فَضِيلِ
ابْنِ يَسَارٍ، عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ: الصَّبْرُ مِنَ الْإِيمَانِ بِمَنْزِلَةِ الرَّأْسِ مِنَ الْجَسَدِ،
فَإِذَا ذَهَبَ الرَّأْسُ ذَهَبَ الْجَسَدُ كَذَلِكَ إِذَا ذَهَبَ الصَّبْرُ ذَهَبَ الْإِيمَانُ.

213/1686: ‘Alī ibn Ibrāhīm, from his father, from Ḥammād ibn ‘Isā, from Rib‘ī ibn ‘Abd Allāh, from Fuḍayl ibn Yasār:

Abū ‘Abd Allāh (A) said: “Patience (*ṣabr*) has the same relationship with faith (*īmān*) as the head with the body. The body cannot survive without the head, so also faith cannot live without patience.”

— عِدَّةٌ مِنْ أَصْحَابِنَا، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدٍ بْنِ خَالِدٍ، عَنْ أَبِيهِ، عَنْ عَلِيِّ بْنِ التُّعْمَانِ،

عَنْ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ بْنِ مُسْكَانَ، عَنْ أَبِي بَصِيرٍ قَالَ: سَمِعْتُ أَبَا عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ يَقُولُ: إِنَّ
الْحُرَّ حُرٌّ عَلَى جَمِيعِ أَحْوَالِهِ، إِنْ نَابَتْهُ نَائِبَةٌ صَبَرَ لَهَا وَإِنْ تَدَاكَتْ عَلَيْهِ الْمَصَائِبُ لَمْ
تَكْسِرْهُ وَإِنْ أُسِرَ وَفُهِرَ وَاسْتُبْدِلَ بِالْيُسْرِ عُسْرًا، كَمَا كَانَ يُوسُفُ الصَّدِّيقُ الْأَمِينُ صَلَوَاتُ اللَّهِ
عَلَيْهِ لَمْ يَضْرُرْ حُرَّتَهُ أَنْ اسْتُغْفِدَ وَقُهِرَ وَسِرَّ وَلَمْ تَضْرُرْهُ ظُلْمَةُ الْجُبِّ
وَوَحْشَتُهُ وَمَا نَالَهُ، أَنْ مَنْنَ اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ فَجَعَلَ الْجَبَّارَ الْعَاتِيَّ لَهُ عَبْدًا بَعْدَ إِذْ كَانَ [لَهُ]
مَالِكًا، فَأَرْسَلَهُ وَرَجَمَ بِهِ أُمَّةً وَكَذَلِكَ الصَّبْرُ يُعْقِبُ خَيْرًا، فَاصْبِرُوا وَوَقِّنُوا أَنْفُسَكُمْ عَلَى
الصَّبْرِ تُوجِرُوا.

214/1687: A group of our companions, from Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Khālid, from his father, from 'Alī ibn al-Nu'mān, from 'Abd Allāh ibn Muskān, from Abū Baṣīr:

Abū Baṣīr says: "I heard Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) say: 'A free human being is free in all circumstances. Should a misfortune befall him he bears it with patience. If calamities strike him, they don't shatter him. If taken captive and subdued, he turns hardship into ease, as was the case with Joseph, the truthful and trustworthy, may God's benedictions be upon him. His (inner) freedom saved him from harm, although he was taken slave, overpowered and imprisoned. The darkness of the pit, its panic and whatever that befell him did him no injury, until God favoured him and made the insolent tyrant, that had been his master, his servant. Then God made him His apostle and through him was merciful to a people. In this way patience is followed by good. So be patient and reconcile yourself to patience in order to be rewarded.' "

— مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ يَحْيَى، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ عِيسَى، عَنْ عَلِيِّ بْنِ الْحَكِيمِ، عَنْ
عَبْدِ اللَّهِ بْنِ بُكَيْرٍ، عَنْ حَمْرَةَ بْنِ حُمْرَانَ، عَنْ أَبِي جَعْفَرٍ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ: الْجَنَّةُ مَحْفُوفَةٌ
بِالْمَكَارِهِ وَالصَّبْرِ، فَمَنْ صَبَرَ عَلَى الْمَكَارِهِ فِي الدُّنْيَا دَخَلَ الْجَنَّةَ وَجَهَنَّمَ مَحْفُوفَةٌ
بِاللَّذَاتِ وَالشَّهَوَاتِ فَمَنْ أُعْطِيَ نَفْسَهُ لَذَّتَهَا وَشَهَوَاتَهَا دَخَلَ النَّارَ.

215/1688: Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā, from Ahmad ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Isā, from 'Alī ibn al-Ḥakam, from 'Abd Allāh ibn Bukayr, from Ḥamzah ibn Ḥumrān:

Abū Ja'far (A) said: "Paradise is surrounded with afflictions and patience; so one who patiently bears afflictions and calamities in the world enters paradise. Hell is surrounded with pleasures and lusts, so one who pursues its (the world's) pleasures and lusts enters hell."

Thankfulness:

— مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ يَحْيَى، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ عَيْسَى، عَنْ مُعَمَّرِ بْنِ خَلَادٍ قَالَ: سَمِعْتُ أَبَا الْحَسَنِ صَلَوَاتُ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ يَقُولُ: مَنْ حَمِدَ اللَّهَ عَلَى النِّعْمَةِ فَقَدْ شَكَرَهُ وَكَانَ الْحَمْدُ أَفْضَلَ مِنْ تِلْكَ النِّعْمَةِ.

216/1719: Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Isā, from Mu'ammār ibn Khallād:

Mu'ammār ibn Khallād says: "I heard Abū al-Ḥasan, upon whom be God's benedictions, say: 'Whoever praises God for a blessing has thanked Him, and this praise on his part is more precious than that blessing (i.e. thanksgiving being itself a Divine blessing is superior to the blessing for which thanks are offered).'"

— مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ يَحْيَى، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ، عَنْ عَلِيِّ بْنِ الْحَكَمِ، عَنْ صَفْوَانَ الْجَمَّالِ، عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ: قَالَ لِي: مَا أَنْعَمَ اللَّهُ عَلَى عَبْدٍ بِنِعْمَةٍ صَفَرَتْ أَوْ كَبُرَتْ فَقَالَ الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ، إِلَّا أَدَى شُكْرَهَا.

217/1720: Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā, from Aḥmad, from 'Alī ibn al-Ḥakam, from Ṣafwān al-Jammāl:

Ṣafwān al-Jammāl says: "Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) said to me: 'Whenever a creature receives a favour, whether small or big, from God and says, "All praise is God's," he has fully thanked (Him) for it.'"

— عَلِيُّ بْنُ إِبْرَاهِيمَ، عَنْ أَبِيهِ، عَنِ ابْنِ أَبِي عُمَيْرٍ، عَنْ مَنْصُورِ بْنِ يُونُسَ، عَنْ أَبِي بَصِيرٍ قَالَ: قَالَ أَبُو عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ إِنَّ الرَّجُلَ مِنْكُمْ لَيَشْرَبُ الشَّرْبَةَ مِنَ الْمَاءِ فَيُوجِبُ اللَّهُ لَهُ بِهَا الْجَنَّةَ ثُمَّ قَالَ: إِنَّهُ لَيَأْخُذُ الْإِنَاءَ فَيَضَعُهُ عَلَى فِيهِ فَيُسَمِّي ثُمَّ يَشْرَبُ فَيُنْحِيهِ وَهُوَ يَشْتَهِيهِ فَيَحْمَدُ اللَّهَ، ثُمَّ يَعُودُ فَيَشْرَبُ ثُمَّ يُنْحِيهِ فَيَحْمَدُ اللَّهَ؛ فَيُوجِبُ اللَّهُ عَزَّوَجَلَّ بِهَا لَهُ الْجَنَّةَ.

218/1722: 'Alī ibn Ibrāhīm, from his father, from Ibn Abī 'Umayr, from Manṣūr ibn Yūnus, from Abū Baṣīr:

Abū 'Abd Allāh said: "Verily, one of you may drink water (in such a manner) that God would assign to him paradise on that account." Then (elaborating this statement), he (A) added: "Verily, one who takes the vessel (containing water), brings it to his mouth, then utters God's Name, then drinks from it, then takes it away again while desiring it, then praises God, then drinks from it again, then takes it away while he

desires it, praises God again, then once more drinks from it, then sets it aside and praises God, God, Almighty and Exalted, makes paradise obligatory for him.”

— ابن أبي عمير، عن الحسن بن عطية، عن عمر بن يزيد قال: قلت لأبي عبد الله عليه السلام: إني سألت الله عز وجل أن يرزقني ما لأفرزقني وإني سألت الله أن يرزقني ولداً فرزقني ولداً وسألته أن يرزقني داراً فرزقني وقد خفت أن يكون ذلك استدرجاً، فقال: أما والله - مع الحمد فلا .

219/1723: Ibn Abi 'Umayr, from al-Ḥasan ibn 'Aṭīyah,¹⁸⁸ from 'Umar ibn Yazīd: 189

'Umar ibn Yazid says: "I said to Abū 'Abd Allāh (A): 'I asked God, Almighty and Exalted, to grant me money; He did. Then I asked Him to grant me a child; He did. Then I asked Him to grant me a house; He did. But I fear lest it should be *istidrāj*' (al-'Imām al-Ṣādiq [A] explains *istidrāj*, referred to in verse 7:182 [We will draw them on little by little whence they know not], in these words: 'When God desires the welfare of someone, He strikes him with an affliction when he commits a sin and inspires him to seek God's forgiveness. But when He desires to make someone wretched, He grants him a bounty when he sins and makes him forget penitence'). The Imam (A) said: 'By God, it cannot be (*istidrāj*) when (the granting of favours is) accompanied with thanksgiving (on the devotee's part).'"

Geniality:

— مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ يَحْيَى، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ عَيْسَى، عَنِ الْحَسَنِ بْنِ مَحْبُوبٍ، عَنْ جَمِيلِ بْنِ صَالِحٍ، عَنْ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ مُسْلِمٍ، عَنْ أَبِي جَعْفَرٍ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ: إِنَّ أَكْمَلَ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ إِيمَانًا أَحْسَنُهُمْ خُلُقًا .

220/1737: Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Isā, from al-Ḥasan ibn Maḥbūb, from Jamīl ibn Ṣāliḥ, from Muḥammad ibn Muslim:

Abū Ja'far (A) said: "The most perfect of the believers in respect of faith is the most genial of them."

— عَلِيُّ بْنُ إِبْرَاهِيمَ، عَنْ أَبِيهِ، عَنْ حَمَادِ بْنِ عَيْسَى؛ عَنِ الْحُسَيْنِ بْنِ الْمُخْتَارِ، عَنِ الْعَلَاءِ بْنِ كَامِلٍ قَالَ: قَالَ أَبُو عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ: إِذَا خَالَطَتِ النَّاسَ فَإِنْ اسْتَطَعْتَ أَنْ لَا تُخَالِطَ أَحَدًا مِنَ النَّاسِ إِلَّا كَأَنَّكَ بَدَكَ الْعُلْيَا عَلَيْهِ فَافْعَلْ، فَإِنَّ الْعَبْدَ يَكُونُ فِيهِ بَعْضُ

التَّقْصِيرِ مِنَ الْعِبَادَةِ وَتَكُونُ لَهُ حُسْنُ خُلُقٍ فَيَبْلُغُهُ اللَّهُ بِـ [حُسْنِ] خُلُقِهِ دَرَجَةَ الصَّائِمِ الْقَائِمِ .

221/1750: 'Alī ibn Ibrāhīm, from his father, from Hammād ibn 'Isā, from al-Ḥusayn ibn al-Mukhtār, from al-'Alā' ibn Kāmil:190

Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) said: "While associating with people, if you can beat all the people that you mix with in being the more kindly disposed towards others, do so. Verily someone may fall short in matters of worship while being genial, but God may elevate him on account of his good-naturedness to the station of the devotee given to fasting and nightly prayers."

Truthfulness and Trustworthiness:

— مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ يَحْيَى ، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ عَيْسَى ، عَنْ عَلِيِّ بْنِ الْحَكَمِ ، عَنْ الْحُسَيْنِ ابْنِ أَبِي الْعَلَاءِ ، عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ : إِنَّ اللَّهَ عَزَّوَجَلَّ لَمْ يَبْعَثْ نَبِيًّا إِلَّا بِصِدْقِ الْحَدِيثِ وَأَدَاءِ الْأَمَانَةِ إِلَى الْبَرِّ وَالْفَاجِرِ .

222/1761: Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Isā, from 'Alī ibn al-Ḥakam, from al-Ḥusayn ibn Abī al-'Alā':

Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) said: "God, Almighty and Exalted, did not send any prophet except to teach truthfulness and fulfilment of trust towards people, whether they be virtuous or wicked."

— عَنْهُ ، عَنْ عُثْمَانَ بْنِ عَيْسَى ، عَنْ إِسْحَاقَ بْنِ عَمَّارٍ وَغَيْرِهِ ، عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ : لَا تَغْتَرُّوا بِصَلَاتِهِمْ وَلَا بِصِيَامِهِمْ ، فَإِنَّ الرَّجُلَ رُبَّمَا لَهَجَ بِالصَّلَاةِ وَالصَّوْمِ حَتَّى لَوْ تَرَكَهُ اسْتَوْحَشَ وَلَكِنْ اخْتَبِرُوهُمْ عِنْدَ صِدْقِ الْحَدِيثِ وَأَدَاءِ الْأَمَانَةِ .

223/1762: From him, from 'Uthmān ibn 'Isā, from Ishāq ibn 'Ammār and others:

Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) said: "Don't be deceived by the people's prayers and fasts. Sometimes a man may get so accustomed to prayers and fasts that their neglect would make him depressed. Rather test persons' worth through their truthfulness and trustworthiness."

— عَنْهُ ، عَنِ ابْنِ مَحْبُوبٍ ، عَنِ الْعَلَاءِ بْنِ رَزِينٍ ، عَنْ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ بْنِ أَبِي يَعْفُورٍ ، عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ : كُونُوا دُعَاةً لِلنَّاسِ بِالْخَيْرِ بغيرِ أَلْسِنَتِكُمْ ، لِيَرَوْا مِنْكُمْ الْإِجْتِهَادَ وَالصَّدْقَ وَالْوَرَعَ .

224/1770: From him, from Ibn Maḥbūb, from al-'Alā' ibn Razīn, from 'Abd Allāh ibn Abī Ya'fūr:

Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) said: "Call people to virtue through means other than your tongues; let them see piety, truthfulness and diligence in you."

(Al-Kulaynī says:) A similar tradition has been narrated by Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad, from al-Ḥajjāl, from al-'Alā'.

— مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ يَحْيَى، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ عَيْسَى، عَنْ عَلِيِّ بْنِ الْحَكَمِ قَالَ: قَالَ أَبُو الْوَلِيدِ حَسَنُ بْنُ زِيَادٍ الصَّقَلِيُّ: قَالَ أَبُو عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ: مَنْ صَدَقَ لِسَانُهُ زَكِيَ عَمَلُهُ فَمَنْ حَسُنَتْ نِيَّتُهُ زِيدَ فِي رِزْقِهِ وَمَنْ حَسُنَ بَرُّهُ بِأَهْلِ بَيْتِهِ مَدَّ لَهُ فِي عُمُرِهِ.

225/1771: Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Isā, from 'Alī ibn al-Ḥakam, from Abū al-Walīd Ḥasan ibn Ziyād al-Ṣayqal:¹⁹²

Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) said: "When one's speech becomes truthful, his deeds also become righteous. When one's intentions become good, his means of livelihood are increased. When one's conduct with his family becomes kindlier, his life is prolonged."

Forgiveness:

— مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ يَحْيَى، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ عَيْسَى، عَنْ ابْنِ فَضَالٍ، عَنْ ابْنِ بُكَيْرٍ، عَنْ زُرَّارَةَ، عَنْ أَبِي جَعْفَرٍ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ: إِنَّ رَسُولَ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَآلِهِ وَسَلَّمَ أَتِيَ بِالْيَهُودِيَّةِ الَّتِي سَمَّيْتُ الشَّاةَ لِلنَّبِيِّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَآلِهِ وَسَلَّمَ فَقَالَ لَهَا: مَا حَمَلَكِ عَلَيَّ مَا صَنَعْتِ؟ فَقَالَتْ: قُلْتُ إِنْ كَانَ نَبِيًّا لَمْ يَضُرَّهُ وَإِنْ كَانَ مَلِكًا أَرَحْتُ النَّاسَ مِنْهُ، قَالَ: فَعَفَا رَسُولُ اللَّهِ (ص) عَنْهَا.

226/1788: Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Isā, from Ibn Faḍḍāl, from Ibn Bukayr, from Zurārah:

Abū Ja'far (A) said: "When the Jewess who had poisoned the Messenger of Allah (S) by offering him a poisoned lamb was brought to him (S), he asked her, 'What made you do what you did?' She replied, 'I thought, if he were a prophet it would not harm him, and if he were only an ordinary king the people would be relieved of his evil.' Thereat the Prophet (S) pardoned her."

Suppression of Anger:

— عَلِيُّ بْنُ إِبْرَاهِيمَ، عَنْ أَبِيهِ، عَنْ ابْنِ أَبِي عُمَيْرٍ، عَنْ هِشَامِ بْنِ الْحَكَمِ، عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ

عليه السلام قال: كان علي بن الحسين عليهما السلام يقول: ما أحب أن لي بذل نفسي حمر النعم وما تجرعت جرعة أحب إلي من جرعة غيظ لا أكافي بها صاحبها.

227/1790: 'Alī ibn Ibrāhīm, from his father, from Ibn Abī 'Umayr, from Hishām ibn al-Hakam:192

Abū 'Abd Allāh (S) said: " 'Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn (A) used to say, 'I would not expose myself to humiliation even in return for red camels, yet I haven't drunk any draught dearer to me than the draught of anger from which I have spared its provocator.' "

— أبو علي الأشعري، عن محمد بن عبد الجبار، عن ابن فضال، عن غالب بن عثمان، عن عبد الله بن منذر، عن الوصافي، عن أبي جعفر عليه السلام قال: من كظم غيظاً وهو يقدر على إمضائه حشا الله قلبه أمناً وإيماناً يوم القيامة.

228/1796: Abū 'Alī al-'Ash'arī, from Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Jabbār, from Ibn Faḍḍāl, from Ghālib ibn 'Uthmān,¹⁹³ from 'Abd Allāh ibn Mundhir,¹⁹⁴ from al-Waṣṣāfī:195

Abū Ja'far (A) said: "One who suppresses his anger while having the power to give vent to it, God shall fill his heart with peace and faith on the Day of Resurrection."

— علي بن ابراهيم، عن أبيه، عن ابن أبي عمير، عن معاوية بن وهب، عن معاذ بن مسلم، عن أبي عبد الله عليه السلام قال: اصبروا على أعداء النعم فإنك لن تكافي من عصي الله فيك بأفضل من أن تطيع الله فيه.

229/1800: 'Alī ibn Ibrāhīm, from his father, from Ibn Abī 'Umayr, from Mu'āwiyah ibn Wahb, from Mu'ādh ibn Muslim:196

Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) said: "Be forbearing in regard to the envious, for you cannot protect yourself in a better way against him who disobeys God in his conduct towards you than by obeying God in your conduct towards him."

Forbearance:

— محمد بن يحيى، عن أحمد بن محمد بن عيسى، عن عبد الله الحجاج، عن حفص بن أبي عائشة قال: بعث أبو عبد الله عليه السلام غلاماً له في حاجة فأبظأ، فخرج أبو عبد الله عليه السلام على أثره لَمَا أَبْظَأَ، فَوَجَدَهُ نَائِماً، فَجَلَسَ عِنْدَ رَأْسِهِ يُرَوِّحُهُ حَتَّى انْتَبَهَ، فَلَمَّا تَنَبَّهَ قَالَ لَهُ أَبُو عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ: يَا فُلَانُ وَاللَّهِ مَا ذَلِكَ لَكَ، تَنَامُ اللَّيْلَ

وَالنَّهَارَ، لَكَ اللَّيْلُ وَلَنَا مِنْكَ النَّهَارُ.

230/1809: Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Isā, from 'Abd Allāh al-Hajjāl,¹⁹⁷ from Ḥafṣ ibn Abī 'Ā'ishah:¹⁹⁸

Ḥafṣ ibn Abī 'Ā'ishah says: "Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) sent his slave on some errand. When he took a long time in returning, Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) went to seek him, to see what had detained him. He found the slave sleeping, and sat down near his head and began to fan him until he rose from his sleep. When he woke up, Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) said to him, 'By God, it is not right for you to do that. You sleep day and night. The night is yours, but you should make yourself available to us during the day.'"

Silence and Carefulness in Speech:

— مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ يَحْيَى، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ عِيسَى، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ أَبِي نَضْرٍ قَالَ: قَالَ أَبُو الْحَسَنِ الرِّضَا عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ: مِنْ عَلَامَاتِ الْفِقْهِ الْجِلْمُ وَالْعِلْمُ وَالصَّمْتُ؛ إِنَّ الصَّمْتَ بَابٌ مِنْ أَبْوَابِ الْحِكْمَةِ إِنَّ الصَّمْتَ يَكْسِبُ الْمَحَبَّةَ إِنَّهُ دَلِيلٌ عَلَى كُلِّ خَيْرٍ.

231/1812: Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Isā, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Abī Naṣr:

Abū al-Ḥasan al-Riḍā (A) said: "Of the signs of learning are silence and forbearance. Indeed, silence is one of the doors of wisdom. Silence endears one to others and it guides one towards every good."

— عَنْهُ، عَنِ الْحَسَنِ بْنِ مَخْبُوبٍ، عَنْ أَبِي عَلِيِّ الْجَوَّانِيِّ، قَالَ: شَهِدْتُ أَبَا عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ وَهُوَ يَقُولُ لِمَوْلَى لَهُ يُقَالُ لَهُ سَالِمٌ - وَوَضَعَ يَدَهُ عَلَى شَفَتَيْهِ وَقَالَ: - يَا سَالِمُ اخْفِظْ لِسَانَكَ تَسْلَمَ وَلَا تَحْمِلِ النَّاسَ عَلَى رِقَابِنَا.

232/1814: From him, from al-Ḥasan ibn Maḥbūb, from Abū 'Alī al-Jawwānī:

Abū 'Alī al-Jawwānī says: "I was present when Abū 'Abd Allāh (A), while putting his hand on the mouth of his slave called Sālim, said to him, 'O Sālim, take care of your tongue to remain secure. Don't make the people get on our necks'."

— عَنْهُ، عَنِ عُثْمَانَ بْنِ عِيسَى قَالَ: حَضَرْتُ أَبَا الْحَسَنِ صَلَوَاتُ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ وَقَالَ لَهُ رَجُلٌ: أَوْصِنِي فَقَالَ لَهُ: اخْفِظْ لِسَانَكَ تَعِزُّ وَلَا تُمَكِّنِ النَّاسَ مِنْ قِيَادِكَ فَتُذِلَّ رَقَبَتُكَ.

233/1815: From him, from 'Uthmān ibn 'Isā:

'Uthmān ibn 'Isā says: "I was present when a man said to Abū al-Ḥasan, may God's benedictions be upon him, 'Give me counsel.' The Imam (A) said to him, 'Be careful of your tongue in order to preserve your honour and power. Don't allow the people to take your reins (i.e. don't impose them upon yourself through indiscrete speech), for then you shall be abased.'"

— أَبُو عَلِيِّ الْأَشْعَرِيِّ ، عَنِ الْحَسَنِ بْنِ عَلِيٍّ الْكُوفِيِّ ، عَنْ عُثْمَانَ بْنِ عِيسَى ، عَنْ سَعِيدِ بْنِ يَسَارٍ ، عَنْ مَنْصُورِ بْنِ يُونُسَ ، عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ : فِي حِكْمَةِ آلِ دَاوُدَ : عَلَى الْعَاقِلِ أَنْ يَكُونَ عَارِفًا بِزَمَانِهِ ، مُقْبِلًا عَلَى شَأْنِهِ ، حَافِظًا لَلِلسَانِهِ .

234/1831: Abū 'Alī al-'Ash'arī, from al-Ḥasan ibn 'Alī al-Kūfi,²⁰⁰ from 'Uthmān ibn 'Isā, from Sa'id ibn Yasār,²⁰¹ from Mansūr ibn Yūnus:

Abū 'Abd Allāh (S) said: "It is said in the (book of) wisdom of the family of David: "The wise man must know his times, keep engaged in his work, and be careful of his speech."

Tolerance:

— أَبُو عَلِيِّ الْأَشْعَرِيِّ ، عَنْ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ عَبْدِ الْجَبَّارِ ، عَنْ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ إِسْمَاعِيلَ بْنِ بَزِيعٍ ، عَنْ حَمْرَةَ بْنِ بَزِيعٍ ، عَنْ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ بْنِ سِنَانٍ ، عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ : قَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَآلِهِ وَسَلَّمَ : أَمَرَنِي رَبِّي بِمُدَارَاةِ النَّاسِ كَمَا أَمَرَنِي بِإِدَاءِ الْفَرَائِضِ .

235/1836: Abū 'Alī al-'Ash'arī, from Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Jabbār, from Muḥammad ibn Ismā'il ibn Bazī', from Ḥamzah ibn Bazī',²⁰² from 'Abd Allāh ibn Sinān:

Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) said: "The Messenger of Allah (S) said: 'My Lord has commanded me to treat people with tolerance, in the same way as He has commanded me regarding the observance of the duties.'"

Humility:

— عِدَّةٌ مِنْ أَصْحَابِنَا ، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ ، عَنْ عُثْمَانَ بْنِ عِيسَى ، عَنْ هَارُونَ بْنِ خَارِجَةَ عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ : إِنْ مِنَ التَّوَاضُّعِ أَنْ يَجْلِسَ الرَّجُلُ دُونَ شَرَفِهِ .

236/1863: A group of our companions, from Aḥmad ibn Abī 'Abd Allāh, from 'Uthmān ibn 'Isā, from Hārūn ibn Khārijah:²⁰³

Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) said: "It is part of humility for a man to take a seat that is lower than his position and dignity."

— عَنْهُ، عَنِ ابْنِ فَضَالٍ وَمُحْسِنِ بْنِ أَحْمَدَ، عَنْ يُونُسَ بْنِ يَعْقُوبَ قَالَ: نَظَرَ أَبُو عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ إِلَى رَجُلٍ مِنْ أَهْلِ الْمَدِينَةِ قَدْ اشْتَرَى لِعِيَالِهِ شَيْئاً وَهُوَ يَحْمِلُهُ، فَلَمَّا رَأَاهُ الرَّجُلُ اسْتَحْيَى مِنْهُ، فَقَالَ أَبُو عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ: اشْتَرَيْتَهُ لِعِيَالِكَ وَحَمَلْتَهُ إِلَيْهِمْ، أَمَا وَاللَّهِ لَوْ لَا أَهْلُ الْمَدِينَةِ لَأَخْبَبْتُ أَنْ أَشْتَرِيَ لِعِيَالِي الشَّيْءَ ثُمَّ أَحْمِلُهُ إِلَيْهِمْ.

237/1864: From him, from Ibn Faḍḍāl and Muḥassin ibn Aḥmad,²⁰⁴ from Yūnus ibn Ya'qūb:²⁰⁵

Yūnus ibn Ya'qūb says: "Once Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) saw a man belonging to the people of Madīnah carrying something that he had bought for his family. When that man saw him he felt ashamed in front of the Imam. Then Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) said, 'You bought it for your family and are carrying it for them. By God, had it not been for the people of Madīnah I would have loved to buy things for my family and carry them home.'"

Love and Hate for God's Sake:

— عِدَّةٌ مِنْ أَصْحَابِنَا، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ عَيْسَى وَأَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ خَالِدٍ؛ وَعَلِيِّ بْنِ إِبْرَاهِيمَ، عَنْ أَبِيهِ، وَسَهْلُ بْنُ زِيَادٍ جَمِيعاً، عَنِ ابْنِ مَحْبُوبٍ، عَنْ عَلِيِّ بْنِ رِئَابٍ، عَنْ أَبِي عُبَيْدَةَ الْحَدَّاءِ عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ: مَنْ أَحَبَّ لِلَّهِ وَأَبْغَضَ لِلَّهِ وَأَعْطَى لِلَّهِ فَهُوَ مِمَّنْ كَمَلَ إِيمَانُهُ.

238/1868: A group of our companions, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Isā and Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Khālid; and 'Alī ibn Ibrāhīm, from his father and Sahl ibn Ziyād;²⁰⁶ and all of them from Ibn Maḥbūb, from 'Alī ibn Ri'āb, from Abū 'Ubaydah al-Ḥadhḍhā':

Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) said: "One who loves for the sake of God and hates for the sake of God and gives for the sake of God is one whose faith has become perfect."

— ابْنُ مَحْبُوبٍ، عَنْ مَالِكِ بْنِ عَطِيَّةَ، عَنْ سَعِيدِ الْأَعْرَجِ، عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ: مَنْ أُوتِيَ عَمْرَى الْإِيمَانِ أَنْ تُحِبَّ فِي اللَّهِ وَتُبْغِضَ فِي اللَّهِ وَتُعْطَى فِي اللَّهِ، وَتَمْنَعَ فِي اللَّهِ.

239/1869: Ibn Maḥbūb, from Mālik ibn 'Aṭīyyah,²⁰⁷ from Sa'id al-'A'raj:²⁰⁸

Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) said: "One of the firmest handles of faith is to love for the sake of God and to hate for the sake of God, to give for the sake of God and to deny for the sake of God."

— ابْنُ مَحْبُوبٍ، عَنْ أَبِي جَعْفَرٍ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ الثُّغْمَانِ الْأَخْوَلِ صَاحِبِ الطَّاقِ، عَنْ
سَلَامِ ابْنِ الْمُسْتَنِيرِ عَنْ أَبِي جَعْفَرٍ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ: قَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَآلِهِ وَسَلَّمَ:
وَدُّ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ لِلْمُؤْمِنِينَ فِي اللَّهِ مِنْ أَعْظَمِ شُعَبِ الْإِيمَانِ أَلَا وَمَنْ أَحَبَّ فِي اللَّهِ وَأَبْغَضَ فِي اللَّهِ
وَأَعْطَى فِي اللَّهِ وَمَنَعَ فِي اللَّهِ فَهُوَ مِنْ أَصْفِيَاءِ اللَّهِ.

240/1870: Ibn Maḥbūb, from Abū Ja'far Muḥammad ibn al-Nu'mān al-'Aḥwal Ṣāhib al-Ṭāq, from Sallām ibn al-Mustanir:

Abū Ja'far (A) said: "The Messenger of Allah (S) said: 'The believer's befriending of another believer for the sake of God is one of the most salient ramifications of faith. Verily, one who loves for the sake of God and hates for the sake of God, gives for the sake of God and refuses for the sake of God, is one of the God's elect'."

— مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ يَحْيَى، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ عَيْسَى، عَنِ الْحُسَيْنِ بْنِ سَعِيدٍ، عَنِ
النَّضْرِ بْنِ سُؤَيْدٍ، عَنْ يَحْيَى الْحَلَبِيِّ، عَنْ بَشِيرِ الْكُنَاسِيِّ، عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ
قَالَ: قَدْ يَكُونُ حُبٌّ فِي اللَّهِ وَرَسُولِهِ وَحُبٌّ فِي الدُّنْيَا فَمَا كَانَ فِي اللَّهِ وَرَسُولِهِ فَثَوَابُهُ عَلَى اللَّهِ
وَمَا كَانَ فِي الدُّنْيَا فَلَيْسَ بِشَيْءٍ.

241/1880: Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Isā, from al-Husayn ibn Sa'id, from al-Naḍr ibn Suwayd, from Yaḥyā al-Ḥalabī, from Bashīr al-Kunāsī:209

Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) said: "One may do something for the love of God and His Messenger, or for the love of the world. As to that which is done for the love of God and His Messenger, its reward lies with God. As to that which is done for the love of the world, it has no reward."

— عَنْهُ، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ أَبِي نَضْرٍ وَابْنِ فَضَالٍ، عَنْ صَفْوَانَ الْجَمَالِ، عَنِ
أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ: مَا التَّقَى مُؤْمِنَانِ قَطُّ إِلَّا كَانَ أَحَدُهُمَا أَشَدَّ حُبًّا لِأَخِيهِ.

242/1882: From him, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Abī Naṣr and Ibn Faḍḍāl, from Ṣafwān al-Jammāl:

Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) said: "Not two believers ever meet but that the better of the two is one who has a greater love of his brother."

To be continued — inshā' Allāh

NOTES:

183. Mu'allā ibn 'Uthmān (or ibn Zayd) Abū 'Uthmān al-'Aḥwal al-Kūfi;

5/VI; N417/A168: *thiqah*.

184. 'Isā ibn Ayyūb; 7/0; source of *tawthiq* untraced.

185. 'Alī ibn Mahziyār, Abū al-Ḥasan al-'Ahwāzi (d. after 254/868); 6/VIII, IX, X; N253/A92/Tf88/Tr381, 417: *thiqah*.

186. Najabah ibn al-Ḥarth; 4/V, VI, VII; Ṣafwān ibn Yaḥyā has narrated from him traditions in al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsi's *al-Tahdhīb* and *al-'Istibsār*.

187. Al-Ḥasan ibn al-Jahm ibn Bukayr ibn A'yan, Abū Muḥammad al-Shaybāni; 6/VII, VIII; Tr347/N50/A43: *thiqah*.

188. Al-Ḥasan ibn 'Aṭiyyah al-Ḥannāṭ al-Muḥāribi al-Kūfi; 5/VI; N46/A42: *thiqah*.

189. 'Umar ibn Muḥammad ibn Yazīd, Abū al-'Aswad Bayyā' al-Sāburi al-Kūfi; 5/VI, VII; N283/Tr353/Tf113/A119: *thiqah*.

190. Al-'Alā' ibn Kāmil Bayyā' al-Sāburi; 5/VI; source of *tawthiq* untraced.

191. Abū al-Walīd al-Ḥasan ibn Ziyād al-Ṣayqal; 5/VI; source of *tawthiq* untraced.

192. Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam, Abū Muḥammad (d. 199/814); 5/VI, VII; Ibn Abi 'Umayr has narrated this tradition from him; N437: *kāna 'thiqatan fī al-riwāyah*; al-Māmaqāni in *Tanqīḥ al-maqāl*, iii, 294: *Mimman ittafaqa al-'aṣḥāb 'alā wathāqatihi wa jalālatihi wa 'izama qadrihi wa rif'at manzilatihi 'ind al-'A'immat al-'Aṭhār*.

193. Ghālib ibn 'Uthmān al-Minqari; 5/VI; N305/A246: *thiqah*.

194. 'Abd Allāh ibn Mundhir ibn Abān; 5/0; source of *tawthiq* untraced.

195. 'Ubayd Allāh ibn al-Walīd, Abū Sa'id al-Waṣṣāfi; 4/IV, V, VI; N231/A113: *thiqah*.

196. Mu'adh ibn Muslim ibn Abi Sārah al-Nahwi; 5/VI; N324/A171: *thiqah*.

197. 'Abd Allāh ibn Muḥammad, Abū Muḥammad al-'Asadi al-Ḥajjal; 6/0; N226/A105: *thiqah thiqah*; Tr381; *thiqah*.

198. Ḥafṣ ibn Abi 'Ā'ishah al-Minqari al-Kūfi; 5/VI; source of *tawthiq* untraced.

199. Abū 'Alī al-Jawwāni; 5/VI; source of *tawthiq* untraced.

200. Al-Ḥasan ibn 'Alī ibn 'Abd Allāh ibn al-Mughīrah al-Bajali al-Kūfi; 7/0; N62/A44: *thiqah thiqah*.

201. Sa'id ibn Yasār al-Duba'i al-Ḥannāṭ; 5/VI, VII; N181/A80: *thiqah*.

202. Ḥamzah ibn Bazi'; 6/VIII; N330/A54: *min ṣāliḥi ḥādhihi al-tā'ifah wa thiqātihim*.

203. Hārūn ibn Khārijah al-Ṣayrafi; 5/VI; N437/A180: *thiqah*.

204. Muḥassin ibn Aḥmad al-Qaysi; 6/VIII; Ibn Abi 'Umayr has narrated from him (*al-Wāfi*, ix, 84).

205. Yūnus ibn Ya'qūb ibn Qays, Abū 'Alī al-Jallāb al-Bajali al-Duhani al-Kūfi; 5/VI, VII; Tr363, 394: *thiqah*; N446: *kāna ḥaṣiyyan 'indahum* (VI, VII and VIII), *muwaththaqan*.

206. Sahl ibn Ziyād, Abū Sa'id al-'Ādami al-Rāzi (d. after 255/869); 7/0; N185: *da'ifan fī al-ḥadīth, ghayr mu'tamad fīhi*; among the rijāl of Ibn Qūlawayh in *Kāmil al-ziyārāt*, 18.

207. Mālik ibn 'Aṭiyyah al-'Aḥmaṣi, Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Bajali al-Kūfi; 5/VI; N422/A169: *thiqah*.

208. Sa'id ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-'A'raj, Abū 'Abd Allāh al-Taymi; 5/VI; N181/A80: *thiqah*.

209. Bashīr al-Kunāsi; 5/VI; source of *tawthiq* untraced.

Ḥadīth al-Thaqalayn: A Study of Its Tawātur Part 3

Fourth/Tenth Century:

164. Al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Ḥasan ibn Sufyān al-Nasawī (d. 303/915).
In Abū Nu‘aym (*Ḥilyat al-‘awliyā’*, i, 355). *Tawthīq* by al-Dhahabī.¹²¹

165. Abū ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Aḥmad ibn Shu‘ayb ibn ‘Alī al-Nasā‘ī
(d. 303/915).
In his *al-Khaṣā‘iṣ*, p. 95, from Muḥammad ibn al-Muthannā (see 104).
A leading scholar and traditionist.

166. Al-Ḥāfiẓ Abū Yaḥyā Zakariyyā ibn Yaḥyā al-Sājī (d. 306/
919).
In al-Ṭabarānī (*al-Mu‘jam al-kabīr*, iii, Nos. 2680, 3052), from him,
from Naṣr ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Washshā’ (see 129). The leading
traditionist of Baṣrah during his days.¹²²

167. Abū Ya‘lā Aḥmad ibn al-Muthannā ibn Yaḥyā al-Tamīmī
al-Mūṣalī (d. 307/919).
In al-Suyūṭī (*Iḥyā’ al-mayyit*, 12), al-Sakhāwī (*al-‘Istijlāb*), al-Samhūdī
(*Jawāhir al-‘iqdayn*), Aḥmad ibn al-Faḍl ibn Bā Kathīr (*Wasīlat al-
ma‘āl*), and al-Badakhshānī (*Miftāḥ al-najā*). A highly respected schol-
ar.¹²³

168. Abū Khubayb al-‘Abbās ibn Aḥmad al-Birtī (d. 308/920).
In Ibn ‘Asākir (*Ta’rīkh*, i, 45), from Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-
Ḥusayn al-Mazrafi, from Abū al-Ḥusayn Muḥammad ibn al-Muhtadī,

*The first part consisted of a preface and a brief explanation of the meaning of *tawātur*, and gave some *ṣaḥīḥ* versions of *Ḥadīth al-Thaqalayn* as well as an account of the different occasions on which the Prophet (S) proclaimed it publicly. The second part was an introduction to *‘Abaqāt al-‘anwār*. It also included a list of the names of the narrators of the ḥadīth up to the end of the 3rd/9th century. This part lists its narrators from the 4th/10th to the present century.

from Abū al-Ḥasan ‘Alī ibn ‘Umar, from him, from Zayd ibn al-Ḥasan al-‘Anmaṭī (193). *Tawthīq* by al-Khaṭīb.¹²⁴

169. Abū Ja‘far Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabari (d. 310/922). In ‘Alī al-Muttaqī al-Hindī (*Kanz al-‘ummāl*, xv, 19, xvi, 252, 253) from him, from Zayd ibn Arqam, Abū Sa‘īd al-Khudri and ‘Alī (A). He is one of the greatest historians, exegetes and legists.

170. Abū Bishr Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Dūlābī (d. 310/922). In his *al-Dhurriyyat al-tāhīrah*, 168 (Qumm, 1407) from Ibrāhīm ibn Marzūq, from Abū ‘Āmir al-‘Aqadī, from Kathīr ibn Zayd, from Muḥammad ibn ‘Umar ibn ‘Alī, from ‘Alī (A). One of the leading traditionists and historians of his era.

171. Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Ishāq ibn Khuzaymah al-Nishābūrī (d. 311/923). In his *Ṣaḥīḥ*, as mentioned by al-Sakhāwī, *op. cit.* One of the imams of ḥadīth.

172. Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān ibn al-Ḥārith, Ibn al-Bāghandī al-Wāsiṭī (d. 312/924). In Ibn al-Maghāzilī (*al-Manāqib*, 234). *Tawthīq* by al-Khaṭīb.¹²⁵

173. Abū ‘Awānah Ya‘qūb ibn Ishāq ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Zayd al-Nishābūrī al-‘Isfarāyīnī (d. 316/928). In his book *al-Musnad al-ṣaḥīḥ*, as mentioned by al-Shaykhānī al-Qādirī in *al-Ṣirāṭ al-sawī*. A leading traditionist of his era.¹²⁶

174. Abū Bakr ibn Abī Dāwūd ‘Abd Allāh ibn Sulaymān al-Sijistānī (d. 316/928). In *al-Ṭahāwī* (*Mushkil al-‘āthār*, iv, 368), from him. A leading scholar of Iraq in his time.¹²⁷

175. Al-Ḥasan ibn Musallim ibn al-Ṭabīb al-Ṣan‘ānī. In al-Ṭabarānī (*Mu‘jam shuyūkhīh*, i, 135) from him.

176. Abū al-Qāsim ‘Abd Allāh ibn Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Baghawī (d. 317/929). In al-Ḥamawī, *Farā‘id al-simṭayn*, ii, 272.

177. Al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Ṭahāwī, Abū Ja‘far Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Salamah (d. 321/933). In his *Mushkil al-‘āthār*, iv, 368, with two chains of transmission from Zayd ibn Arqam. A leading writer and scholar of his era.¹²⁸

178. Abū Ja‘far al-‘Uqaylī, Muḥammad ibn ‘Amr ibn Ḥammād (d. 322/934). In his *Kitāb al-du‘afā’* (MS. 362 in Dār al-Kutub al-Zāhiriyyah, Damascus, F. 104) through three chains from Abū Sa‘īd and Jābir. A leading scholar of his age.¹²⁹

179. Abū ‘Umar Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd Rabbih al-Qurṭubī (d. 328/939). In his *al-‘Iqd al-farīd*. He is a well-known scholar of a high standing.

180. Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Qāsim ibn Muḥammad ibn

Bashshār, known as Ibn al-'Anbārī (d. 328/939).

In his *al-Masāḥif*, from Zayd ibn Arqam and from Zayd ibn Thābit. An eminent scholar. *Tawthīq* and *taṣḍīq* by Ibn Khallikān and al-Sam'ānī.¹³⁰

181. Abū 'Abd Allāh Ḥusayn ibn Ismā'il ibn al-Ḍabbī al-Muḥāmili (d. 330/941).

In his *Amālī*, where he regards it as *ṣaḥīḥ*, as mentioned by 'Alī al-Muttaqī in *Kanz al-'ummāl* (xv, 122-123). A great scholar (*imām*) of Baghdād.¹³¹

182. Abū al-'Abbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Sa'id, known as Ibn 'Uqdah (d. 332/943).

In his *Kitāb al-wilāyah*, known as *Kitāb al-muwālāt*, through 8 chains, as mentioned by al-Sakhāwī (*op. cit.*), al-Samhūdī (*op. cit.*), Ibn Bā Kathīr (*op. cit.*) and al-Shaykhānī al-Qādirī (*op. cit.*). An eminent scholar of his era.

183. Al-Ḥasan ibn Ya'qūb, Abū al-Faḍl al-Bukhārī (d. 342/953). In al-Bayhaqī (*Sunan*, ii, 148) from al-Ḥākim, from him, from Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Farrā' al-'Abdī. Also in Ibn 'Asākir in *Mu'jam shuyūkhīh* (MS. F. 11). *Tawthīq* by al-Dhahabī.¹³²

184. Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Ya'qūb ibn al-'Akhrām al-Shaybānī (d. 344/955).

In al-Bayhaqī (*Sunan*, vii, 30) from him, from Abū Aḥmad al-Farrā'. Author of a voluminous *Musnad*. An eminent traditionist from Nishābūr.

185. Abū Muḥammad 'Abd Allāh ibn Ja'far al-'Iṣfahānī (d. 346/957).

In Abū Nu'aym (*Hilyat al-'awliyā'*, ix, 64) from him, from Aḥmad ibn Yūsuf al-Ḍabbī. Teacher of Abū Nu'aym, who reports from Abū 'Umar al-Qaṭṭān that he saw 'Abd Allāh ibn Ja'far in a dream after his death. When asked, "How did God treat you?" He replied, "He forgave me and put me with the prophets in their station."¹⁸³

186. Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Tamīm al-Khayyāṭ al-Qanṭarī (d. 348/959).

In al-Ḥākim (*al-Mustadrak*, iii, 90) from him. Al-Ḥākim considers him *thiqah* and considers this narration of his as *ṣaḥīḥ*.

187. Abū Ja'far Muḥammad ibn 'Alī ibn Duḥaym al-Shaybānī (d. 351/962).

In al-Bayhaqī (*Sunan*, x, 113) from Abū Muḥammad Janāḥ ibn Nadhīr, from him, from Ibrāhīm ibn Ishāq al-Zuhri. Also in al-Ḥākim (*al-Mustadrak*, iii, 533) from him, where he, and after him al-Dhahabī in his *Talkhīṣ*, has regarded it as *ṣaḥīḥ*. The *qāḍī* and traditionist of Kūfah.¹³⁴

188. Abū Muḥammad Da'laj ibn Aḥmad ibn Da'laj al-Sijzī al-Mu'addal (d. 315/962).

In al-Ḥākim (*al-Mustadrak*, iii, 109-110) from him, from Zayd ibn

Arqam. A leading traditionist and legist of his era and author of *al-Musnad al-kabir*.

189. Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn 'Umar ibn Muslim al-Tamīmī, known as Ibn al-Ji'ābī (d. 355/966).

In his book *al-Ṭālibiyyīn*, as mentioned by al-Sakhāwī (*al-'Istijlāb*) and al-Samhūdī (*Jawāhir al-'iqdayn*). A leading scholar.

190. Abū al-Qāsim Sulaymān ibn Aḥmad al-Ṭabarānī (d. 360/970). In his works *al-Mu'jam al-ṣaghīr*, *al-Mu'jam al-kabīr* and *al-Mu'jam al-'awsaṭ* with different chains. One of the imams of ḥadīth.

191. Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn Ja'far ibn Ḥamdān ibn Mālik ibn Shabīb al-Qaṭī'i (d. 368/978).

In al-Ḥākim (*al-Mustadrak*, iii, 109) from him, from Zayd ibn Arqam. A famous traditionist.¹³⁵

192. Al-Ḥāfiẓ Abū al-Shaykh Ibn Ḥayyan al-Bustī al-'Iṣfahānī (d. 369/979).

In his compilation of traditions (MS. No. 3637, F. 60, in Dār al-Kutub al-Zāhiriyyah, Damascus) from Abū Sa'id. *Tawthīq* by Abū Nu'aym, Ibn al-'Athīr, Ibn Mardawayh, Ibn al-'Imād and al-Dhahabī.¹³⁶

193. Abū Mansūr Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Ṭalḥah al-'Azharī (d. 370/980).

In his *Tahdhīb al-lughah* under *'itrah*, as mentioned in *Lisān al-'Arab* (iv, 538), and also under *ḥabl* (*Lisān al-'Arab*, xi, 137). A legist and leading philologist and lexicographer (*imām fi al-lughah*).¹³⁷

194. Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Bālwayh (d. 374/984).

In al-Ḥākim (*al-Mustadrak*, iii, 109) from him, from 'Abd Allāh ibn Aḥmad. Al-Ḥākim has considered his narration as *ṣaḥīḥ*. *Tawthīq*, also, by Abū Bakr al-Barqānī.¹³⁸

195. Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Ḥamdān Abū 'Amr al-Ḥirī (d. 376/986).

In Abū Nu'aym (*Ḥilyat al-'awliyā'*, i, 355) from him, from al-Ḥasan ibn Sufyān al-Nasawī. Also in al-Khwārazmī (*Maqatal al-Ḥusayn*, i, 104) from 'Abū al-'Alā', from Zāhir al-Shahḥānī, from Abū Sa'id al-Ganjrudī, from him. Grammarian, legist and traditionist.

196. Abū al-Ḥusayn Muḥammad ibn al-Muẓaffar ibn Mūsā ibn 'Isā al-Baghdādī (d. 379/989).

In Ibn al-Maghāzilī (*al-Manāqib*, 236) from Abū Ṭālib Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn 'Uthmān, from him, from Zayd ibn Arqam. *Tawthīq* by al-Dhahabī, who calls him *'al-'imām al-thiqah* and al-Dārquṭnī, al-Ṣafadī, and al-Suyūṭī.¹³⁹

197. 'Abd Allāh ibn Aḥmad ibn Ḥammūyah al-Ḥamawī al-Sarakhsī (d. 381/991).

In Ibn 'Asākir, *Mu'jam shuyūkhīh* MS. F. 205.

198. Abū al-Ḥasan 'Alī ibn 'Umar ibn Aḥmad al-Dārquṭnī (d. 385/995).

In Ibn Bā Kathīr al-Makkī (*wasīlat al-ma'āl*, MS.) from him from Umm Salamah. A leading scholar and traditionist (*imām*) of his era, legist and expert on *rijāl*.¹⁴⁰

199. Al-Ḥāfiẓ Abū al-Ḥasan 'Alī ibn 'Umar ibn Shādhān al-Sukkari (d. 386/996).

In Ibn 'Asākir (*Ta'rikh Dimashq*, ii, 45). *Tawthīq* by al-'Atiqī and al-Khaṭīb.¹⁴¹

200. Abū Ṭāhir Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Mukhalliṣ al-Dhahabī (d. 393/1002).

In al-Ḥamawī (*Farā'id al-simṭayn*, ii, 272) from him, from Abū Sa'id al-Khudri. *Tawthīq* by al-Sam'ānī.¹⁴²

201. Abū Muḥammad Sulaymān ibn Dāwūd al-Baghdādī.

In *Manāqib Ahl al-Bayt*, MS.

Fifth/Eleventh Century:

202. Abū 'Ubayd Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Harawī (d. 401/1010).

In his *Kitāb al-gharībayn*, under "thaql". A leading scholar and philologist.

203. Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Ḥākim al-Nishābūrī (d. 405/1014).

In his *Mustadrak* (iii, 109, 174) through a *sahīḥ* chain of transmission from Zayd ibn Arqam. There he also narrates it through another chain. He was the leading traditionist of his age (*imām al-muḥiddithīn*).¹⁴³

204. Abū Sa'd al-Malik ibn Muḥammad al-Wā'iẓ al-Nishābūrī al-Kharkūshī (d. 406/1015).

In his book *Sharaf al-nubuwwah*, as mentioned in Shihāb al-Dīn al-Dawlatābādī (*Manāqib al-sādāt*). One of the leading scholars.¹⁴⁴

205. Yaḥyā ibn Ibrāhīm Abū Zakariyyā al-Muzakkī al-Nishābūrī (d. 414/1023).

In al-Bayhaqī (*Sunan*, vii, 30) from him, from Zayd ibn Arqam. *Ta'dīl* by al-Dhahabī.¹⁴⁵

206. Al-Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār ibn Aḥmad al-Mu'tazilī (d. 414/1023).

In his *al-Mughnī* (xx, 191, 136). An eminent scholar and Shāfi'i legist.

207. Abū al-Faraj Muḥammad ibn 'Abd Allāh ibn Aḥmad ibn Shahriyār al-'Iṣfahānī.

In al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī (*Talkhīṣ al-mutashābih fī al-rasm*, MS. in Dār al-Kutub al-Zāhiriyyah, F. 30) from him, from al-Ṭabarānī, from Abū Sa'id al-Khudri. One of the eminent scholars of the 5th/11th century and al-Khaṭīb's teacher.

208. Abū Ishāq Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm al-Tha'labī (d. 427/1036).

In his *tafsīr* (*al-Kashf wa al-bayān*, MS.). One of the leading scholars of the Qur'ān, a legist, grammarian, philologist and writer.¹⁴⁶

209. Abū Nu'aym Aḥmad ibn 'Abd Allāh al-'Iṣfahānī (d. 430/1038).

In his *Manqabat al-Muṭahharīn*, with several chains and in different wordings from Abū Sa'īd, Zayd ibn Arqam, Anas ibn Mālik, al-Barā' ibn 'Azib and Jubayr ibn Muṭ'am. Also in his *Hilyat al-'awliyā'*, as mentioned by al-Samhūdī (*Jawāhir al-'iqdayn*) from Ḥudhayfah ibn Usayd. One of the great traditionists.¹⁴⁷

210. Abū Naṣr Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Jabbār al-'Utbi.

In his *al-Ta'rikh al-Yamīnī*. An eminent historian and man of letters.¹⁴⁸

211. Abū Sa'd Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Ganjrudī (d. 453/1061).

In Akḥṭab Khwārazm (*Maqtal al-Ḥusayn 'alayhi al-salām*, i, 104). *Tawthīq* by al-Sam'ānī.¹⁴⁹

212. Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn 'Ubayd Allāh ibn Khalaf.

In Ibn al-'Asākir in the *Mu'jam* of his *shuyūkh* (F. 11), from Ibn al-'Irāqī, from him, from al-Ḥākim al-Nishābūrī. One of the eminent scholars of 5th century.

213. Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn al-Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī al-Bayhaqī (d. 458/1066).

In al-Khwārazmī (*al-Manāqib*, 93) from him. A leading traditionist, legist and writer.¹⁵⁰

214. Abū Ghālib Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Sahl al-Naḥwī, known as Ibn Bushrān (d. 462/1069).

In Ibn al-Maghāzili (*al-Manāqib*) from him. A scholar of known standing.

215. Abū 'Umar Yūsuf ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Namarī al-Qurṭubī known as Ibn 'Abd al-Barr (d. 463/1071).

As mentioned by Shāh Walī Allāh in *Izālat al-khifā*. One of the leading scholars.¹⁵¹

216. Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn 'Alī ibn Thābit al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī (d. 463/1071).

In his *al-Muttafaq wa al-muftaraq* from Jābir, as mentioned by al-Badakhshānī. One of the great scholars; traditionist and historian.¹⁵²

217. Ibn al-Gharīq Abū al-Ḥusayn ibn al-Muhtadī bi Allāh (d. 465/1072).

In Ibn 'Asākir (*Ta'rikh Dimashq*, ii, 45). *Tawthīq* by al-Khaṭīb and Ibn al-Jawzī.¹⁵³

218. Abū al-Ḥasan 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Dawūdī al-Būshanjī (d. 467/1074).

Ibn 'Asākir, *Mu'jam shuyūkhīh*. A leading scholar (imām).¹⁵⁴

219. Abū Muḥammad Ḥasan ibn Aḥmad ibn Mūsā al-Ghandajānī (d. 467/1074).

In Ibn al-Maghāzili (*al-Manāqib*, 235) from him, from Abū Sa'īd al-Khudrī. *Tawthīq* by al-Sam'ānī.¹⁵⁵

220. Abū al-Ḥasan 'Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Ṭayyib al-Jullābī, known

as Ibn al-Maghāzili (d. 483/1090).

In his *al-Manāqib* through various chains. A leading scholar.

221. Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Futūḥ ibn 'Abd Allāh ibn Ḥāmid al-'Azdi al-Ḥamīdi (d. 488/1095).

In *al-Jam' bayn al-Ṣaḥīḥayn*, from Zayd ibn Arqam. *Tawthīq* by Ibn Khallikān, al-Dhahabī, Ibn Mākūlā, al-Salmāsī and al-Ṣafādī.¹⁵⁶

222. Al-Sayyid Abū al-Ma'ālī Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Zayd al-Samarqandī (d. 488/1095).

In *'Uyūn al-'akhbār*.

223. Abū al-Muẓaffar Mansūr ibn Muḥammad al-Sam'ānī (d. 489/1096).

In his *al-Risālat al-qawwāmiyyah*, from Abū Sa'id al-Khudrī. A leading scholar of his age.¹⁵⁷

Sixth/Twelfth Century:

224. Abū 'Alī Ismā'īl ibn Aḥmad ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Bayhaqī (d. 507/1113).

In al-Khwārazmī, *al-Manāqib*. A leading scholar of his era.¹⁵⁸

225. Abū al-Faḍl Muḥammad ibn Ṭāhir ibn 'Alī al-Shaybānī al-Maqdisī, known as Ibn al-Qaysarānī (d. 507/1113).

In his biographical account in al-Maqrizī's *al-Ta'rikh al-muqfā*, it is mentioned that he wrote a book *Kitāb ṭarīq ḥadīth: Innī tārikun fī kum al-thaqalayn*. An eminent scholar. *Tawthīq* by al-Maqrizī in *al-Ta'rikh al-muqfā*.

226. Abū Shujā' Shīrwayh ibn Shahrḍār ibn Shīrwayh al-Daylamī al-Hamadānī (d. 509/1115).

In *Firdaws al-'akhbār* (MS). A scholar well-known to biographers.

227. Abū Muḥammad Ḥusayn ibn Mas'ūd al-Farrā' al-Baghawī, known as Muḥyi al-Sunnah (d. 516/1122).

In *Maṣābiḥ al-Sunnah* (*Sharḥ* by al-Qādirī, v, 593, 600), from Zayd ibn Arqam and Jābir; in *Ma'ālim al-tanzīl*, vi, 101, vii, 6; and in *Sharḥ al-Sunnah*, as mentioned by al-Khalkhālī in *al-Mafātīḥ*. An eminent scholar.

228. Abū Bakr al-Mazrafi, Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Shaybānī (d. 527/1132).

In Ibn 'Asākir (*Ta'rikh Dimashq*, ii, 45) from him. *Tawthīq* by al-Sam'ānī and al-Dhahabī.¹⁵⁹

229. 'Abd al-Ghāfir al-Fārsī (d. 529/1134)

In his *Majma' al-gharā'ib fī gharīb al-ḥadīth*.

230. Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn al-'Amrakī al-Mattūthī al-Būsanjī.

In Ibn 'Asākir *Mu'jam shuyūkhīh* (MS., F. 205). He was Ibn 'Asākir's teacher.

231. Muḥammad ibn Ḥammūyah al-Juwaynī (d. 530/1135).

In al-Ḥamawī (*Farā'id al-simṭayn, al-simṭ al-thānī, bāb 55*) from him. A well-known scholar of his age.¹⁶⁰

232. Abū Naṣr Aḥmad ibn 'Alī al-Ṭūsi, known as Ibn al-'Irāqī. Ibn 'Asākir in *Mu'jam shuyūkhīh* (F. 11).

233. Zāhir ibn Ṭāhir ibn al-Qāsim al-Shahḥāmī al-Mustamli (d. 533/1138).

Al-Khwārazmī (*Maqatal al-Ḥusayn, i, 104*). *Tawthīq* by Ibn al-Jazari.¹⁶¹

234. Abū al-Ḥusayn Razīn ibn Mu'āwiyah al-'Abdarī (d. 535/1140).

In *al-Jam' bayn al-Ṣiḥāḥ al-sittah*, MS. A leading traditionist.

235. Abū al-Barakāt 'Abd al-Wahhāb ibn al-Mubārak al-'Anmāṭī al-Baghdādī (d. 538/1143).

In Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī, *Tadhkirat khawāṣṣ al-'ummah, 322-323*. *Tawthīq* by al-Ṣam'ānī, al-Salafī and Abū Sa'd.¹⁶²

236. Jār Allāh al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1143).

In *al-Fā'iḳ fī gharīb al-ḥadīth, i, 170*. A great scholar, philologist, grammarian, traditionist, exegete and man of letters.

237. Ibn al-'Arabī al-Mālikī (d. 543/1148).

In *Āriḍat al-'ahwadhī, xiii, 73*.

238. Al-Qāḍī Abū al-Faḍl 'Iyāḍ ibn Mūsā al-Yahṣabī (d. 544/1149).

In *al-Shifā' bi ta'rīf ḥuqūq al-Muṣṭafā* (al-Qārī's *sharḥ, 485, 657-658*). A leading scholar, traditionist, grammarian and historian of his era.¹⁶³

239. Abū Muḥammad Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Alī al-'Āsimī. In his book *Zayn al-fatā fī tafsīr Sūrat Hal Atā*, MS. from Abū Dharr and Zayd ibn Arqam.

240. Al-Qāḍī Abū Muḥammad ibn 'Aṭīyyah al-Muḥārībī al-Ghar-nāṭī (d. 546/1151).

In his exegesis *al-Muḥarrar al-wajīz fī tafsīr Kitāb Allāh al-'Azīz, i, 34*. Scholar, exegete, faqīh, grammarian, traditionist and man of letters.¹⁶⁴

241. Abū al-Faḍl ibn Nāṣir al-Salāmī al-Baghdādī (d. 550/1155). In al-Ḥamawī (*Farā'id al-simṭayn, simṭ 2, bāb 55*). *Tawthīq* by Ibn al-Jawzī.¹⁶⁵

242. Abū al-Mu'ayyad Muwaffaq ibn Aḥmad al-Makkī, known as Akḥṭab Khwārazm (538/1143).

In his *al-Manāqīb* with his *isnād* from Zayd ibn Arqam.

243. Al-Ḥāfiẓ Abū al-'Alā' al-Ḥasan ibn Aḥmad al-'Aṭṭār al-Hama-dānī (d. 569/1173).

In al-Khwārazmī (*Maqatal al-Ḥusayn, i, 104*) from him, from Abū al-Qāsim Zāhir ibn Ṭāhir al-Shahḥāmī al-Mustamli al-Nishābūrī. *Tawthīq* by al-Jazari.¹⁶⁶

244. 'Umar ibn 'Isā al-Khaṭībī al-Dihlaqī.

In his book *Lubāb al-'albāb fī faḍā'il al-Khulafā' wa al-'Aṣḥāb, bāb 4, F. 147, MS. 3912 in Maktabah Nūr 'Uthmāniyyah and MS. 3343 in*

al-Maktabah al-Sulaymāniyyah in Turkey.

245. Abū al-Qāsim 'Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn ibn Hibat Allāh al-Dimashqī, known as Ibn 'Asākir (d. 571/1175).

In *Ta'riḫ Ibn Kathīr* (v, 208) and al-Kanjī in *Kifāyat al-ṭālib*. One of the great traditionists and historians.

246. Muḥammad ibn 'Umar ibn Aḥmad ibn 'Umar al-'Iṣfahānī known as Abū Mūsā al-Madīnī (d. 581/1185).

In his *Tatimmat Ma'rifat al-Ṣaḥābah*, appended to Abū Nu'aym's book, and as mentioned by al-Sakhāwī; al-Samhūdī, Ibn al-'Athīr (*Uṣd al-ghābah*) and Ibn Ḥajar (*al-'Iṣābah*). *Tawthīq* by al-Dhahabī, al-Sam'ānī, Ibn al-Najjār, al-Tha'ālibī and others.¹⁶⁷

247. Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Muslim ibn Abī al-Fawāris al-Rāzī.

In his *al-Kitāb al-mubīn fī faḍā'il al-'Imām Amīr al-Mu'minīn*, MS.

248. Sirāj al-Dīn Abū Muḥammad 'Alī ibn 'Uthmān ibn Muḥammad al-'Ushī al-Farghānī al-Ḥanafī (d. after 569/1174).

In his *Niṣāb al-'akhbār li tadhkīrat al-'akhyār*, as mentioned by al-Dawlatābādī in *Hidāyat al-su'adā'*. A leading scholar of his age.¹⁶⁸

249. Abū al-Faraj 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn 'Alī ibn Muḥammad, known as Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1200).

In his *al-Musalsalāt*.

Seventh/Thirteenth Century:

250. Abū al-Futūḥ As'ad ibn Maḥmūd ibn Khalaf al-'Ijlī al-'Iṣfahānī (d. 600/1203).

In his *Faḍā'il al-Khulafā'*, as mentioned by al-Samhūdī, *op. cit.*

251. Al-Mubārak ibn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Karīm, known as Ibn al-'Athīr al-Jazarī (d. 606/1209).

In *Jāmi' al-'uṣūl*, i, 187; x, 102, 103, from Jābir and Zayd ibn Arqam and also in his *al-Nihāyah*, under 'thaql' and 'itrah'. A great grammarian, philologist, exegete and legist.

252. Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn 'Umar al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209).

In his exegesis *Mafātīḥ al-ghayb*, vii, 173. A great exegete, mutakallim and philosopher.

253. Abū Muḥammad 'Abd al-'Azīz ibn al-'Akhḍar al-Janābadhī al-Baghdādī (d. 611/1214).

In his *Ma'ālim al-'Itrat al-Nabawiyyah*, as mentioned by al-Samhūdī, *op. cit.*, and Ibn Bā Kathīr al-Makkī (*Wasīlat al-ma'āl*, MS.). *Tawthīq* by al-Dhahabī.¹⁶⁹

254. Al-Rāfi'ī (d. 623/1226).

In *al-Tadwīn*, twice, in the biographical account of Aḥmad ibn Mehrān Abū Ja'far al-Qaṭṭān, from Jābir, and that of 'Amr ibn Rāfi' ibn al-Furāt al-Bajalī, from Zayd ibn Arqam. A leading scholar.

255. Muwaffaq al-Dīn 'Abd al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī (d. 629/1231). In his *al-Mujarrad li lughat al-ḥadīth*, I, 253.

256. Abū al-Ḥasan 'Izz al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Karīm, known as Ibn al-'Athīr (d. 630/1232). In *Usd al-ghābah*, iii, 147, from 'Abd Allāh ibn Ḥanṭab. One of the leading historians.

257. Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Maḥmūd ibn al-Ḥasan ibn Hibat Allāh, known as Ibn al-Najjār (d. 642/1244). As mentioned by al-Kanjī in his *Kifāyat al-ṭālib*. A leading scholar of his era, traditionist, historian and author of several works.¹⁷⁰

258. Diyā' al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Wāḥid al-Maqdisī al-Ḥanbalī (d. 643/1245). In his *al-Mukhtārah*, as mentioned by Ibn Bā Kathīr al-Makki (*Wasīlat al-ma'āl*). A leading scholar and traditionist.¹⁷¹

259. Raḍī al-Dīn Ḥasan ibn Muḥammad al-Ṣaghānī (d. 650/1252). In his *Mashāriq al-'anwār* (Ibn al-Mālik's *sharḥ*, iii, 157) from Zayd ibn Arqam. An eminent grammarian, traditionist and legislator.¹⁷²

260. Abū Sālim Muḥammad ibn Ṭalḥah al-Qarashī al-Naṣībī al-Shāfi'ī (d. 652/1254). In his *Maṭālib al-sa'ūl*, 8, from *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*. A leading scholar of his era.¹⁷³

261. Abū al-Muẓaffar Shams al-Dīn Yūsuf ibn Qizughli, Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzi (d. 654/1256). In his *Tadhkirat khawāṣṣ al-'ummah*, 322—323, where he establishes its authenticity and *ṣiḥḥah*. A leading scholar whose biography has been written by all the major biographers.

262. Abū al-'Abbās Aḥmad ibn 'Umar al-Qurṭubī al-'Anṣārī (d. 656/1258). In his *Talkhīṣ Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*, ii, F. 100. A leading scholar of his era.¹⁷⁴

263. 'Izz al-Dīn 'Abd al-Ḥamid ibn Hibat Allāh ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd al-Mu'tazilī (d. 656/1258). In his *Sharḥ Nahj al-balāghah*, vi, 375. An eminent Mu'tazilī scholar of his era and man of letters.

264. Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf ibn Muḥammad al-Kanjī al-Shāfi'ī (d. 658/1260). In his *Kifāyat al-ṭālib*, *bāb fī bayān ṣiḥḥat khuṭbatihī bimā' yud'ā Khumman* 259, from al-Laythī, from Abū al-Waqt, from al-Dawūdī. A leading scholar.

265. Abū al-Faṭḥ Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr al-'Abīwardī al-Shāfi'ī (d. 667/1268). As mentioned by al-Suyūṭī in *Iḥyā' al-mayyit*, 30, and al-Badakhshī, *op. cit.*, from him, from Abū Sa'id. A leading traditionist (*al-īmām al-muḥaddith*).¹⁷⁵

266. Abū Zakariyyā Muḥyi al-Dīn Yaḥyā ibn Sharaf al-Nawawī

(d. 676/1277).

In his *Tahdhīb al-'asmā' wa al-lughāt*, i, 347, and *al-Minhāj fī sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*, xv, 180, from *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*. One of the leading scholars (*al-'imām al-'allāmah*).

267. Abū Muḥammad Sharaf al-Dīn 'Umar ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Wāḥid al-Mūsili.

In his book *al-Na'im al-muqīm li 'Itrat al-Nabī al-'Azīm*, Maktabat Ayāsofiyā MS. 3504, F. 64, 69.

268. Al-Qāḍi Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Bayḍāwī (d. 685/1286).

In *Tuḥfat al-'abrār*, F. 236, *sharḥ* on al-Baghawī's *Maṣābiḥ al-Sunnah*, from Jābir. A leading exegete and legist.

269. Abū al-'Abbās Muḥibb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Ṭabari al-Makki al-Shāfi'i (d. 694/1294).

In *Zakhā'ir al-'uqbā fī manāqib Dhawī al-Qurbā*, 16, from Zayd ibn Arqam. A well-known scholar.

270. Sa'id al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Farghānī (d. 699/1299).

In his exposition, in Persian, of Ibn al-Fārid's poem, *Tā'iyyah*, under the couplet:

وَأَوْضِحَ بِالتَّأْوِيلِ مَا كَانَ مُشْكَلًا عَلَيَّ بِعِلْمِ نَالَةٍ بِالْوَصِيَّةِ

271. Nizām al-Dīn Ḥasan ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Qummi al-Nishāburi, known as al-Nizām al-'A'raj.

In his exegesis *Gharā'ib al-Qur'an*, i, 349. An outstanding scholar and exegete.

Eight/Fourteenth Century:

272. Zāhir al-Dīn 'Abd al-Ṣamad al-Fāriqi al-Fārābi (d. after 707/1307).

In his *sharḥ* of al-Baghawī's *Maṣābiḥ al-Sunnah* (MS. 60 in al-Maktabat al-Sulaymāniyyah, Istanbul, F. 340 b.)

273. Abū al-Faḍl Jamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Mukarram al-'Anṣari al-'Ifriqi al-Miṣri (d. 711/1311).

In *Lisān al-'Arab*, xi, 137, from Ibn Ishāq al-'Azharī. A leading lexicographer and philologist.

274. Ṣadr al-Dīn Abū al-Majāmi' Ibrāhim ibn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Mu'ayyad al-Ḥamawī (d. 722/1322).

In his *Farā'id al-simṭayn* (ii, 250, 268, 272, 274) from Zayd ibn Arqam, Abū Sa'id al-Khurdrī, and Ḥudhayfah ibn Usayd. An eminent scholar.

275. Abū al-'Abbās Najm al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Makki ibn Yāsīn al-Qamūli (d. 727/1327).

In *Takmilat Tafsīr al-Rāzī*. A leading jurist of his era.¹⁷⁶

276. Ibn Taymiyyah al-Ḥarrānī (d. 728/1328).

In his *Minhāj al-Sunnah*, 105, from *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*, where he tries to misinterpret its meaning.

277. 'Alā' al-Dīn 'Alī ibn Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm al-Baghdādī, known as al-Khāzin (d. 741/1340).

In his tafsīr, *Lubāb al-ta'wīl*, i, 328, vi, 102, vii, 6. A leading scholar and exegete.¹⁷⁷

278. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Hānsawī.

In his *Dustūr al-ḥaqā'iq* from Zayd ibn Arqam, as mentioned by Malik al-'Ulamā' al-Dawlatābādī in *Hidāyat al-su'adā'*, MS. A leading scholar.

279. Abū 'Abd Allāh Walī al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Khaṭīb al-Tabrizī.

In his *Mishkāt al-maṣābīḥ*, iii, 255, 258, from Zayd ibn Arqam and Jābir. An eminent scholar.

280. Abū al-Ḥajjāj Yūsuf ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Yūsuf al-Mizzī (d. 742/1341).

In his *Tuḥfat al-'ashraf bi ma'rifat al-'atraf* from al-Tirmidhī, Muslim and al-Nasā'ī. A leading scholar and writer.¹⁷⁸

281. Ḥasan ibn Muḥammad al-Ṭayyibī (d. 743/1342).

In his *Sharḥ al-Mishkāt*, MS. A leading scholar of his era.¹⁷⁹

282. Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn al-Muzaffar al-Shāhrūdī al-Khalkhālī (d. 745/1344).

In his *al-Mafātīḥ fī sharḥ al-Maṣābīḥ*, MS. A leading scholar.¹⁸⁰

283. Athīr al-Dīn Abū Ḥayyān al-'Andalusī (d. 745/1344).

In his exegesis *al-Baḥr al-muḥīṭ*, i, 12, A leading scholar of his era.¹⁸¹

284. Shams al-Dīn Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1347).

As mentioned by al-Shaykhānī al-Qādirī in *al-Ṣirāṭ al-sawī*, MS. A leading scholar, historian, biographer, traditionist and an authority on rijāl.

285. 'Alā' al-Dīn ibn al-Turkamānī al-Ḥanafī (d. 749/1348).

In his *al-Jawhar al-naqī 'alā Sunan al-Bayhaqī*, vii, 31 (published with *Sunan al-Bayhaqī*, Hyderabad, India). An eminent scholar.

286. Jamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf ibn al-Ḥasan al-Zarandī al-Madanī al-'Anṣarī (d. after 750/1349).

In his *Nazm Durar al-simṭayn*, 231-232, from Zayd ibn Arqam, Abū Sa'īd and Jābir. An eminent scholar and writer.

287. Badr al-Dīn Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥasan ibn Ḥabīb al-Ḥalabī.

In *al-Najm al-thāqib fī ashraf al-manāṣib* (F. 86, MS. 5883, Dār al-Kutub al-Zāhiriyyah, Damascus). An eminent scholar.¹⁸²

288. Zayn al-'Arab 'Alī ibn 'Abd Allāh ibn Aḥmad al-Miṣrī (d. after 751/1350).

In his *sharḥ* of al-Baghawī's *Maṣābīḥ al-Sunnah* (F. 356, MS. 59, al-Maktabat al-Sulaymāniyyah, Istanbul).

289. Sa'īd al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Mas'ūd ibn Muḥammad al-

Kāzerūni (d. 758/1357).

In *al-Muntaqā ft sirat al-Muṣṭafā*. An eminent scholar and traditionist.

290. Ismā'īl ibn Kathīr ibn Ḍaw' al-Qarashī al-Dimashqī (d. 774/1372).

In his exegesis (v, 457; vi 199, 200) and his work on history. A leading historian, exegete and legist.

291. Muḥammad ibn Qāsim al-Nuwayrī al-'Iskandarāni (d. after 775/1373).

In *Kitāb al-'ilmām* (Hyderabad, 1390), iii, 154.

292. Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Wāsiṭī (d. 776/1374).

In his *Majma' al-'aḥbāb* (MS. 2096 in al-Maktabat al-Sulaymāniyyah, Istanbul, F. 78) from *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*. An exegete and legist.

293. Al-Sayyid 'Alī Shihāb al-Dīn al-Hamadāni (d. 786/1384).

In his *al-Mawaddah fī al-qurbā* from Abū Sa'id and Jubayr ibn Muṭ'im. An eminent scholar.

294. Al-Sayyid Muḥammad al-Ṭāliqāni.

In *Risālah-ye Qiyāfeh-nāmeḥ*, as mentioned by al-Badakhshāni in *Jāmi' al-salāsil*, MS. in the former's biographical account.

295. Sa'd al-Dīn Mas'ūd ibn 'Umar al-Taftāzāni (d. 791/1389).

In *Sharḥ al-Maqāsid*, ii, 221. A great scholar, grammarian, legist, exegete and mutakallim.¹⁸³

296. Abū 'Abd Allāh Ḥusām al-Dīn Ḥamid ibn Aḥmad al-Maḥalli.

In his *Maḥasin al-'azhār fī tafṣīl manāqib al-'itrat al-'akhyār al-'aṭhār* as mentioned by al-'Allāmah Muḥammad ibn Ismā'īl al-'Amīr in *al-Rawḍat al-nadiyyah*. An eminent scholar and legist.

Ninth/Fifteenth Century:

297. Nūr al-Dīn 'Alī ibn Abī Bakr ibn Sulaymān al-Haythami (d. 807/1404).

In his *Majma' al-zawā'id wa manba' al-fawā'id*, 9. An eminent scholar.¹⁸⁴

298. Majd al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ya'qūb al-Firūzābādī al-Shirāzi (d. 817/1414).

In his *al-Qāmūs al-muḥīṭ*, iii, 343. One of the great lexicographers.

299. Muḥammad ibn Maḥmūd al-Ḥāfiẓī al-Bukhārī al-Naqshbandī, known as Khwājah Pārsā (d. 822/1419).

In his *Faṣl al-khiṭāb* from al-Tirmidhī, from Jābir, Ḥudhayfah ibn Usayd and Zayd ibn Arqam. An eminent scholar and the most eminent of the Khulafā' of Khwājah Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband.

300. Abū al-'Abbās Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn 'Alī al-Maqrizi (d. 845/1441).

In his *Ma'rifat mā yajib li Al al-Bayt al-Nabawī* (Cairo: Dār al-'I'tisām,

1392, ed. by Muḥammad Aḥmad 'Āshūr, p. 38) from al-Tirmidhī. A great historian and traditionist.¹⁸⁵

301. 'Uthmān ibn Ḥājī ibn Muḥammad al-Harawī.

In his *Sharḥ on Maṣābiḥ al-Sunnah* (F. 178, MS 288 in al-Maktabat al-Sulaymāniyyah).

302. Malik al-'Ulamā' Shihāb al-Dīn ibn Shams al-Dīn al-Zawālī al-Dawlatābādī (d. 849/1445).

In his *Hidāyat al-su'adā'* (MS.) from *al-Maṣābiḥ*, *al-Mashāriq*, *Mishkāt al-'anwār*, *al-'Umdah*, *al-Durar*, *Tāj al-'asāmī*, *al-'Arba'in 'an al-'arba'in*, *Kitāb al-Shifā'*, *Nisāb al-'akhbār*, etc., and *Manāqib al-sādāt*. A leading scholar of his era.¹⁸⁶

303. Nūr al-Dīn 'Alī ibn Muḥammad, known as Ibn al-Ṣabbāgh al-Mālikī (d. 855/1451).

In *al-Fuṣūl al-muhimmah*, 23. An eminent scholar.

304. Al-Ḥāfiẓ ibn Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī (d. 852/1448).

In *al-Maṭālib al-'āliyah bi zawā'id al-masānīd al-thamāniyah*, iv, 65 from 'Alī (A), where he judges its *isnād* to be *ṣaḥīḥ*. From 'Alī and Abū Hurayrah in his *Zawā'id Musnad al-Bazzāz* MS., F. 277. One of the leading scholars.¹⁸⁷

Tenth/Sixteenth Century:

305. Abū al-Khayr Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Sakhāwī (d. 902/1496).

In his *Istijlāb irtiqā' al-ghuraf*, MS. through many different *asnād* and sources from a number of Ṣaḥābah, such as Abū Sa'id, Zayd ibn Arqam, Jābir, Ḥudhayfah ibn Usayd, Khuzaymah, Sahl ibn Sa'd, Ḍamrah al-'Aslamī, 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn 'Awf, Ibn 'Abbās, Ibn 'Umar, 'Alī (A), Abū Rāfi', Abū Hurayrah and others. A leading scholar of his era.¹⁸⁸

306. Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī al-Kāshifī (d. 910/1504).

In his *al-Risālah al-'aliyyah, fī al-'aḥādīth al-Nabawiyyah*, 29, 30 and his exegesis *al-Mawāhib al-'aliyyah*, ii, 367.

307. Jalāl al-Dīn 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn 'Abī Bakr al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505).

In his *Iḥyā' al-mayyit bi faḍā'il Ahl al-Bayt*, 11, 12, 19, 26, 27, 30, *Nihāyat al-'ifḍāl*, MS. *al-'Asās fī faḍā'il Banī al-'Abbās*, MS. *al-'Ināfah fī rutbat al-Khilāfah*, *al-Budūr al-sāfirah*, his exegesis *al-Durr al-manthūr*, 11, 60, vi, 70, *al-Jāmi' al-ṣaghīr*, and *al-Khaṣā'ish al-kubrā*, ii, 266 through several chains from Muslim, al-Tirmidhī, al-Nasā'ī, al-Ḥākim, 'Abd ibn Ḥamid, Aḥmad, Abū Ya'lā, al-Bazzāz and al-Ṭabarānī from Zayd ibn Arqam, Zayd ibn Thābit, Abū Sa'id al-Khudrī, Abū Hurayrah, 'Alī (A), Jābir and 'Abd Allāh ibn Ḥanṭab. One of the great scholars in the history of Islam.

308. Nūr al-Dīn 'Alī ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Samhūdī (d. 911/1505).

In his *Jawāhir al-'iqdayn fī faḍl al-sharafayn sharaf al-'ilm al-jalī wa al-nasab al-'alī*, MS., from more than twenty Ṣaḥābah from various recognized compilations of ḥadīth. An eminent scholar of his era.

309. Al-Faḍl ibn Rūzbahān al-Khunjī al-Shirāzī.

In his *Sharḥ-e 'aqā'id*, in Persian, written at the behest of 'Abd Allāh Khān Uzbek, the ruler of Bukhārā.

310. Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Qaṣṭallānī al-Shāfi'ī (d. 923/1517).

In his *al-Mawāhib al-madaniyyah* (al-Zarqānī's *sharḥ*, vii, 4-8). An eminent scholar and author of famous commentaries on *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim* and *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*.

311. Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad al-'Alqamī (d. 929/1522).

In *al-Kawkab al-munīr fī sharḥ al-Jāmi' al-ṣaḡhīr*, MS. A leading scholar of his era.

312. 'Abd al-Wahhāb ibn Muḥammad ibn Rafī' al-Dīn al-Bukhārī (d. 932/1525).

In his exegesis *Tafsīr Anwarī* (MS) from al-Tha'labī and Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal from Abū Sa'id. A leading scholar of his era.¹⁸⁹

313. Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-Dimashqī al-Ṣāliḥī (d. 942/1535).

In his *Subul al-hudā wa al-rashād fī sirat khayr al-'ibād*, known as *al-Sīrat al-Shamsiyyah*, as mentioned by al-Ḥalabī in *Insān al-'uyūn*. A scholar of eminence.

314. Al-Ḥāfiẓ ibn al-Dayba' al-Shaybānī (d. 943/1536).

In his *Taysīr al-'uṣūl ilā Jāmi' al-'uṣūl*, iii, 297. An eminent scholar and traditionist.

315. Shams al-Dīn Ibn Ṭulūn al-Dimashqī (d. 953/1546).

In his *al-Shadharāt al-dhahabiyyah* 66 (published under the title *al-'A'imat al-'Ithnā 'ashar*, Beirut, 1377 H.) ed. Dr. Salāḥ al-Dīn al-Munjid, from *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*. A leading scholar of his era.¹⁹⁰

316. Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Sharbīnī al-Khaṭīb (d. 968/1560).

In his exegesis *al-Sirāj al-munīr*, ii, 528, iv, 167.

317. Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Alī ibn Ḥajar al-Haythamī al-Makki (d. 973/1565).

In his *al-Ṣawā'iq al-muḥriqah*, 25, 89-90, 132 and *al-Minah al-Makkiyyah fī sharḥ al-qasīdat al-hamziyyah* under the couplet:

مُعَمَّدُ سَيِّدِ الْكُونِيْنَ وَالْثَّقَلَيْنِ وَالْفَرِيقَيْنِ مِنْ عَرَبٍ وَمِنْ عَجَمٍ

A leading scholar of his era.

318. Nūr al-Dīn 'Alī ibn Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Muttaqī al-Hindī (d.975/1567).

In his *Kanz al-'ummāl* from al-Ṭabarānī from Zayd ibn Arqam. A leading scholar, traditionist, author and legist.

319. Muḥammad Ṭāhir al-Fitannī al-Gujrātī (d. 986/1578). In his *Majma' al-bihār fī gharīb al-ḥadīth* under *thaql* and *'itrah*, as well as in *Takmilat Majma' al-bihār* under *thaql*. A leading scholar of his age.

320. 'Abbās ibn Mu'in al-Dīn, known as Mirzā Makhdūm al-Jurjānī al-Shirāzī (d. 988/1580).

In his *al-Nawāqid* from *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim* from Zayd ibn Arqam. An eminent scholar.

321. Al-Shaykh Ibn 'Abd Allāh ibn al-Shaykh 'Abd Allāh al-'Aydarūs al-Yamanī (d. 990/1582).

In *al-'Iqd al-Nabawī wa al-sirr al-Muṣṭafawī* (MS) from Ibn Abī Shaybah, from 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn 'Awf. An eminent scholar.

322. Kamāl al-Dīn ibn Fakhr al-Dīn al-Jahromī (d. after 994/1586).

In his *al-Barāhīn al-qāṭi'ah fī tarjumat al-Sawā'iq al-muḥriqah*, in Persian. An eminent scholar from Bijāpūr, India.¹⁹¹

323. Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Muṣṭafā ibn Ibrāhīm al-Ṣūfī, known as Badr al-Dīn al-Rūmī.

In his *Tāj al-durrah fī sharḥ al-burdah* under the lines:

آل بيت النبي إن فؤادي ليس يسئله عليكم التأساء

324. 'Aṭā' Allāh ibn Faḍl Allāh al-Shirāzī, known as Jamāl al-Dīn al-Muḥaddith (d. 1000/1591).

In his *al-'Arba'in fī faḍā'il Amīr al-Mu'minīn* (MS) and *Rawḍat al-'aḥbāb fī siyar al-Nabī wa al-'Āl wa al-'Aṣḥāb*, from Ḥudhayfah ibn Usayd. An eminent scholar.

Eleventh/Seventeenth Century:

325. 'Alī ibn al-Sultān Muḥammad al-Harawī, known as 'Alī al-Qārī (d. 1013/1604).

In his *Sharḥ al-Shifā'*, 485, from Muslim and al-Nasā'ī, from Zayd ibn Arqam. In his *al-Mirqāt fī sharḥ al-Mishkāt*, v, 593-594, 600-601 from Muslim, from Zayd ibn Arqam; from Imām Aḥmad from Abū Sa'īd al-Khudrī; and from al-Tirmidhī from Jābir and Zayd ibn Arqam. An eminent scholar.

326. 'Abd al-Ra'ūf ibn Tāj al-'Ārifīn al-Munāwī (d. 1031/1621).

In his *Fayḍ al-Qadīr fī sharḥ al-Jāmi' al-ṣaghīr*, ii, 174, 571; iii, 14, 15, a *sharḥ* of al-Suyūṭī's work that expounds it with the help of the *riwāyāt* of al-Qurtubī and al-Samhūdī. An eminent scholar.

327. Nūr al-Dīn 'Alī ibn Ibrāhīm ibn 'Alī al-Ḥalabī al-Shāfi'ī (d. 1033/1623).

In his *Insān al-'uyūn fī sirat al-'Amīn wa al-Ma'mūn*, iii, 336. An eminent scholar.

328. Aḥmad ibn al-Faḍl ibn Muḥammad Bā Kathīr al-Makki (d. 1037/1627).

In his *Wasīlat al-ma'āl fī 'add manāqib al-'Āl* (MS) from Imām Aḥmad, al-Ṭabarānī, Abū Ya'lā, al-Ḥākim, al-Tirmidhī, Ibn 'Uqdah, al-Diyā', al-Zarandī, Abū al-Ḥasan Yaḥyā ibn al-Ḥasan, al-Ji'ābī, al-Dūlābī, al-Bazzāz, Abū Nu'aym, Ibn Ḥajar and al-Dārquṭnī. An eminent scholar.¹⁹²

329. Maḥmūd ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Alī al-Shaykhānī al-Qādirī al-Madani.

In *al-Ṣirāt al-sawī ft manāqib Āl al-Nabī* (MS.), from Muslim, al-Ḥākim, al-Bazzāz, Ibn 'Uqdah, al-Ṭabarānī, Ibn Sa'd and al-Zarandī, from Zayd ibn Arqam, Abū Sa'id, Zayd ibn Thābit, 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn 'Awf, Abū Ḥurayrah, Jābir, Ḥudhayfah ibn Usayd and others

330. Al-Sayyid Muḥammad ibn al-Sayyid Jalāl Māh 'Ālam al-Bukhārī (d. 1045/1635).

In *Tadhkirat al-'abrār* (MS.). A respectable scholar.¹⁹³

331. Al-Shaykh 'Abd al-Ḥaqq al-Dehlawī (d. 1052/1642).

In his *al-Lumu'āt fī sharḥ al-Mishkāt* from Muslim and al-Tirmidhī, and also in *Madārij al-nubuwwah*, 520. A leading legist, traditionist and scholar of his era in India.¹⁹⁴

332. Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Umar al-Khafāji al-Miṣri al-Ḥanafī (d. 1069/1658).

In his *Nasīm al-riyād ft sharḥ Shifā' al-Qāḍi 'Iyād*, iii, 409; iv, 283, 324, while expounding the narrations of al-Qāḍi 'Iyād. A leading scholar.¹⁹⁵

333. 'Alī ibn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm al-'Azizī al-Būlāqī al-Shāfi'i (d. 1070/1659).

In his *al-Sirāj al-munīr ft sharḥ al-Jāmi' al-ṣaghīr*, i, 322; ii, 51. A leading traditionist.¹⁹⁶

334. Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān al-Sūsī al-Maghribī (d. 1094/1683).

In his *Jam' al-fawā'id min Jāmi' al-'uṣūl wa Majma' al-zawā'id*, i, 16, ii, 236. (Meerut 1346H.), from al-Tirmidhī and Muslim. A leading traditionist.¹⁹⁷

335. Mullā Ya'qūb al-Banyānī al-Lāhori (1098/1686).

In his *'Aqā'id*. A well-known scholar of his age.¹⁹⁸

Twelfth/Eighteenth Century:

336. Ṣāliḥ ibn Mahdī ibn 'Alī al-Muqbilī al-Ṣan'ānī (d. 1108/1696).

In his *Mulḥaqāt al-'abhāth al-musaddadah* as quoted in *Khulāṣat 'Abaqāt al-'anwār*, i, 312.

337. 'Abd al-Malik al-'Iṣāmī al-Makki (d. 1111/1699).

In his *Simt al-nujūm al-'awālī*, ii, 502 from Ibn Abī Shaybah.

338. Muḥammad Amin al-Muḥibbī (d. 1111/1699).

In his *Janā al-jannatayn fī tamyiz naw'ay al-mathnayayn*, 31.

339. Aḥmad Afandī, known as Munajjim Bāshī (d. 1113/1701). As mentioned in his biographical account in *Tanḍīd al-'uqūd al-saniyyah*. An eminent scholar, as mentioned in the above account.

340. Kamāl al-Dīn Ibn Ḥamzah al-Ḥusaynī (d. 1120/1708). In his *al-Bayān wa al-ta'rīf*, i, 164; ii, 136, from Aḥmad, Muslim, 'Abd ibn Ḥamid, al-Ṭabarānī and al-Ḥākim. A leading scholar, traditionist and grammarian of his era.¹⁹⁹

341. Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Bāqī ibn Yūsuf al-'Azharī al-Zarqānī al-Mālikī (d. 1122/1710). In his *Sharḥ al-Mawāhib al-laduniyyah*, vii, 4–8, while expounding the traditions narrated by al-Shihāb al-Qaṣṭallānī in *al-Mawāhib al-laduniyyah*.

342. Ḥusām al-Dīn ibn Muḥammad Bā Yazīd ibn Badī' al-Dīn al-Sahāranpūri. In *Marāfiḍ al-rawāfiḍ* from Muslim, al-Tirmidhī and al-Ṭabarānī.

343. Mirzā Muḥammad ibn Mu'tamad Khān al-Ḥārithī al-Badakhshī. In *Miftāḥ al-najā fī manāqib Al al-'Abā* (MS.), from Muslim, al-Tirmidhī, al-Ṭabarānī, al-Ḥākim, 'Abd ibn Ḥamid, Ibn al-'Anbārī, al-Bārūdī and al-Ḥākim al-Tirmidhī. Also in *Nazl al-'abrār bimā saḥḥa min manāqib Ahl al-Bayt al-'Aṭhār*, from Muslim, al-Ḥākim al-Tirmidhī and al-Ṭabarānī. An eminent scholar of his era.²⁰⁰

344. Raḍī al-Dīn ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Alī ibn Ḥaydar al-Ḥusaynī al-Shāmī al-Shāfi'i (d. 1142/1729). In his *Tanḍīd al-'uqūd al-saniyyah bi tamhīd al-dawlat al-Ḥusayniyyah*.

345. 'Abd al-Ghanī ibn Ismā'īl al-Nābulusī al-Ḥanafī (d. 1143/1730). In his *Dhakhā'ir al-mawārith*, i, 215. An eminent scholar of his era.

346. Muḥammad Ṣadr al-'Ālam. In his *Ma'ārif al-'ulā fī manāqib al-Murtaḍā* (MS.). An eminent scholar.²⁰¹

347. Ibrāhīm al-Shabrāwī Shaykh al-'Azhar (d. 1162/1749). In his *al-'Iṭḥāf bi ḥubb al-'ashrāf*, 6, from Muslim and al-Tirmidhī.

348. Shāh Walī Allāh ibn 'Abd al-Raḥīm al-Dehlawī (d. 1176/1762).

In his *Izālat al-khafā' 'an sirat al-Khulafā'*, from Muslim, al-Ḥākim and Abū 'Amr and in *Qurrat al-'aynayn*, 119, 168, from Muslim and al-Tirmidhī. An eminent scholar.

349. Muḥammad Mu'in ibn Muḥammad Amin al-Sindī. In his *Dirāsāt al-labīb fī al-'uswat al-ḥasanah bi al-ḥabīb*. An eminent scholar of ḥadīth, kalām and Arabic literature.²⁰²

350. Muḥammad ibn Ismā'īl al-'Amīr al-Yamānī al-Ṣan'ānī (d. 1182/1768). In his *al-Rawḍat al-nadiyyah fī sharḥ al-Tuḥfat al-'Alawiyyah*, through

several chains and from several sources.

351. Muḥammad ibn 'Alī al-Ṣabān.

In *Is'āf al-rāghibīn*, 110-111, from Muslim, Aḥmad and al-Nasā'ī, from Zayd ibn Arqam.

352. Abū al-Fayḍ Muḥibb al-Dīn Muḥammad Murtaḍā al-Wāsiṭī al-Zubaydī al-Ḥanafī al-Bilgīrāmī.

In his *Tāj al-'arūs min jawāhir al-qāmūs*, vii, 345 under *thaql*. A leading philologist and a legist and traditionist.²⁰³

353. Aḥmad ibn 'Abd al-Qadīr ibn Bakr al-'Ujaylī al-Shāfi'ī (d. 1182/1768).

In his *Dhakhīrat al-ma'āl fī sharḥ 'iqd jawāhir al-li'āl fī manāqib al-'Āl* (MS.). An eminent scholar.²⁰⁴

Thirteenth/Nineteenth Century:

354. Mīr Ghani al-Ḥusaynī (d. 1207/1792).

In his *Durrat al-yatīmah fī ba'd faḍā'il al-Sayyidat al-'Azīmah* (MS. 3671 in al-Maktabat al-Zāhiriyyah, F. 71-77). An eminent scholar of his days.

355. Muḥammad Mubīn ibn Muḥibb Allāh al-Lacknowī (d. 1220/1805).

In his *Wasīlat al-najāt fī manāqib al-sādāt*, from Muslim, al-Tirmidhī and al-Ḥākim.²⁰⁵

356. Muḥammad Ikrām al-Dīn ibn Muḥammad Niẓām al-Dīn al-Dehlawī.

In his *Sa'adat al-Kawnayn fī bayān faḍā'il al-Ḥasanayn*, from *al-Mashāriq*, *al-Maṣābiḥ* and other works. An eminent scholar.²⁰⁶

357. Rashīd al-Dīn Khān al-Dehlawī (d. 1243/1827).

In his *al-Ḥaqq al-mubīn fī faḍā'il Ahl Bayt Sayyid al-Mursalīn* from *al-Ṣawā'iq*, *al-Shifā'*, *Qurrat al-'aynayn*, *Nazl al-'abrār* and *Sharḥ al-Maqāsīd*, and from Aḥmad, Ibn Jarīr, and al-Ḥākim.²⁰⁷

358. Mīrzā Ḥasan 'Alī Muḥaddith al-Laknowī (d. 1255/1839).

In his *Tafriḥ al-'aḥbāb fī manāqib al-'Āl wa al-'Aṣḥāb* from Muslim and al-Tirmidhī. An eminent scholar.²⁰⁸

359. 'Abd al-Raḥīm ibn 'Abd al-Karīm al-Ṣafīpūrī (d. 1267/1850).

In his *Muntahā al-'arab*, i, 143, under *thaql*. An eminent philologist and grammarian.²⁰⁹

360. Walī Allāh ibn Ḥabīb Allāh al-Laknowī (d. 1270/1853).

In his *Mir'āt al-mu'minīn* (MS.). An eminent scholar.²¹⁰

361. 'Ashīq 'Alī Khān al-Laknowī.

In his *Dakhīrat al-'uqbā fī dhikr faḍā'il A'immat al-Hudā*.

362. Al-Shaykh Ḥasan al-'Adawī al-Ḥamzāwī.

In his *Mashāriq al-'anwār fī fawz ahl al-'i'tibār*, 86, from Ibn Ḥajar, Aḥmad, al-Suyūṭī, Muslim and al-Nasā'ī.

363. Sulaymān ibn Ibrāhīm, known as Khwājah Kalān al-Ḥusaynī al-Balkhī al-Qundūzī.

In his *Yanābt' al-mawaddah*, 27—41, from many early authorities on tradition, such as Muslim, al-Tirmidhī, al-Tha'labī, Aḥmad, 'Abd Allāh ibn Aḥmad, and later scholars such as al-Samhūdī, al-Khwārazmī, al-Sayyid 'Alī al-Hamadānī, al-Zarandī and others, from eminent Ṣaḥābah.

364. Mawlawī Ṣiddīq Ḥasan Khān al-Qannawjī.

In his *al-Sirāj al-wahhāj fi sharḥ Ṣaḥḥ Muslim ibn al-Ḥajjāj* has expounded Muslim's narrations and cited the narrations of al-Tirmidhī and others.

365. Mawlawī Ḥasan al-Zamān.

In his *al-Qawl al-mustaḥsan ft fakhr al-Ḥasan*.

Fourteenth/Twentieth Century:

366. Aḥmad Zaynī Dahlān.

In his *al-Sīrat al-Nabawiyyah*, ii, 300.

367. Aḥmad Diyā' al-Dīn al-Kamushkhānawī.

In his *Rāmūz al-'aḥādīth*, 144.

368. Mu'min ibn Ḥasan al-Shablanjī.

369. Behjat Buhlūl Afandī.

In his *Ta'rīkh Āl-e Muḥammad*, 45.

370. Al-Shaykh Manṣūr 'Alī Nāṣif al-Miṣrī.

In his *al-Tāj al-jāmi' li al-'uṣūl*, iii, 308-309.

371. Yūsuf ibn Ismā'īl al-Nabhānī.

In his *al-Fath al-kabīr*, i, 451 and *al-Sharaf al-mu'abbad*, 18, 24.

372. Al-'Abbās ibn Aḥmad al-Yamanī.

In his *al-Rawḍ al-naḍīr*, v, 343, 466.

373. Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Mubārakpūrī.

In his *Tuḥfat al-'aḥwadhī bi sharḥ Jāmi' al-Tirmidhī*, x, 287-291.

374. Aḥmad al-Bannā al-Sā'ātī.

In his *al-Fath al-rabbānī bi tartīb Musnad Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal al-Shaybānī*, i, 186 and *Bulūgh al-'amānī min asrār al-Fath al-rabbānī*, iv, 26.

375. 'Abd Allāh al-Shāfi'ī.

In his *Arjaḥ al-maṭālib*, 335-341, from leading traditionists from Zayd ibn Thābit, Zayd ibn Arqam, Abū Sa'īd al-Khudrī, Jābir ibn 'Abd Allāh, Zayd ibn Aslam, 'Alī (A), Abū Dharr, Abū Rāfi'. Abū Hurayrah, Umm Salamah, Ḥudhayfah ibn Usayd.

376. Maḥmūd Abū Rayyah.

In his *Aḍwā' alā al-Sunnat al-Muḥammadiyyah*, 404.

377. Tawfiq Abū 'Alam.

In his *Ahl al-Bayt*, 77-80.

378. Ḥabīb al-Raḥmān al-'A'zamī.

In his *ḥawāshī on al-Maṭālib al-'āliyah bi zawā'id al-masānīd al-thamānī-*

yah, iv, 65.

To be continued — inshā' Allāh

NOTES:

121. *Al-'Ibar*, i, 355.
122. *Tadhkirat al-huffāz*, 709.
123. *Ibid*, ii, 707; *al-'Ibar*, ii, 124; *Wafayāt al-'a'yān*, vii, 241; *Mir'āt al-jinān*, ii, 243; *Ṭabaqāt al-huffāz*, 306.
124. *Ta'riḫ Baghdād*, xii, 152.
125. *Tadhkirat al-huffāz*, ii, 732.
126. *Wafayāt al-'a'yān*, v, 436.
127. *Ta'riḫ Baghdād*, ix, 464.
128. *Tadhkirat al-huffāz*, 808.
129. *Ibid.*, 833.
130. *Al-'Ansāb*, under 'al-'Anbārī'; *Wafayāt al-'a'yān*.
131. *Tadhkirat al-huffāz*, iii, 824.
132. *Al-'Ibar*, iii, 259.
133. *Akhbār Isfahān*, ii, 80.
134. *Al-'Ibar*, ii, 293.
135. *Al-'Ansāb*, under 'al-Qaṭī'i'.
136. *Akhbār Isfahān*, ii, 90; *al-Lubāb*, i, 404; *Tadhkirat al-huffāz*, 945; *Shadharāt al-dhahab*, iii, 69; *al-'Ibar*, ii, 351.
137. *Wafayāt al-'a'yān*, iii, 458.
138. *Ta'riḫ Baghdād*, i, 282.
139. *Tadhkirat al-huffāz*, iii, 980; *al-Wāfi bi al-Wafayāt*, v, 34; *Ṭabaqāt al-huffāz*, 389.
140. *Al-'Ibar*, iii, 28; *al-'Asadī*, *Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfi'iyyah*, MS; *al-Qannawjī*, *al-Tāj al-mukallal*, 82.
141. *Ta'riḫ Baghdād*, xii, 40.
142. *Al-'Ansāb*, under 'al-Mukhallas'.
143. *Tadhkirat al-huffāz*, iii, 93; *Wafayāt al-'a'yān*, iii, 408; *al-Mukhtaṣar*, ii, 144; *Mir'āt al-jinān*, iii, 14; *al-'Ibar*, iii, 91; *al-Ṣubḥī*, *Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfi'iyyah*, iv, 155.
144. *Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfi'iyyah*, v, 222.
145. *Al-'Ibar*, iv, 118.
146. *Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfi'iyyah*, i, 429; iv, 58; *Wafayāt al-'a'yān*, i, 61; *al-'Ibar*, iii, 161; *Mir'āt al-jinān*, iii, 46; *al-Dāwūdī*, *Ṭabaqāt al-mufasssirin*, i, 65.
147. *Tadhkirat al-huffāz*, iii, 1091; *al-Wāfi bi al-Wafayāt*, vii, 81; *al-Tāj al-mukallal*, 31.
148. *Yatīmat al-dahr*, iv, 397.
149. *Al-'Ansāb*, under 'al-Ganjrudī.'
150. *Tadhkirat al-huffāz*, iii, 1132.
151. *Al-Dhahabī*, *Siyar a'lām al-nubalā'*, MS.
152. *Tadhkirat al-huffāz*, iii, 1135.
153. *Ta'riḫ Baghdād*, iii, 108; *al-Muntaẓam*, vii, 283.
154. *Al-'Ansāb*, under 'al-Dāwūdī.'
155. *Al-'Ansāb*, under 'al-Ghandajānī.'
156. *Wafayāt al-'a'yān*, ii, 410; *Tadhkirat al-huffāz*, iv, 1218; *al-Wāfi bi al-Wafayāt*, iv, 317.
157. *Wafayāt al-'a'yān*, ii, 380.
158. *Ibn al-Wardī*, *Tatimmat al-Mukhtaṣar*, ii, 31.
159. *Al-'Ansāb*, under 'al-Mazraqī'; *al-Dhahabī*, *Ma'rifat al-qurrā' al-kibār*, i, 391.

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160. *Al-Wāfi bi al-Wafayāt*, iii, 28.
 161. *Ṭabaqāt al-qurrā'*, i, 288.
 162. *Tadhkirat al-ḥuffāz*, iv, 1282; *Ṭabaqāt al-ḥuffāz*, 464.
 163. *Wafayāt al-'a'yān*, iii, 152; *Tatimmat al-Mukhtasar*, ii, 72; *Ṭabaqāt al-ḥuffāz*, 468.
 164. Ibn Farḥūn, *al-Dībāj al-mudhahhab*, ii, 57.
 165. *Al-Muntazam*, x, 162; *Tadhkirat al-ḥuffāz*, 1289.
 166. *Ṭabaqāt al-qurrā'*, i, 204.
 167. *Tadhkirat al-ḥuffāz*, iii, 1334; *Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfi'iyyah*, vi, 161; *al-Tha'āl-ibi*, *Maqālīd al-'asānīd*; *Wafayāt al-'a'yān*, iii, 414.
 168. 'Abd al-Qadīr al-Qarashī, *al-Jawāhir al-mudī'ah*, i, 367.
 169. *Tadhkirat al-ḥuffāz*, iv, 1383.
 170. *Al-'Ibar*, v, 179; *Tadhkirat al-ḥuffāz*, iv, 1405.
 171. *Ibid.*, iv, 1428.
 172. Ibn Shākir, *Fawāt al-Wafayāt*, i, 358; *al-'Ibar*, v, 205; *Mir'āt al-jinān*, iv, 121.
 173. Al-Kanjī, *Kifāyat al-tālib*, 231; *al-Badakhshī*, *Miftāḥ al-najā*, MS.
 174. Ibn Farḥūn, *al-Dībāj al-mudhahhab*, 68.
 175. *Tadhkirat al-ḥuffāz*, iv, 1476; *Ṭabaqāt al-ḥuffāz*, 511.
 176. Al-'Asnawī, *Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfi'iyyah*, ii, 332; *al-Suyūṭī*, *Husn al-muḥā-darah*, i, 424.
 177. Ibn Hajar al-'Asqalānī, *al-Durar al-kāminah*, ii, 79.
 178. Al-Shawkānī, *al-Badr al-tāli' li maḥāsin min ba'd al-qarn al-sābi'*, ii, 352.
 179. *Al-Durar al-kāminah*, ii, 68; *Bughyat al-wi'āt*, 228; *al-Badr al-tāli'*, i, 229.
 180. Al-'Asnawī, *Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfi'iyyah*, i, 505.
 181. *Al-Wāfi bi al-Wafayāt*, v, 267-283.
 182. *Al-Durar al-kāminah*, ii, 113; *Abnā' al-ghumar*, i, 249.
 183. Al-Shawkānī, *al-Badr al-tāli'*, ii, 303.
 184. Al-Sakhāwī, *al-Daw' al-lāmi'*, v, 200.
 185. *Al-Manhal al-Ṣāfi*, i, 394-399; *Abnā' al-ghumar*, ix, 170.
 186. 'Abd al-Ḥaqq al-Dehlawī, *Nuzhat al-khawāṭir*, ii, 19.
 187. *Al-Daw' al-lāmi'*, ii, 36-40.
 188. *Ibid.*, vii, 1-32.
 189. Al-Sayyid Muḥammad al-Bukhārī, *Tadhkirat al-'abrār*, MS; *Nuzhat al-khawāṭir*, iv, 223.
 190. Al-Ghazzī, *al-Kawākib al-sā'irah*, ii, 52.
 191. *Nuzhat al-khawāṭir*, iv, 274.
 192. Al-Muḥibbī, *Khulāṣat al-'athar*, i, 271; Raḍī al-Dīn al-Shāmi, *Tanḍīd al-'uqūd al-saniyyah*.
 193. *Ibid.*, v, 337.
 194. *Ibid.*, v, 201.
 195. *Khulāṣat al-'athar*, i, 331; *al-Tāj al-mukallal*, 289.
 196. *Khulāṣat al-'athar*, iii, 201.
 197. *Ibid.*, iv, 204.
 198. *Nuzhat al-khawāṭir*, iv, 285.
 199. Al-Murādī, *Silk al-durar*, i, 22.
 200. *Nuzhat al-khawāṭir*, vi, 259.
 201. *Ibid.*, vi, 113.
 202. *Ibid.*, vi, 351-355.
 203. Al-Qannawjī, *Abjad al-'ulūm*.
 204. *Idem.*, *al-Tāj al-mukallal*, 509.
 205. *Nuzhat al-khawāṭir*, vii, 403.

206. Ḥaydar 'Alf Fayḍābādī, *Izālat al-ghayn; Nuzhat al-khawāṭir*, vii, 69.
207. *Ibid.*
208. *Ibid.*, vii, 136.
209. *Ibid.*, vii, 258.
210. *Ibid.*, vii, 527.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

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In the Name of Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate

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Bidāyat al-Ḥikmah: The Elements of Contemporary Muslim Metaphysics *Part 1*

by 'Allāmah Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā'ī—*quddisa sirruh*

translated from the 'Arabic by 'Alī Qulī Qarā'ī

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ وَلَهُ الشَّانُ بِحَقِيقَتِهِ وَالصَّلَاةُ وَالسَّلَامُ عَلَى رَسُولِهِ مُحَمَّدٍ خَيْرِ خَلْقَتِهِ وَآلِهِ
الظَّاهِرِينَ مِنْ أَهْلِ بَيْتِهِ وَعِزَّتِهِ.

In the Name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Compassionate

All praise is God's and to Him belongs eulogy, in its reality, and may benedictions and peace be upon His Messenger, Muḥammad, the best of His creation, and upon the Pure Ones from his family and progeny.

INTRODUCTION

The Definition, Subject and End of Ḥikmah:

Metaphysics (*al-ḥikmat al-'ilāhiyyah*, literally means 'theosophy') is a discipline which discusses being (*mawjūd*) *qua* being. Its subject deals with the essential properties of being, *qua* being. Its aim is to achieve a general knowledge of existents and to discriminate them from that which is not really existent.

To explain, when man considers himself he finds his own self to

*This work, completed on Rajab 7, 1390 (Sept. 8, 1970), was written as an introductory textbook for students of Muslim philosophy. The style is concise, because it is meant to be studied under a teacher, who would furnish the necessary details and explanations. 'Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'ī, the great exegete and philosopher, also wrote another textbook, *Nihāyat al-ḥikmah*, for advanced study. Both of these works are now used as textbooks by students in the traditional centres of Islamic

have a reality. He also finds that there is a reality that lies beyond his self which is within the reach of his knowledge. Accordingly, when he seeks something, it is because it is what it is, and when he avoids something or runs away from something, it is because it is what it is. An infant, for instance, that seeks its mother's breast, seeks real not imaginary milk. Similarly, a man running away from a wild beast runs away from what he considers to be a real tiger, not something imaginary. However, at times he mistakenly regards something unreal as existing in external reality, for instance, luck and giants. At times, he considers something existing in external reality as unreal, for instance, the immaterial soul (*al-nafs al-mujarradah*) and the immaterial intellect (*al-'aql al-mujarrad*). Hence it is necessary, first of all, to recognize the states (*aḥwāl*) of real being in order to differentiate it from that which is not such. The science that discusses this matter is metaphysics.

Metaphysics, therefore, is the science that discusses the character of being *qua* being. It is also called the First Philosophy and the Higher Science (*al-'ilm al-'a'lā*). Its subject is being *qua* being and its end is to distinguish real existents from that which is not such, and to recognize the higher causes (*al-'ilal al-'āliyah*) of existence, especially the First Cause (*al-'illat al-'ūlā*), in which ends the entire chain of existents, the Beautiful Names and the Sublime Attributes; that is, Allāh, exalted is His Name.

* * *

PART ONE

The General Notions Concerning Existence

1. The Self-Evident Character of the Meaning of Existence:

The concept of 'existence' is a self-evident one and needs no explanatory terms (*mu'arrif*). There are no explanatory terms for it in the form of a definition (*ḥadd*) or description (*rasm*), because its meaning is more evident than that of any explanatory term. Such definitions as "Existence is that which is subsistent in reality" or "Existence is that which allows of predication" are explications of the word, not true definitions.

Moreover, as shall be explained,¹ existence has neither any genus

learning in Iran. Explanatory additions to the text have been placed within square brackets. It is hoped that this translation will contribute to the expansion of the understanding of *Ḥikmah*, the tradition of Muslim metaphysics as developed by generations of Muslim philosophers since Ibn Sīnā, and especially by Mullā Ṣadrā.

(*jins*), nor specific difference (*faṣl*), nor any specific quality, in the sense of one of the five universals (*al-kulliyyāt al-khams*). Since all definitions and descriptions (*mu'arrif*) are based on these, existence can have no definition or description.

2. Existence is Shared by all Entities:

Existence is predicated of different existents in a single sense (*ishtirāk ma'nawī*). A proof (*dalīl*) of it is that we divide existents into their different kinds, such as Necessary Being (*wujūd al-wājib*) and possible being (*wujūd al-mumkin*). The possible being is divided into the being of substance (*wujūd al-jawhar*) and the being of accident (*wujūd al-'araḍ*). The being of substance and the being of accident are again divided into their various kinds. It is evident that the validity of a division depends on the unity of that which is divided and its presence in all its divisions.

Another proof of it is that, sometimes, after affirming the existence of something we have doubts about its essential characteristics. For instance, after affirming the existence of a creator for the world, we may doubt as to whether the creator is a necessary (*wājib*) or a possible (*mumkin*) being, or whether he is characterized with quiddity (*māhiyyah*) or not. Or for instance, after affirming that man has a soul (*nafs*), we may have doubts as to whether it is material (*māddī*) or immaterial (*mujarrad*), a substance (*jawhar*) or an accident (*'araḍ*). Hence, if 'existence' did not have a single meaning [intension] in the different cases [extension] and were it a term with different meanings (*mushtarak lafzī*), its meaning would have necessarily varied from one subject to another of which it is predicated.

Another proof is that non-existence (*'adam*) is the contradictory of existence (*wujūd*). Non-existence has one meaning, because there is no distinction (*tamāyuz*) in non-existence. Hence, existence, which is the contradictory of non-existence, has also one meaning. Otherwise, it would imply the simultaneous falsity of two contradictories, which is impossible.

Those who have held that 'existence' has different intensions in relation to things — i.e. in relation to the Necessary Being and possible beings — have done so in order to avoid the conclusion that cause and effect in general,² or the Necessary and the possible, are cognates.³ However, such a position stands refuted because it amounts to suspending the intellect's cognitive faculties. For, when in the statement "The Necessary Being exists" we understand 'existence' to mean the same as in a statement asserting the existence of a possible being, it means that 'existence' has the same meaning in the two cases (*al-'ishtirāk al-ma'nawī*). If what is understood in the former case (by 'existence') is

the opposite of that which is understood in the latter, being the contradictory of the latter, it [i.e. the statement, 'The Necessary Being exists] would amount to the negation of the existence of God Almighty. Thirdly, if nothing is understandable from it, that would amount to [admitting a state of] suspension of the intellect's cognitive faculties, which is not however the condition we find ourselves in.

3. Existence is Additional to Quiddity:

Existence is additional to the quiddity characterizing a thing, in the sense that each of them [i.e. 'existence' and 'quiddity'] signifies something not understandable from the other. The intellect abstracts [or divests] quiddity — which is represented by the answer to the question, 'What is it?' — from existents, cognizes it in isolation, and then characterizes it with existence. This is what is meant by predication [*urūd*, i.e. predication of existence in regard to quiddity]. Hence existence is neither identical with quiddity nor a part of it.

A proof of it is that it is proper to negate existence in relation to quiddity. And had it been identical with quiddity, or part of it, such a negation would have been invalid, for it is impossible to negate something in regard to a thing which is identical with that thing or a part of it.

Also, the predication of existence in regard to quiddity requires proof, therefore, it is neither identical with quiddity nor part of it, because a thing's essence (*dhāt*) and its essential characteristics [i.e. genus and specific difference] are self-evident in it and do not stand in need of a proof.

Moreover, quiddity in itself is equally indifferent (*mutasāwiyat al-nisbah*) to existence and non-existence. Had existence been identical with it or a part of it, it would be impossible to attribute non-existence — which would be its contradictory — to it.

4. The Fundamental Reality of Existence:

We have no doubt that there are real things out there [in the external world] possessing certain real effects (*āthār*), and that they are not illusions. In regard to every one of the things that we observe — which is a single reality in the external world — we form two concepts different from one another, though they apply to one thing. These two concepts are 'existence' and 'quiddity'. For instance, in regard to a person existing in external reality, we posit his quiddity as a human being and that he exists.

The philosophers (*ḥukamā'*) have differed as to which of the two are fundamentally real (*aṣīl*). The Peripatetics (*al-Mashshā'ūn*) have

held existence to be fundamentally real (*aṣālat al-wujūd*), and the belief in the fundamental reality of quiddity (*aṣālat al-māhiyyah*) has been ascribed to the Emanationists (*al-'Ishrāqiyyūn*). As to regarding both of them to be fundamentally real, no one has held such a belief, for it would imply that every thing is two things, which is logically inadmissible.

The Peripatetics have been right in holding existence to be fundamentally real. The proof of it is that quiddity as such is indifferent to [or in a state of equality in regard to] existence and non-existence, and should it be capable of emerging from this state of indifference [or equality] by itself and assume existence and its effects (*āthār*), that would amount to a mutation (*inqilāb*) occurring in it, which is impossible. Hence, it is existence that brings quiddity out of its state of indifference and is fundamentally real.

As to that which has been said that quiddity comes out of its state of indifference to assume reality through the relation that it acquires with the Maker, such an argument stands refuted. Because the difference in its state after its relation with the Maker is existence, even though it be called 'relation with the Maker'. And should there occur no difference in its state, and should existence nevertheless be predicated of it, that would amount to a mutation, as mentioned.

Another proof is that quiddities are the source of multiplicity and variance. Had existence not been fundamentally real, there would have been no real unity nor any union of two quiddities [in one thing]. As a consequence there would be no predication, which signifies [as in a proposition of the kind, 'A is B'] unity in existence, and logical necessity requires the contrary of it. Hence existence is fundamentally real, existing by itself, and quiddity exists through it.

Another proof is that when quiddity exists externally, it possesses the effects (*āthār*) to be expected from it. But when quiddity exists through mental existence (*wujūd dhihnī*) — which shall be explained — it does not possess any of those effects. So if existence were not real, and were quiddity — which is there in both the modes of being — real, there would have been no difference between the two modes. Since this consequent premise is invalid, the antecedent premise must also be such.

Another proof is that quiddity as such is indifferent in its relation to priority (*taqaddūm*) and posteriority (*ta'khkhur*), strength (*shiddah*) and weakness (*ḍa'f*), actuality (*fi'l*) and potentiality (*quwwah*). However, the things existing in external reality differ in regard to these characteristics. Some of them are prior and strong — such as the cause (*'illah*) — and some are the opposite of that — such as the caused (*ma'lūl*). Some of them are in act and some of them in potential. Had existence not been fundamentally real, the difference of these characteristics would be attributable to quiddity, which is indifferent to all

of them. This involves a contradiction. There are other proofs besides the ones given here, which are mentioned in detailed works.

Those who believe in the fundamental reality of quiddity and in existence being a purely mental construct (*i'tibārī*), have offered certain infirm arguments, like the one which says, If existence were fundamentally real, it would exist externally; from that it follows that it has an existence and that existence has again existence and so on *ad infinitum*. This involves an infinite regress, which is logically inadmissible.

The answer to such an argument is that existence certainly exists, but it exists by itself, not by another existence. So the matter does not lead to an infinite regress.

In the light of what has been said, the infirmity of another view, ascribed to al-Dawwānī, also becomes evident. That view ascribes fundamental reality to existence in respect of the Exalted Necessary Being and to quiddity in respect of possible beings. According to it, existence is attributable to the Necessary Being in the sense that It is existent by Itself and to quiddities in the sense that they have a relation with being, such as the relation between *lābin* (milker) and *tāmir* (date seller) on the one hand and *laban* (milk) and *tamr* (date) on the other. However, in accordance with the doctrine accepted by us, existence exists by its essence (*bi dhātih*) and quiddity exists by accident (*bi al-'arad*).

5. Existence is One Graded Reality:

The believers in the fundamental reality of existence disagree amongst themselves. Some of them regard existence as a single graded (*mushakkakah*) reality. This view is ascribed to the Fahlavīyyūn from among the [ancient] Persian philosophers. Existence, according to them, is self-manifesting and makes others — i.e. quiddities — manifest. It is like sensible light which is self-apparent and makes other things, such as dense bodies, apparent to vision.

Sensible light is a single species. Its reality is that it is self-manifesting and makes other than itself manifest. This feature of it applies to all the various degrees of light and shadows with their multiplicity and variance. Hence a strong light shares its luminous nature with a weak light and vice versa. Neither the strength of a strong light is the constituting differentia (*juz' muqawwim*) of its luminous nature — so as to deprive a weak light of its luminous character — nor is it an accident exterior to its reality. Neither is the weakness of a weak light depreciative of its luminous nature nor a compound of light and darkness, for darkness is non-existence of light. The intensity of a strong light inheres in its luminous nature, and so also the weakness of a weak light. Light possesses a wide range in accordance with its various degrees of intensity

and weakness, and there is a wide range associated with each of its degrees depending on the varying receptivities of dense bodies [as in reflection and refraction].

In the same way, existence is one reality, with various degrees differentiated by strength and weakness, priority and posteriority, etc. That which differentiates these degrees of existence is that which is common to them and that which makes them different is that which unites them. Hence, the particularity of any of these degrees is not a constituting differentia of existence because of its simplicity (*basāṭah*) — as will be explained later⁴ — nor anything external to it. This is because the fundamental reality of existence precludes anything other than it and outside it. Rather, the particularity of every degree is what constitutes that degree itself and is not anything outside it.

The multiplicity in existence pertains to its various vertical (*tūlī*) degrees, beginning from the weakest of degrees where it has no actuality except the absence of actuality; that is primal matter, which exists on the horizon of non-existence. From there it rises⁵ in degrees to the level of the Necessary Being, which has no limit except the absence of limit. Also, existence has a horizontal (*arḥī*) multiplicity particularized by the various quiddities, quiddity being the source of multiplicity.

A group of Peripatetics have held the view that existence consists of entities essentially different from each other (*ḥaqā'iq mutabāyinah bi tamām dhawātihā*). They are different because their effects are different. The difference is essential and complete because existence is simple. On the basis of this position, the predication of existence in regard to these entities becomes necessarily something accidental and external to them [for, had it been internal to them, it would have been a constituent of them, which contradicts simplicity].

The truth is that existence is one graded reality. Had it not been such, entities would have been different from one another with the totality of their essences (*dhawāt*). That would entail that the concept of existence — which is a single concept, as said⁶ — has been abstracted from different things *qua* different things [having no unifying aspect]. This is impossible. To explain, there is an essential unity between a concept and that to which it refers. The factor of difference lies in existence being mental or external. Should that which is one *qua* one be abstractable from that which is many *qua* many, one *qua* one would be the same as many *qua* many, which is impossible.

Besides, if a single concept could be abstracted from a multiplicity of referents *qua* different things, [this process of abstraction cannot but be one of the following two]: either (1) a certain characteristic is considered in correspondence of the concept to a certain referent, in which case it will not be predicable of another referent; if the characteristic of the other referent is taken into consideration, the concept will not

correspond to the first referent; (2) the characteristics of both referents together are taken into consideration, in which case it will not correspond to any of the two referents; and should none of these two characteristics be taken into consideration and the concept be abstracted from that which is common to the two referents, such an abstraction could not have been from different things *qua* different things but from their unifying aspect — such as the abstraction of universals from the common aspect shared by all the individuals covered by that universal. This, however, contradicts the assumption.

That existence is a graded reality is also confirmed by the various real excellences that make up the distinctive attributes which are not exterior⁷ to the single reality [of existence], such as strength and weakness, priority and posteriority, potentiality and actuality, etc. Hence existence is a single reality multiple in its essence, in which all that makes existents differ returns to that which is common to them and vice versa. This is what is called gradation (*tashkīk*).

6. That Which Particularizes Existence:

Existence is particularized in three aspects: (1) as a single fundamental reality in itself that is [unlike quiddity] self-subsistent; (2) in accordance with the characteristics of its degrees, which are not external to it; (3) in accordance with the different quiddities to which existence 'occurs', which differentiate it accidentally in accordance with their difference.

The manner in which existence 'occurs' to quiddity and gives it subsistence (*thubūt*) is not of the kind of 'occurrence' peculiar to categories [as accidents in relation to substance], wherein the subject subsists prior to its predicates; for existence makes quiddity subsist by making it subsist through itself [i.e. existence]. This follows from the fundamental reality of existence and the *i'tibārī* character of quiddity. It is the intellect which due to its familiarity with quiddities, supposes quiddity to be the subject of which it predicates existence. However the matter is the reverse of this predication in actual reality.

This explanation serves to answer the well-known objection concerning the predication of existence in regard to quiddity. It is said that in accordance with the Rule of Subordination (*qā'idat al-far'īyyah*) whenever one thing (B) is affirmed of another thing (A), this affirmation (*thubūt*) is subordinate to the affirmation [of the existence] of the other thing (A). Hence the affirmation of existence in relation to quiddity depends on the prior affirmation of quiddity. For should the affirmation of quiddity be the same as the affirmation of existence, that would mean that a thing is prior to itself; and should it be different, the affirmation of existence in relation to quiddity would depend on

another affirmation of it, and so on. This results in an infinite regress.

This objection has forced some of the philosophers to allow an exception to the rule in the case of the affirmation of existence in regard to quiddity. And some of them have been forced to change posteriority into concomitance, stating: The truth is that the affirmation of one thing [predicate] in regard to another [subject] is the concomitant affirmation of the subject, though it be through the affirmed predicate. The affirmation of existence in regard to quiddity is concomitant with the affirmation of quiddity through this existence itself. Hence there remains no room for an objection.

Some of them have been forced by this objection into holding that existence has no entity or subsistence, either in the mind or in external reality. 'Being' has a simple meaning represented in Persian by the word *hast* (meaning, is).¹ This derivation is merely verbal and existence has no subsistence at all so that one may affirm it in regard to quiddity.

Some others have been led to hold that 'existence' has nothing but a general meaning, signified by existence in general. It has also a specific meaning, which is the same general meaning appended to quiddity, in the sense that the specification is internal while the specifying factor is external. The individual, which is the totality of the specified, specification and the specifying factor, has no subsistence.

These attempts to solve the difficulty are invalid, like the earlier one. The correct solution is the one suggested earlier,⁸ that the Rule of Subordination applies to the affirmation of a thing in regard to another thing, not to the affirmation of a thing's existence. In other words, the rule applies to questions involving multiplicity of ingredients [e.g., 'Has A the quality B?'] not to those involving simplicity [e.g., 'Does A exist?'], as in the present case [where we are concerned with the predication of existence in regard to quiddity].

7. Negative Properties of Existence:

One of these properties is that it has no 'other'. Since its reality exhausts all fundamental reality, that necessitates the essential vacuity of anything that may be supposed as being alien to it or besides it. Another of these properties is it has no second, for the singleness of its fundamental reality and the vacuity of anything that may be supposed as being besides it, negates the presence of any [external] ingredient in it or any appendage to it. It is pure in itself and has no duality or repetition. Anything second that may be supposed for it would be identical with the first or differ from it due to something inside or outside it that is other than it, and the supposition (that there is nothing except existence) negates any other.

Another of these properties is that existence is neither substance nor accident. It is not substance, because substance is only a quiddity which does not need a substratum to subsist in external reality, while existence is not cognate with quiddity.

As to its not being an accident, that is because an accident subsists through its subject and existence is self-subsisting and everything else subsists through it.

Another of these properties is that existence is not a part [constituent] of anything, because its being a part implies that there is another part, while existence has no other.

As to that which has been said that every possible existent is a duality composed of quiddity and existence, [which apparently implies that existence is part of a thing], that is merely one of the intellect's constructs (*i'tibār 'aqlī*) representing the necessary relation between possible existence and quiddity. It does not mean that it is a composite made up of two parts possessing fundamental reality.

Another of these properties is that existence has no constituents. Constituents may be: (1) conceptual, such as genus and specific difference; (2) external, such as matter and form; or (3) quantitative, such as length, area, and volume. Existence possesses none of these ingredients. As to existence possessing conceptual constituents, were there a genus and differentia for existence, the genus would be either existence or something other than it. If the genus were existence, its differentia, instead of dividing it, would constitute it, for differentia in relation to genus actualizes genus [through species] not genus itself. Existence, however, actualizes itself. The genus cannot be something other than existence, because existence has no other.

As to the external constituents, i.e. matter and form, they are genus and differentia, though like genus and differentia they are not predicable of each other. The negation of genus and differentia [in regard to existence] necessarily leads to the negation of these also.

As to the quantitative constituents, magnitude is a property of bodies, which are composed of matter and form. Since existence has neither matter nor form, it follows that it has neither body nor magnitude.

From that which has been said, it is evident that existence has no species either, for a species is actualized by particular individuals, and existence is actualized by itself.

8. The Meaning of 'Fact Itself':

From what has been said earlier,⁹ it becomes clear that existence has reality and actuality by itself, or rather existence is reality and actuality itself, and quiddities (which are represented by the reply to

the question 'What is it?' and which are either found in external existence — in which case they possess certain effects — or in mental existence — in which case they do not possess those effects) come to have reality and actuality through existence, not by themselves, though the two, existence and quiddity, be united in external reality.

The *i'tibārī* concepts of the intellect, e.g. existence, unity, causality and the like, are those which have not been abstracted from external reality. The intellect abstracts them through a kind of analysis, into which it is forced by necessity. Moreover, these concepts have a kind of subsistence (*thubūt*), subsisting by means of their referents, although they are not abstracted from their referents in the way quiddities are abstracted from their particular referents and their defining terms.

Subsistence in general, including the subsistence of existence, quiddity and *i'tibārī* concepts, is called 'fact itself' (*nafs al-'amr*). It is that to which a proposition must correspond in order to be true, as when one says, "It is so and so in fact."

To explain, some propositions pertain to external reality, as when we say, "The Necessary Being — Exalted is He — exists," or when we say, "The people have gone out of the city," or when we say, "Man is a potential laughter." The truth of these propositions depends on their correspondence with external reality.

There are some other propositions that pertain to the mind, in that they pertain to the mind's formulations, even if they should involve concepts abstracted from external reality, such as the propositions "A universal is either essential or accidental," and "Man is a species." The criterion of truth in these cases is their correspondence with the mind, wherein they find subsistence.

In each of the above cases, truth depends on correspondence with 'fact itself.' Hence 'fact itself' is more general than external or mental subsistence (*al-thubūt al-dhihnī wa al-khārijī*).

Some have said that 'fact itself' is an immaterial intellect (*'aql mujarrad*) which contains the general forms of the intelligibles, and true judgements regarding propositions pertaining to the mind and external reality correspond with its intelligible forms.

This is not admissible, for when we shift our discussion to the immaterial intellect and its intelligible forms, we see that they are also judgements which in order to be true stand in need of correspondence of their contents with what is external to it.

9. Thingness and Existence:

Thingness (*shay'iyah*) is concomitant with existence, and non-existence has no entity, being sheer vacuity with no subsistence whatso-

ever. Hence subsistence (*thubūt*) means existence, and 'negation' (*nafy*) means non-existence.

According to the Mu'tazilah, subsistence is more general than existence and they regard some non-existents — namely, 'possible non-existents' (*al-ma'dūm al-mumkin*) — as possessing subsistence. Hence, according to them, 'negation' is more particular than non-existence and does not include anything except the 'impossible non-existents' (*al-ma'dūm al-mumtani*).

According to some of them there is an intermediary between the existent and the non-existent which they call 'state' (*ḥāl*), which is the attribute of a being that is neither existent nor non-existent, such as knowledgeability (*'ilmiyyah*), fatherhood and powerfulness, which are abstract adjectives that have no independent existence. Hence they may not be said to exist, though existents are characterized by these [relations]. Neither they may be said to be non-existent. As to subsistence (*thubūt*) and negation (*nafy*), they are contradictories, there being no intermediary between them.

All these ruminations are mere fancies. The self-evident judgement based on sound nature that non-existence is vacuity and has no entity, suffices to refute them.

10. There is No Distinction or Causal Relationship in Non-Existence:

As to the absence of distinction (*tamāyuz*), distinction is something derived from subsistence and entity, while non-existence has no subsistence or entity. Of course, at times, [absolute] non-existence is distinguished from the non-existence related by imagination to certain faculties and certain kinds of beings, such as non-existence of vision or hearing, or non-existence of Zayd and 'Amr. However, there is no distinction in absolute non-existence.

As to the absence of causality in non-existence, that is on account of its vacuity and negation of thingness. As to such statements as, "The non-existence of cause is the *cause* of the non-existence of the effect," they involve an approximation and metaphoric expression.¹⁰ Hence when it is said, for instance, "There were no clouds and so there was no rain," it means that the causal relation between the existence of clouds and the existence of rain did not actualize. This case, as has been pointed out, is similar to the application of the classification of affirmative propositions to the negative ones, which are classified as "negative predicative propositions" and "negative implicative propositions," and so on, although they involve the negation of predication and implication, respectively.

11. Absolute Non-Existence Allows of no Predication:

From that which was said earlier¹¹ it becomes clear that non-existence is sheer vacuity without any kind of entity, and only a thing can be predicated of a thing.

However, a doubt has been raised here by those who say that the statement "Non-existence allows of no predication" is self-contradictory, for non-predicability is predicated of it. This argument stands refuted on the basis of that which shall be said in the discussion on unity and multiplicity.¹² To mention it briefly here, predication is either by primary essential predication (*al-ḥaml al-'awwalī al-dhātī*) or common technical (*al-ḥaml al-shā'i' al-ṣinā'i*). In primary essential predication, the subject and predicate are one intensionally (*mafḥūman*) [as in all definitions] though different from the viewpoint of subjective consideration (*i'tibāran*), as when we say, 'The human being is human being.' In common technical predication, the two are united ontically (*wujūdan*) and differ intensionally (*mafḥūman*) as when we say, 'Man is a laugher.' Absolute non-existence is absolute non-being from the viewpoint of primary predication and does not allow of any predication, but is not absolute non-being from the viewpoint of common predication but one of the entities present in the mind of which unpredicability is predicated. Hence no contradiction is involved here.

In the light of this explanation, ambiguity is removed from a number of propositions that have been imagined to be self-contradictory, e.g. 'The particular is particular,' 'A deity besides God is impossible' and 'A thing is either subsistent in the mind or non-subsistent.' One may argue that the particular is a universal in that it applies to a multiplicity of objects; that 'A deity besides God' is an intelligible in the mind and has an entity therein; 'that which is non-subsistent in the mind' subsists in the mind, which apprehends it.

This apparent paradox is resolved when we recognize that the particular is particular from the viewpoint of primary predication and a universal from the viewpoint of common predication. 'A deity besides God' is such from the viewpoint of primary predication and a creature of God and a possible existent from the viewpoint of common predication. The 'non-subsistent in the mind' is such from the viewpoint of primary predication and subsistent in the mind from the viewpoint of common predication.

12. What has Ceased to Exist Does not Come Back Itself:

The philosophers have said that something that has ceased to exist cannot come back itself. Some of the *mutakallimūn* have followed them in this, but most of them consider it admissible.

Ibn Sinā has considered the impossibility of the return of that which has ceased to exist as a self-evident axiom, for the intellect regards what has ceased to exist as devoid of thingness and a vacuity that cannot be characterized with return.

Others who [do not consider the impossibility as self-evident and] regard it as deductive have offered arguments in this regard.

(i) One of the arguments is that if it be admitted that something that has ceased to exist in a certain period of time can itself return in another period of time, non-existence would intervene between the thing and itself, which is impossible, because then it would exist in two periods separated by non-existence.

(ii) Another argument is that if the return of a thing after its ceasing to exist were possible, we would also have to allow the possibility of a thing having another entity identical to itself in all aspects during the first and the second periods, which is impossible. To explain this implication, there is the rule that all identical things are to be judged equally with regard to what is possible for them and what is impossible for them. There is no difference in any aspect between a thing's like in the first period and its coming back counterpart in the second period because, they are equal to the first thing in all aspects. However, the concomitance of two existents similar in all aspects necessarily implies the absence of distinction between them. This amounts to the unity of many *qua* many, which is impossible.

(iii) Another argument is that the coming back of a thing that has ceased to exist requires that the coming back counterpart be identical with the first thing, which is impossible because it implies 'mutation' and contradiction. To explain the implication, the return of a thing itself that has ceased to exist entails that the coming back counterpart should be the same as the first thing in respect of essence and all its individualizing characteristics, even time, so that the returning thing becomes identical with the first thing, which involves mutation and contradiction.

(iv) Another argument is that if the coming back of a thing that has ceased to exist be admissible, there can be no determinate limit to the number of returns. Then, there will be no difference between the first, second and the consecutive comebacks up to infinity, in the same way as there was no difference between the thing at the beginning and its comeback. However, determinate number is a necessary requirement for the existence of an individualized thing.¹³

Those who consider such a comeback to be admissible advance the argument that should the coming back of a thing that has ceased to exist be impossible, that impossibility must either inhere in its quiddity, or in something concomitant with its quiddity. And had it been so, the thing, obviously, would not have come into existence in the first place.

And should the impossibility be due to a separable accident (*'ārid mufāriq*), the impossibility would disappear on its disappearance.

This argument is refutable on the ground that the impossibility is inherent in the thing's existence and its ipseity, not in its quiddity, as is evident from the above-mentioned arguments.

The main reason that has led those who believe in the possibility of the coming back of something that has ceased to exist is their belief that the resurrection preached by the true heavenly religions involves the return of a thing after its ceasing to exist.

Such a claim stands refuted on the ground that death is a kind of development (*istikmāl*) that does not involve extinction and cessation of existence.¹⁴

To be continued — inshā' Allāh

NOTES:

1. See Section 7 of Part I.
2. That is, in accordance with the belief that the term 'existence' has different intensions in relation to the objects to which it applies. (Ṭabāṭabā'ī)
3. That is, in accordance with the belief that the term 'existence' has different intensions in relation to the Necessary Being and the possible being. (Ṭabāṭabā'ī)
4. See Section 7 of Part I.
5. Its explanation is that, when we consider a certain degree of this reality, beginning from its weaker degrees, the degree that lies above it is stronger than it and more intense. The third degree that lies above the second is stronger than the one below it, and this strength goes on increasing until it reaches the highest degree, which is above all of them.
Moreover, when we consider a certain intermediate degree and compare it with the one above it, the higher degree will be found to contain all the excellence (*kamāl*) of the lower degree and something in addition to it. Hence the lower degree is limited in relation to the one above it, for it does not possess all the excellence of the higher degree. However, when the higher degree is compared with another one above it, it will be found to be limited in relation to the latter. This comparison goes on until it reaches the highest degree, in relation to which all the degrees that are below it are limited and it itself is absolutely without any limit that signifies non-being (*ḥadd 'adamī*). One may say that "its limit is the non-existence of limit."
- As to the degree which is at the lowest, it possesses all kinds of limits signifying non-being, and it has no excellence except the capacity to receive excellence. That is, primal matter (*al-hayūlā al-'awwalī*). (Ṭabāṭabā'ī)
6. Refer to Section 2 of this part.
7. For should it be external to the reality of existence it would be a vacuity, because the only fundamental reality lies exclusively in existence. (Ṭabāṭabā'ī)
8. The foregoing discussions suffice to prove the invalidity of these replies. (Ṭabāṭabā'ī)
9. Refer to Section 4 of this part.
10. One may raise an objection here that, "If that is so, the examples given of

propositions where subject is a rational construct (*al-mafhūm al-'tibārī al-'aqlī*) also involve approximation and metaphoric expression.'

The answer is that the examples were offered in relation to statements of fact (*qadiyyat al-nafs al-'amriyyah*): and the approximate and metaphorical character of predication in a proposition neither invalidates it nor makes it a pseudo-proposition. The meaning of the statement in the example given is: "The relation of causality between clouds and rain did not materialize," which is also a proposition, capable of being true or false. (Ṭabāṭabā'i)

11. Refer to Section 9 of this part.

12. Refer to Section 3 of Part 8.

13. There are no grounds for preferring some of these numbers to others. Hence, the conclusion is that identity, or being determinate, is necessary for existence, for that which is not determinate does not exist.

14. If it is said, "That is true if death be regarded as development of both the soul and the body - something that is uncertain. But should it be the development of only the soul, the problem remains as it is, because the coming back of the body amounts to the coming back of that which has ceased to exist."

In reply to this, it may be said that a human being's identity is based on its soul, not on the body, which is in a state of perpetual change. The human being coming back on the Day of Resurrection is soul-wise and body-wise the same human being that existed in the world, irrespective of whether death is a development solely for the soul, the body returning with it on Resurrection being a new body, or if it is development of the soul and the body, the body returning with it being the same worldly body but in a developed form. Hence soul-wise and body-wise the resurrected human being is the same as that which existed in the world. (Ṭabāṭabā'i)

Hajr (Legal Disability), According to Five Schools of Islamic Law

by 'Allāmah Muḥammad Jawād Maghniyyah

Translated from the Arabic by Mujāhid Ḥusayn

Hajr:

Hajr literally means *man'* (to prohibit, refuse, prevent, deprive, detain), and this meaning is also evident from the Qur'ānic verse:

... وَيَقُولُونَ حَجْرًا مَحْجُورًا ﴿٢٢﴾

(Upon the day that they see the angels, no good tidings that day for sinners: they — i.e. the angels — shall say), 'A ban forbidden.' (25:22)

Legally it implies prohibiting the dispositions of a person with respect to all or some of his property. The causes of disability, which we will discuss here, are four: (1) insanity (*al-junūn*); (2) minority (*al-ṣighar*); (3) idiocy (*al-safah*); (4) insolvency (*al-'iflās*).¹

1. Insanity:

In accordance with explicit traditions as well as consensus, an insane person is prohibited from all dispositions, irrespective of whether his insanity is permanent or recurring. But if a person suffering from recurring insanity manages his property during the period he is free from it, his dispositions are binding. Further, where it is uncertain whether a particular disposition belongs to the period of sanity, it will not become binding. Because sanity is a condition for the validity of an agreement, and an uncertainty regarding it amounts to an uncertainty concerning the existence of the contract itself, not its validity, consequently its very basis is negated. In other words, where there is uncertainty about the validity of a contract due to uncertainty concerning the presence of sanity at the time of its conclusion, we will presume that the situation before the contract continues to exist and will leave it at

that.

The rule applicable to an insane person is also applied to a person in a state of unconsciousness and intoxication.

If an insane person cohabits with a woman and she becomes pregnant, the child will be considered his, exactly like in the case of 'intercourse by mistake.'

2. Minority:

A minor is considered legally incapable by consensus, and there is a difference of opinion regarding some dispositions of a child of discerning age, as will be mentioned later. When a minor matures mentally and attains puberty he becomes an adult and all his dispositions become enforceable.

The Imāmi and the Shāfi'i schools observe: When a child reaches the age of ten, his will shall be considered valid in regard to matters of charity and benevolence. More than one Imāmi legist, relying on some traditions, has said: His divorce is also valid.

The reader may refer to the chapter on marriage, the section entitled "Capacity to Enter Into a Marriage Contract," regarding the age of puberty and its signs.

Liability (al-Damān):

If an insane person or a child destroys another person's property without his permission, they are considered liable, because liability pertains to *al-'aḥkām al-waḍ'iyyah* in which mental maturity and puberty are not considered as conditions.² Therefore, if they have any property that is being administered by their guardian, compensation will be claimed from this property; otherwise, the person entitled to the compensation will wait until the insane person regains sanity and the child attains puberty and then claim from them his dues.

A Discerning Child:

A discerning child (*mumayyiz*) is one who can in general distinguish between that which is harmful and beneficial, and who understands the difference between contracts of sale and rent and between a profitable bargain and one entailing loss.

The Ḥanafis say: The dispositions of a discerning child without his guardian's permission are valid provided they involve sheer benefit, e.g. the acceptance of gifts, bequests and *waqfs* without giving anything in return. But the dispositions in which the possibility of profit and loss exists — such as transactions of sale, mortgage, rent and bailment —

are not valid except by the permission of the guardian.

As to a non-discerning child, none of his dispositions are valid, irrespective of the permission of the guardian, and regardless of the thing involved being of petty or considerable worth.

The Ḥanbalis observe: A discerning child's dispositions are valid with the permission of the guardian; so are those of a non-discerning child, even without the guardian's permission, if the thing involved is of petty worth, e.g. where he buys from a confectioner what children usually purchase, or buys a bird from someone in order to set it free. (*al-Tanqīh* and *al-Tadhkirah*)

The Imāmi and the Shāfi'i schools state: A transaction by a child whether discerning or not, is altogether illegal, irrespective of whether he acts as an agent or for himself, irrespective of whether he gives or takes delivery, even if the object transacted is trivial and insignificant, and whether it involves a vow (*nadh'r*) or a confession (*iqrār*). Al-Shaykh al-'Anṣārī observes in *al-Makāsib*: "The basis for invalidating a child's transaction is a narrated consensus (*al-'ijmā' al-maḥkī*) strengthened by an unusual preponderance (*al-shuhrat al-'azīmah*). The criterion is to act in accordance with the preponderance."

The Imāmi legists have mentioned in this regard a number of subtle sub-issues which al-'Allāmah al-Ḥillī has recorded in *al-Tadhkirah*. Among these are the following:

1. If one owes something to a person, and he tells one: "Give what you owe me to my son," when his son is legally incapable, and one does so on the basis of the father's behest, and by chance the child loses it, in such a situation one's liability concerning the debt does not cease and the creditor is still entitled to demand it from one, although it was he who asked one to deliver it to his son. Similarly, the child will not be responsible for the thing he has lost, and one is neither entitled to claim it from his guardian nor from him on his attaining majority.

As to one's remaining liable for the debt, this is because the debt is not cleared unless it is validly delivered, and it is presumed that neither the creditor nor his authorized representative has taken delivery. As to the delivery taken by the child, its occurrence and non-occurrence are equal, presuming his incapacity for taking and giving delivery. As to the father's permission to deliver to the child, it is exactly like someone telling one: "Throw what you owe me into the sea," and one does as he tells one. Here, one's liability for the debt is not cast off.

The reason for not considering the child liable for the thing delivered to him is that it is the deliverer who has destroyed it by improperly using his discretion and giving it to someone whose possession has no effect, even if it is by the permission and order of the child's guardian.

2. Where one has in one's possession something belonging to a

child and his guardian tells one to give it to him, and one gives it to the child who destroys it, one will be liable for it because one is not entitled to act negligently regarding the property of someone legally incapable even if his guardian permits it.

3. If a child gives one a *dīnār* to see whether it is genuine or counterfeit, or gives one an article for pricing it or selling it or for some other purpose, it is not valid for one, after it has come into one's hands, to return it to him; rather one must return it to his guardian.

4. If two children buy and sell between themselves and each takes delivery from the other and then both destroy what they have received, their guardians will be liable if they had permitted the transaction, if not, the liability will be borne from the property of each child.

This is what the Imāmi legists have observed, but what we consider appropriate is this: If we know doubtlessly that a particular disposition of a discerning child is cent per cent to his benefit, it is obligatory for his guardian to accept it and he cannot annul it, especially if his annulling it entails a loss for the child.

As to the general proofs which indicate that a child's disposition is void, they either do not include this situation or it is exempted from these general proofs. This is so because we are sure that the purpose of the Shari'ah is benefit, and when we are certain that it exists, we are bound to accept it exactly like our acceptance of a self-evident notion or a valid syllogism. And this is not *ijtihād* contradicting *naṣṣ* (an explicit Qur'anic verse or tradition); rather, it amounts to acting in accordance with *naṣṣ* for the knowledge of the aim of the Shari'ah is exactly like the knowledge of a *naṣṣ*, if not a *naṣṣ* itself.

If we were to accept the view of the Imāmi and the Shafi'i schools, a prize — for instance, a watch — given by the school to the best student would be something out of place, and if a child under the age of majority were to receive it he would not own it. This is something unnatural and goes against the practice of rational beings, creeds and religions.

A Child's Intentional Act is a Mistake:

If a child kills a person or injures him or severs any part of his body, he will not be subject to retribution. He will be dealt exactly like an insane person, because he is not capable of being punished, neither in this world nor in the Hereafter. A tradition states: *عَمْدُ الصَّبِيِّ خَطَأٌ* (A child's intentional act is a mistake). There is no difference of opinion among the schools concerning this. As to the compensation given to the victim, it will be borne by the paternal relatives (*al-'āqilah*).

In some circumstances where beating a child is permissible, it is only for reforming him, not as retribution (*qiṣās*) or punishment (*ta'zīr*).

3. Idiocy (al-Safah):

An 'idiot' differs from a child due to majority and from an insane person on account of sanity. Thus idiocy as such is accompanied with the capacity to comprehend and distinguish. An 'idiot' is one who cannot manage and expend his property properly, irrespective of whether he has all the qualities necessary for its proper management but is negligent and does not apply them, or lacks these qualities. In short, he is negligent and extravagant, in that he repeatedly performs acts of negligence and extravagance. The acts of extravagance may be such as donation by him of all or a major part of his wealth, or building a mosque, school or hospital which a person of his social and monetary status would not build, so that it is detrimental to his own interests and those of his dependents, and the people view him as having strayed from the practice of rational persons in the management of property.

Declaration of Legal Disability (al-Taḥjīr):

The schools — with the exception of Abū Ḥanīfah — concur that the idiot's legal disability is confined to his financial dispositions, and excepting where his guardian permits him, his position in this regard is that of a child and an insane person. He is totally free regarding his other activities that are not closely or remotely connected with property. An idiot's disability continues until he attains mental maturity, in accordance with the following verse:

وَلَا تُؤْتُوا السُّفَهَاءَ أَمْوَالَكُمُ الَّتِي جَعَلَ اللَّهُ لَكُمْ قِيَمًا وَارْزُقُوهُمْ فِيهَا وَاكْسُوهُمْ وَقُولُوا لَهُمْ قَوْلًا مَعْرُوفًا
 ﴿٥﴾ وَأَبْلُوا الِئْتَمَىٰ حَتَّىٰ إِذَا بَلَغُوا النِّكَاحَ فَإِنْ آنَسْتُمْ مِنْهُمْ رُشْدًا فَادْفَعُوا إِلَيْهِمْ أَمْوَالَهُمْ . . .

And do not give to fools your property which Allah has assigned to you to manage; provide for them and clothe them out of it, and speak to them words of honest advice. And test the orphans until they reach the age of marrying; then if you find in them mental maturity, deliver to them their property; (4:5-6)³

This is the view of the Imāmi, Shāfi'ī, Mālikī and the Ḥanbali schools, as well as that of Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad, the two disciples of Abū Ḥanīfah.

Abū Ḥanīfah observes: Mental maturity is neither a condition for delivering property to its owners nor for the validity of their monetary dispositions. Thus if a person attains puberty in a state of mental maturity and then becomes an idiot, his dispositions are valid and it is not valid to consider him legally incapable even if his age is less than 25

years. Similarly, one who attains puberty in a state of idiocy so that his childhood and idiocy are concomitant, he will not be considered legally incapable in any manner after attaining maturity at 25 years (*Fath al-Qadīr* and Ibn 'Ābidīn).

This contradicts the explicit *ijmā'* of the entire ummah, or rather it contradicts the obvious teaching of the faith as well as the unambiguous text of the Qur'ān: وَلَا تُؤْتُوا السُّفَهَاءَ أَمْوَالَكُم

The Judge's Order:

Imāmi legal authorities state: The criterion for considering the dispositions of an idiot as void is appearance of idiocy, not the order of a judge declaring him legally incapable. Thus every disposition of his during the state of idiocy is void, irrespective of whether a judge declares him incapable or not, and regardless of whether his idiocy continues from childhood or occurs after puberty. Hence, if an idiot acquires mental maturity, his disability will be removed, returning only on the return of idiocy and disappearing with its disappearance (al-Sayyid al-'Iṣfahānī, *Wasīlat al-najāt*). This opinion is very close to the one expressed by the Shāfi'i school.

The Ḥanafī and the Ḥanbalī schools observe: An idiot will not be considered legally incapable without the judge's declaration. Therefore, the dispositions prior to the declaration of his legal disability are valid even if they were improper; after the declaration his dispositions are not enforceable even if appropriate.

This opinion cannot be substantiated unless we accept that the declaration of the judge alters the actual fact. This view is confined to the Ḥanafīs only. As to the Shāfi'i, Mālikī and the Ḥanbalī schools, they concur with the Imāmiyyah in holding that the judge's order has no bearing, close or remote, on the actual fact, because it is only a means and not an end in itself. We have dealt with this issue in detail in our book *Uṣūl al-'ithbāt*.

The Mālikīs say: When a person, man or woman, comes to be characterized with idiocy he becomes liable to be declared legally incapable. But if idiocy occurs after a short period, say a year, after his attaining puberty, the right to declare his legal incapacity lies with his father, because the time of its occurrence is close to the period of his attaining puberty. But if it occurs after a period exceeding a year after puberty, his disability can be only declared by a judge (*al-Fiqh 'alā al-madhāhib al-'arbā'ah*, vol. 2, "bāb al-ḥajr").

The Mālikīs also observe: A woman, even if she becomes mentally mature, is not entitled to dispose her property unless she has married and the marriage has been consummated. After the consummation of marriage, her right to donate is limited to one-third of the property,

and for the remainder she requires the permission of the husband until her oldage (al-Zarqānī).

But all the other schools do not differentiate between the sexes, in accordance with the general import of the Qur'ānic verse (4:6): فَإِنْ أَنْتُمْ مِنْهُمْ زُجْجَاءَ فَأَدْفَعُوا إِلَيْهِمْ أَمْوَالَهُمْ

The Idiot's Confession, Oath and Vow:

If an idiot is permitted to dispose his property and he does so, the schools concur that it is valid. As to non-financial acts, such as his acknowledgement of lineage (*nasab*) or his taking an oath or a vow to perform, or abstain from, a certain act that does not involve property, these acts are valid even if the guardian has not permitted them.

If he confesses to having committed theft, it will be accepted only for the purpose of amputation and not for financial liability, i.e. his confession will have effect vis-à-vis the right of God (*ḥaqq Allāh*) and not vis-à-vis the rights of other human beings (*ḥaqq al-nās*).

The Ḥanafīs state: His confession will be given credence in regard to those of his assets which have been realized after his disability and not from what he owned at its advent. Also, his will is valid to an extent of one-third in matters of charity and benevolence.

The Imāmiyyah state: There is no difference between the former and the latter properties. Rather, they say, it is not valid for an idiot to hire himself for any work even if advantageous without his guardian's permission. They also observe: If a person deposits something with an idiot with the knowledge of his idiocy and the idiot personally destroys it, either voluntarily or by mistake, he will be liable. But if the deposited thing is not destroyed personally by the idiot but as a consequence of his negligence in preserving it, he will not be liable, because in this situation the depositor himself has been negligent and at fault. As to the liability of the idiot where he personally destroys the deposit, it has its basis in the dictum: مَنْ أَتْلَفَ مَالَ غَيْرِهِ فَهُوَ لَهُ ضَامِنٌ 'He who destroys another's property is liable for it.' (*Wasīlāt al-najāt*)

The Idiot's Marriage and Divorce:

The Shāfi'ī, Ḥanbalī and Imāmi schools say: The idiot's marriage is not valid, and his divorce (*ṭalāq* or *khul'*) is valid. But the Ḥanbalīs allow his marriage where it is a necessity.

The Ḥanafīs observe: His marriage, divorce, and freeing a slave are valid, because these three are valid even when performed in jest, and with greater reason in a state of idiocy. But if he marries for more than *mahr al-mithl*, the *mahr* will be valid only to the extent of *mahr al-mithl*.

The Proof of Mental Maturity:

The schools concur that mental maturity (*rushd*) is ascertainable through testing, in accordance with the words of God Almighty: *وَإِن تَلَوْا... فَإِن أَنَسْتُمْ مِنْهُمْ رُشْدًا* But the modes of testing are not specific, though the legists mention as examples such methods as handing over to a child the management of his property, or relying upon him to buy or sell for fulfilling some of his needs, and the like. If he shows good sense in these activities, he will be considered mentally mature. As to a girl, she will be given domestic responsibilities to ascertain her mental maturity or the lack of it.

As per consensus, mental maturity in both the sexes is proved by the testimony of two male witnesses because the testimony of two male witnesses is a principle. The Imāmiyyah say: It is also proved in the case of women by the testimony of a man and two women, or that of four women. But in the case of men, it is only proved by the testimony of men (*al-Tadhkirah*).

The Guardian:

A Minor's Guardian:

We have discussed the legal disability of the minor, the insane person and the idiot. It is obvious that every legally incapable person needs a guardian or an executor to attend to the things concerning which his disability has been declared, and to manage them as his representative. Now, who is this guardian or executor? It is worth pointing out at the outset that the discussion in this chapter is limited to guardianship over property. As to guardianship concerning marriage, it has already been discussed in the related chapter.

The schools concur that the guardian of a minor is his father; the mother has no right in this regard except in the opinion of some Shāfi'ī legists. The schools differ concerning the guardianship of others apart from the father. The Ḥanbalī and the Mālikī schools state: The right to guardianship after the father is enjoyed by the executor of his will, and if there is no executor, by the judge (*ḥākim al-Shar'*). The paternal grandfather has no right to guardianship whatsoever, because, according to them, he does not take the father's place in anything. When this is the state of the paternal grandfather, such is the case of the maternal grandfather with greater reason.

The Ḥanafīs say: After the father the guardianship will belong to his executor, then to the paternal grandfather, and then to his executor. If none are present it will belong to the judge.

The Shāfi'īs observe: It will lie with the paternal grandfather after

the father, and after him with the father's executor, followed by the executor of the paternal grandfather, and then the judge.

The Imāmiyyah state: The guardianship belongs to the father and the paternal grandfather simultaneously in a manner that each is entitled to act independently of the other, though the act of whoever precedes acquires legality, in view of that which is necessary. If both act simultaneously in a contrary fashion, the act of the paternal grandfather will prevail. If both are absent, the executor of any of them will be the guardian. The grandfather's executor's acts will prevail over those of the father's executor. When there is no father or paternal grandfather nor their executors, the guardianship will be exercised by the judge.

The Guardian of an Insane Person:

An insane person is exactly like a minor in this regard, and the views of the schools are similar for both the cases, irrespective of whether the child has attained puberty while continuing to be insane or has attained puberty in a state of mental maturity to become insane later. Only a group of Imāmi legists differ here by differentiating between insanity continuing from minority and that which occurs after puberty and mental maturity. They say: The father and the paternal grandfather have a right to guardianship over the former. As to the latter, the *ḥākim al-Shar'* will act as his guardian despite the presence of both of them. This view is in consonance with *qiyās* (analogical reasoning) practised by the Ḥanafis, because the guardianship of both the father and the paternal grandfather had ended (on the child's attaining puberty and mental maturity), and that which ends does not return. But the Ḥanafis have acted here against *qiyās* and have opted for *istiḥsān*.

The Imāmi author of *al-Jawāhir* says: It is in accordance with caution (*iḥtiyāt*) that the paternal grandfather, the father and the judge act in consonance, i.e. the property of an insane person between whose insanity and childhood there is a time gap, will be managed by mutual consultation among the three. Al-Sayyid al-'Iṣfahānī remarks in *al-Wasīlah*: Caution will not be forsaken if they act by mutual consent.

In my opinion there is no doubt that caution is a good thing, but here it is only desirable and not obligatory, because the proofs establishing the guardianship of the father and the paternal grandfather do not differ in the two situations. Accordingly, the father and the paternal grandfather will always be preferred to the judge, because the applicability or inapplicability of a particular rule revolves around its subject, and the generality of the proofs proving the guardianship of the father and the paternal grandfather enjoy precedence over the generality of the proofs proving the judge's guardianship.

Apart from this, the sympathy of the judge or someone else cannot equal that of the father and the grandfather, and what rational person would approve the appointment by the judge of a stranger as a guardian over a legally incapable person whose father or paternal grandfather are present and fulfil all the necessary conditions and qualifications?

The Guardian of an Idiot:

The Imāmi, Ḥanbali and Ḥanafī schools concur that if a child attains puberty in a state of mental maturity and then becomes an idiot, his guardianship will lie with the judge to the exclusion of the father and paternal grandfather, and, with greater reason, to the exclusion of the executors of their wills.

That which was observed concerning an insane person holds true here as well, that no rational person would approve that a judge appoint a stranger as guardian in the presence of the father and the paternal grandfather. Hence, as a measure of caution, it is better that the judge choose the father or the paternal grandfather as the guardian of their child. However, if the idiocy has continued from childhood and the subject has attained puberty in that state, the opinion of the three above-mentioned schools is similar to their opinion concerning a minor (*al-Mughnī, al-Fiqh 'alā al-madhāhib al-'arba'ah, Abū Zuhrah and al-Jawāhir*).⁴

The Shāfi'is neither differentiate between the guardianship of a minor, an insane person and an idiot, nor between idiocy occurring after puberty and one continuing from childhood.

The Qualifications of a Guardian:

The schools concur that a guardian and an executor require to be mentally mature adults sharing a common religion. Many jurists have also considered *'adālah* (justice) as a requirement even if the guardian is the father or the grandfather.

There is no doubt that this condition (*'adālah*) seals the door of guardianship firmly with reinforced concrete and not merely with stones and mud. Apart from this, *'adālah* is a means for safeguarding and promoting welfare, not an end in itself. The inclusion of *'adālah* as a condition, if it proves anything, proves that *'adālah* was not something rare in the society in which those who consider it necessary lived.

There is consensus among the schools that those dispositions of a guardian which are for the good and advantage of the ward are valid, and those which are detrimental are invalid. The schools differ concerning those dispositions which are neither advantageous nor detrimental.

A group of Imāmi legists observe: They are only valid if the guardian is the father or the paternal grandfather, because the condition for their dispositions is the absence of harm, not the presence of an advantage. But where a judge or an executor is involved, their dispositions are valid only when advantageous. Rather, some of them observe: The dispositions of a father are valid even if they are disadvantageous and entail a loss for the child.⁵

Other non-Imāmi schools state: There is no difference between the father, the paternal grandfather, the judge and the executor in that the dispositions of all of them are invalid unless they are advantageous and entail benefit. This is also the opinion of a large number of Imāmi legists.

On this basis, it is valid for the guardian to trade with the wealth of his ward — be he a child, an insane person or an idiot — or to give it to another to trade with it, to buy with it real estate for his ward, and to sell and lend from what belongs to him, provided all this is done for benefit and with good intention, and the surity of benefit in lending is limited to where there is a fear of the property being destroyed.

It is beneficial here to mention some sub-issues mentioned by the great Imāmi legist al-'Allāmah al-Hillī in *al-Tadhkirah*, "bāb al-ḥajr."

1. Pardon and Compromise (*al-'Afw and al-Ṣulḥ*):

Some Imāmi scholars have said: A child's guardian can neither demand *qiṣāṣ* (retaliation), a right to which his ward is entitled, because the child may opt for pardon, nor can he pardon, because the child may opt for the execution of the sentence for his own satisfaction. Al-'Allāmah al-Hillī has then opined that a guardian can demand the execution of the sentence, or pardon, or conclude a compromise regarding a part of the child's property, provided it is advantageous.

2. Divorce and pre-emption (*al-Ṭalāq and al-Shuf'ah*):

A guardian is not entitled to divorce the wife of his ward, irrespective of whether it is with or without any monetary compensation.

If there is along with the child a cosharer in a property and the cosharer sells his share to a stranger, the guardian of the child is entitled to opt for pre-emption or to forgo it, depending on the child's interest. This is the more *ṣaḥīḥ* of the two opinions subscribed to by the Shāfi'is.

3. Deduction of Claims (*Ikhrāj al-ḥuqūq*):

It is obligatory upon the guardian to deduct from the property of his ward those claims whose payment is compulsory, e.g. debts, criminal

damages, *zakāt*, even if they have not been claimed from him. As to the maintenance of those relatives whose maintenance is *wājib* upon the child, the guardian will not pay it to the person entitled unless it is demanded.

4. *Spending Upon the Ward:*

It is obligatory upon the guardian to spend towards his ward's welfare and it is not permissible for him to act either niggardly or extravagantly. He is expected to act moderately, keeping in mind the standard of those similar to the ward.

The guardian and the executor are trustees and are not liable unless breach of trust or negligence is proved. Hence, when a child attains puberty and claims breach of trust or negligence on behalf of the guardian, the burden of proof lies on him, and the guardian is only liable to take an oath, because he is a trustee and the dictum, "The trustee is liable to nothing except an oath" (*وما على الأمين إلا اليمين*), will apply.

A Guardian's Sale to Himself:

The Shāfi'is as well as some Imāmi legists observe: It is not valid for a guardian or an executor to sell himself any property belonging to his ward or to sell his own property to the ward. Al-'Allāmah al-Ḥillī himself has considered it permissible, making no distinction between the guardian and a stranger, provided such a deal is advantageous (for the ward) and no blame is involved. Similarly it is also permissible for a guardian appointed by the judge to sell to the judge an orphan's property whose sale is valid. This also applies to an executor, even if he has been appointed by the judge to act as a guardian. As to the judge selling his property to the orphan, Abū Ḥanīfah has prohibited it on the basis that it amounts to the judge's pronouncing a decision concerning himself, and such a judgement is void. Al-'Allāmah al-Ḥillī says: "There is nothing objectional in it," i.e. the opinion of Abū Ḥanīfah.

As may be noted, there is more to it than mere objectionability, because this act is neither the same as pronouncing judgement nor related to it, closely or remotely. Therefore, if it is valid for a judge to buy from the property of an orphan provided it is advantageous, it is also valid for him to sell to the orphan if advantageous, and the distinction is arbitrary.

The Guardian's or Executor's Agent:

The guardian and the executor are entitled to appoint others as

their agents for those activities which they are not capable of performing personally, as well as for those activities which they are capable of performing personally but do not consider it appropriate on the basis of custom to perform them personally. But where they consider it appropriate, the opinion prohibiting it is preferable.

It is evident here that acting personally or through an agent is a means for securing the ward's advantage and for fulfilling what is *wājib*. So wherever this end is achieved, the act is valid, irrespective of whether it is performed by the guardian or his agent; otherwise, the act is not valid even if performed by the guardian himself.

The Insolvent Person (al-Muflis):

'*Muflis*', literally, means someone who has neither money nor a job to meet his needs. In legal terminology it means someone who has been declared legally incapable by the judge because his liabilities exceed his assets.

The schools concur that an insolvent person may not be prohibited from disposing his wealth, regardless of the extent of his liabilities, unless he has been declared legally incapable by the judge. Hence, if he has disposed of all his wealth before being declared incapable, his dispositions will be considered valid and his creditor, or anyone else, is not empowered to stop him from doing so, provided these dispositions are not with an intent to elude the creditors, especially where there is no reasonable hope of his wealth returning.

A judge will not declare a person insolvent unless the following conditions exist:

1. Where he is indebted and the debt is proven in accordance with the Shari'ah.

2. Where his assets are less than his liabilities. There is consensus among the schools regarding these two conditions.

The schools also concur on the validity of the declaration of disability where the assets are less than the liabilities. They differ where the liabilities are equal to the assets. The Imāmi, the Ḥanbalī and the Shāfi'i schools state: He will not be declared legally incapable (*al-Jawāhir*, *al-Tanqīḥ*, and *al-Fiqh 'alā al-madhāhib al-'arba'ah*). The two disciples of Abū Ḥanīfah, Muḥammad and Abū Yūsuf, observe: He will be declared legally incapable. The Ḥanafis have followed these two in their *fatwā*. But Abū Ḥanīfah has basically rejected the idea of considering an insolvent person as legally incapable even if his liabilities exceed his assets because legal disability entails the waste of his capabilities and human qualities. However, Abū Ḥanīfah says: If his creditors demand payment, he will be imprisoned until he sells his property and clears his debts.

This form of imprisonment is reasonable — as we will point out later — where the debtor has some known property. But Abū Ḥanifah has permitted his detention even if no property is known to exist in his name. The following text has been narrated from him in *Fath al-Qadīr* (vol. 7, p. 229, “*bāb al-ḥajr bi sabab al-dayn*”): If no property is known to be owned by the insolvent person, and his creditors demand his detention while he says: “I have nothing,” the judge will detain him for debts accruing from contractual obligations, e.g. *mahr* and *kifālah*.

This is contrary to the explicit Qur’ānic verse:

وَإِنْ كَانَتْ ذُو عُسْرَةٍ فَنَظِرَةٌ إِلَىٰ مَيْسَرَةٍ...

...If the debtor is in straitened circumstances, then let there be postponement until they are eased. (2:280)

Moreover, there is consensus on the issue among all the legal schools of the Ummah: the Shāfi‘ī, the Imāmī, the Ḥanbalī, the Mālikī, as well as Muḥammad and Abū Yūsuf (*Fath al-Qadīr*, Ibn ‘Abidīn, *al-Fiqh ‘alā al-madhāhib al-‘arba‘ah*, and al-Sanhūrī in *Maṣādir al-ḥaqq*, vol. 5)

3. The debt should be payable presently, not in the future, in accordance with the opinion of the Imāmī, Shāfi‘ī, Mālikī and Ḥanbalī schools. But if part of it is to be paid presently and part of it in the future, it will be seen whether the assets suffice for clearing the present debts; if they do, he will not be declared legally incapable; if not, he will be declared so. If he is declared legally incapable for debts presently payable, the debts payable in the future will remain till the time of their payment arrives (*al-Tadhkirah* and *al-Fiqh ‘alā al-madhāhib al-‘arba‘ah*).

4. That the creditors, all or some of them, demand the declaration of his legal disability.

When all these conditions are present, the judge will declare him legally incapable and stop him from disposing his property by selling, renting, mortgaging, lending, and so on, being detrimental to the interests of the creditors.

The judge will sell the assets of the insolvent person and distribute the proceeds among his creditors. If they suffice for repaying all the debts, they will be so applied. In the event of their falling short, a proportionate distribution will be affected.

On the completion of the distribution, the disability will automatically end, because its purpose was to safeguard the interests of the creditors and this has been achieved.

Exceptions:

Al-'Allāmah al-Hillī observes in *al-Tadhkirah*, "bāb al-taflīs": From among the assets of the insolvent person, the house where he resides, his slave, and the horse which he rides will not be sold. This is the view held by the Imāmiyyah, Abū Ḥanīfah and Ibn Ḥanbal. Al-Shāfi'ī and Mālik state: All of these will be sold.

A day's provision will also be left for him and his family on the day of distribution, and if he dies before the distribution, the cost of his shroud and burial will be met from his own assets, because funeral expenses have precedence over debts.

In fact all that which is immediately necessary will be left for him, e.g. clothes, a day's provision or more, in accordance with the circumstances, books that are essential for someone like him, the tools of his trade by which he earns his living, the necessary household goods such as mattresses, blankets, pillows, cooking pots, plates, pitchers, and all other things which one requires for his immediate needs.

A Particular Thing and Its Owner:

If an owner (from among the creditors) finds a particular thing which the insolvent person had purchased from him on credit, that thing will belong to him in preference to all other creditors, even if there exists nothing else besides it. This is the opinion of the Imāmī, Mālikī, Shāfi'ī and the Ḥanbalī schools.

The Ḥanafis observe: He is not entitled to it, but will have a joint interest in it with the other creditors (*al-Tadhkirah* and *Fath al-Qadīr*).

Wealth Accruing after Insolvency:

If after legal disability any wealth accrues to an insolvent person, will his disability extend to it exactly like the wealth existing at the time of the disability, or not? Will the insolvent person be completely free in his dispositions concerning it?

The Ḥanbalis say: There is no difference between the wealth acquired after insolvency and the wealth present at the time of it.

The Shāfi'īs hold two opinions, and so do the Imāmiyyah. Al-'Allāmah al-Hillī states: That which is more likely is that the disability extends to it as well, because the purpose of the disability is to give those entitled their claims, and this right is not limited to the wealth existing at the time of the declaration.

The Ḥanafis observe: The disability does not extend to it, and his dispositions as well as acknowledgement (of debt) are valid in regard to

it (*Fath al-Qadīr*, *al-Tadhkirah*, and *al-Fiqh 'alā al-madhāhib al-'arba'ah*).

If a crime has been committed against an insolvent person, if it is unintentional and requires the payment of damages, the insolvent person cannot pardon the crime because the right of the creditors extends to it, and if it is intentional and entails *qiṣāṣ*, the insolvent person is entitled either to take *qiṣāṣ* or to opt for damages, and the creditors are not entitled to force him to take damages and forsake *qiṣāṣ* (*al-Jawāhir*).

The Acknowledgement of an Insolvent Person:

If after being declared legally incapable an insolvent person acknowledges being indebted to some person, will his word be accepted and that person included among the creditors at the time of distribution of the property?

The Shāfi'i, the Ḥanafī and the Ḥanbalī schools observe: His acceptance will not be valid in respect to his property present at the time of declaration of his insolvency.

The Imāmi legists differ among themselves, with the author of *al-Jawāhir* and a large number of other authorities subscribing to the view of the Ḥanbalī, Shāfi'i and Ḥanafī schools.

Marriage:

The Ḥanafis say: If an insolvent person marries after his being declared legally incapable, his marriage is valid and his wife is entitled to be included among the creditors to the extent of *mahr al-mithl*, and that which exceeds it remains a claim against him.

The Shāfi'i and the Imāmi schools observe: The marriage is valid but the entire *mahr* will be considered a claim against him and the wife will not be entitled to anything along with the creditors.

Imprisonment:

The Imāmiyyah say: It is not valid to detain a person in financial straits despite the disclosure of his insolvency because the Qur'ānic verse says:

وَإِنْ كَانَتْ ذُو عُسْرَةٍ فَنَظِرَةٌ إِلَىٰ مَيْسَرَةٍ...

And if the debtor is in straitened circumstances, then let there be postponement until they have eased (2:280).

If he is found to possess any known asset, the judge will order him

to surrender it, and if he refuses to comply, the judge is entitled either to sell it and clear the debts — because the judge is the guardian (*walī*) of the uncompliant — or to imprison the debtor until he clears his debts himself, in accordance with the tradition:

الوَاجِدُ تَحِلُّ عُقُوبَتُهُ وَعِرْضُهُ

It is legitimate to punish and humiliate (as when the creditor calls his debtor 'injust', 'a delayer', etc.) a debtor who possesses (financial capability).

Abū Ḥanīfah observes: The judge is not entitled to sell his property against his will, but he can imprison him.

Al-Shāfi'ī and Ibn Ḥanbal state: The judge is empowered to sell and clear the debts (*al-Tadhkirah* and *al-Jawāhir*).

Prohibition on Travelling:

There is no doubt that if it is permissible to punish a debtor by imprisonment it is also valid to prohibit him from travelling provided the necessary conditions exist. These conditions are: The debt be proven as per the Shari'ah; the debtor be capable of repaying it, and he procrastinate and keep on postponing payment. Apart from this, the interests of the creditors should be feared to be in jeopardy if he travels, such as where the journey is long and dangerous. Hence if the debt is not proved, or is proved but the debtor's circumstances are straitened and he is unable to repay, or he has an agent or surety, or there is no fear of the creditors' interests being hurt if he travels, in all these circumstances it is in no way permissible to prohibit him from travelling.

From here it becomes clear that the measures taken by the courts in Lebanon for stopping a defendant from travelling simply on the initiation of proceedings against him have no basis in the Islamic Shari'ah but in positive law.

NOTES:

1. Last illness (*marād al-mawt*) is also one of the causes, considering that it leads the person in last illness to being prohibited from dispositions exceeding one-third of his property. We have already discussed this in the chapter on wills under the title, 'Dispensations of a Critically ill person.' Please refer.

2. Every moral duty that is a duty vis-à-vis God Almighty is conditional to mental maturity (*'aql*) and puberty (*bulūgh*), whereas every economic duty vis-à-vis people is not conditional to mental maturity and puberty.

3. At first the Qur'ānic verse mentions the property of the legally incapable while relating it to the second person (*kāf al-mukhāṭab* in *أموالكم*) and the second

time to the third person (*hā' al-ghā'ib* in أموالهم), alluding thereby that everything owned by an individual has two aspects: firstly, his personal authority over it, and secondly, that he apply it in a manner profitable to himself and the society, or, at the worst, in a manner unharmed to the two.

4. The author of *al-Jawāhir* observes in the "*bāb al-ḥajr*": "There is *ijmā'* among the Imāmiyyah that if idiocy occurs after the attainment of puberty, the guardianship will be exercised by the judge, and if it continues from childhood, the *ijmā'* has been narrated that it belongs to the father and the paternal grandfather. But the truth is that there is a difference of opinion in the latter case, and a group of scholars has explicitly mentioned that the guardianship belongs to the two.

5. Al-Nā'ini, in al-Khwānsārī's *Taqrīrāt* (1357 H., vol. 1, p. 324) states: "The truth is that the guardianship of the father is a proven fact, even if it entails disadvantage or loss for the child." But the compiler of this work narrates from his teacher, al-Nā'ini, that he retracted from this opinion after having been emphatic about it earlier.

Imām Khumaynī: Life and Works Part 4

by Sa'īd Najafiyān

Qiyām for the sake of God:

The *Kashf al-'asrār*, published in 1941, was Imām Khumaynī's first public statement of a political nature. At the end of the book, he called the Muslims and his countrymen to rise to defend the independence of the Islamic world. After citing some verses of social and political relevance from the Qur'ān, he invites the readers to read them repeatedly, to reflect upon them, and to put them into practice. If we try to put the gist of the life, message and work of Imām Khumaynī into a single phrase, that phrase is "*qiyām lillāh*", standing up for the sake of God. *Qiyām lillāh* is not just an act; it is a decision to ordain one's life according to divine values and to dedicate it to God. It is a way of life. It is the resolution to live a life of courage and commitment, the resolution to live and die for a divine cause, to face all the dangers, anxieties and personal losses that one may encounter on the path of faith and commitment. In a letter written about the same time, there are the first glimpses of a man who has resolved to live a life of *qiyām lillāh* and who invites others to do the same:

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ (بخوانید و بلا رنجید)

قال به تالی قدرنا عظیم بواحد ان تقویا ته فرد فرادا خدا تالی در این کلمه شریف از رزق ایزد طبیعت
تاختهای یر بنیت را بیان کرده و بهترین روح عطا شده است که خدا عالم از میان تمام بر حفظ کتاب فرموده این
یک کلمه را پیشنهاد بر فرموده این کلمه تناره صلح در جهان است قیام برای خداست که ابراهیم خلیل الرحمن را

بمزل غلت رسیده و از جلوه ای کواکرن عالم طبیعت رازده خیر سار در علم استین زن نماز لاجب الاغیرین
 قیام دست که در سر کیمج را با یک عصا بنویسند چیره کرد و تمام تخت ریح آنها را یاد فاداد و نیز اورا ایست
 محبوب رسد و تمام صحن و محو کشند قیام برای خداست که تمام نین صیاد علیه و له را یک تیر تمام
 عادات و عقاید جا همیت غلبه داد و بهار از خانه خدا بر انداخت و بکاران توجه و تصور را که است
 و نیز آن ذات مقدس را بمقام قاب قوسین او ادان رسد خود خواهی و ترک قیام برای خدا ما را این بلاد
 سیاه رسد و همه جهانیان را بر ما چیره کرده و کشورای هدی ما نیز نفوذ دیگران در آورده قیام بر یک
 نافع شخصی است که روح وحدت و برادری را در ملت هدی فقه کرده قیام برای نفس است که نیز از ده
 میون جمعیت شیعه را بطوری از هم متفرق و جدا کرده که طمعه شنی ثبوت پرست پشت نیز نشین شده
 قیام برای نفس است که یک نفر از ندان به سواد را بر یک کرده چندین میونه چیره میکند که حوث و انهار
 است خوش ثبوت خد که قیام بر این شخصی است که بدن هم چند نفر کودک حیوان کرد را در تمام کشور
 بر اموال و نفوس و اراضی مسلمانان حکومت داده قیام برای نفس است که حارس علم و دین را تسلیم شنی
 کند که ساده کرده و مراکز علم قرآن را مرکز فحش کرده قیام برای خداست که موقوفات مدارس و معاهد دینی را
 بر بیان تسلیم شنی هرزه کرد به شرف کرده و نفس از کلهبر در می آید قیام برای نفس است که چهار غنمت را

از زنا خفیه سهران بردشت و بدن هم این امر خدای دین و دین در مملکت جابر است و کمر بر علیه ای
 شنی میگوید قیام برای نفس ای شخصی است که روزنامه که کلهبرش نفس خدای است امروز هم همان نشاند که
 از سفر خنک رخصان به شرف تراش کرده تعقیب میکند و در بیان توده کلهبر میکند قیام برای خداست که مجال
 بعضی از این دکنر فاجان داده که در پاره آن بر علیه دین در دعایت هر چه بخواد هر کجود و کلهبرش نشاند آن
 از روحانی هدی از علماء ربانه از دانشمندان دین دار ار کونیدگان این دست ای دین در آن خدا خواه
 از رضا خوان حق پرست ای حق پرستان ثلث نه ای شرفمندان وطن خواه ای وطن خوانان با ما یکی

رحلت خدا جهان را بخوانید و آه مهدی را که پیش از فرود پیروی و ترک شیخ اشرفی کرده تا به بعد
 در جهان ناپدید و باز در خانه ترغیبانه در عالم دست درخت نشوید. این نه غایب و هرگز نجات الای
 امروز روز است که نسیم اوجان الهی در زمین کوفه و بار قیام مهدی بهترین روز است اگر بحال راز
 دست برسد و قیام بار خدا کنیز و امام دینی را عودت خیزد فردا است که شنی برزه کرد
 نهوت را بر شاپیره شوند و تمام آئین در شرف نما را دشمنش از افر با طله خود کند امروزها
 در پیشه و خوار عالم چه عذری دارد همه دیده کتاب از یک تریزری به برود با را که تمام این
 دشمنش را ترا که در هر کوشش با امام صادق و امام غایب روحی که بعد از ان همه جرات کرد
 و با کلمه از آنها صادر است امروز چه عذر در محله خدا دارید این چه ضعف و بیچاره است
 که تا ارا فرا گرفته ای آری شرح که این صفات را هیچ آوری نمود و بیطر علماء بعد و کویان
 رسانید خوب است یک کتابه ام فراهم آورید که هیچ تفرقه آنان را کند و همه آنان را در
 تمام مهدی همراه کرده از هم نهاد میگوید که اگر در یک گوشه مملکت بین جسد است

همه یک دول جت از تمام کشور قیام بگیرند خوب است دین داری را دست کم از بهایان یاد بگیرد که اگر
 یک نفر آنها در یک دید زنگ کند از مراکز فاس آنها با اور بطله دارند و اگر جز آن تصور باد شود روزی
 او قیام کند تا آنکه بن شروع خود قیام کردید خیره بران به دین از چهار فرخنده دور گوشه زنده
 به دینی را آغاز کردند و بهین زوری بر شای تفرقه زده چنان چیره شوند که از زمان رضایان نماند
 سخت تر شود دین بیخبر من جبهه با جبر الی هم در سوله ثم حرد که الموت تصدق اجرو معهم
 «در صدر بعد از ۱۳۶۲» (سید محمد خنجر)

In the Name of Allāh, the Beneficent, the Merciful

(Read this and put it into practice)

Allah, the Exalted, says: "Say (O Prophet): 'I give you but one admonition, that you stand unto God, two by two and one by one.'" (34:46)

In this noble saying, God, the Supreme, has depicted the ascent

from the dark abode of physical nature to the ultimate apex of humanity. It is the best admonition that the Lord of the Universe has selected out of all the admonitions, proposing it to the human being in this dictum. This dictum is the only way to the betterment of both the worlds. It was *qiyām* for the sake of God that made Abraham, the friend (*khalīl*) of the Beneficent, attain to the station of sincere friendship (*khullāh*) of God and liberated him from the multiple manifestations of the world of corporeal nature. Hence, like Abraham, knock the door of the knowledge of certainty (*'ilm al-yaqīn*) and make 'I love not the setters' (6:76) thy slogan.

It was *qiyām lillāh* that afforded Moses (Mūsā Kalīm) to overpower Pharaoh and his lot with a staff and destroy their power, and allowed him to attain to the rendezvous with the Beloved and the stations of 'swooning' (*ṣa'q*) and 'awakening' (*ṣaḥw*).

It was *qiyām* for the sake of God that afforded the Seal of the Prophets (S) to overpower single-handedly all the pagan customs and beliefs of the *Jāhiliyyah*, to throw the idols out of the House of God, and to replace them with monotheism and piety, and made that sacred being attain to the station of *qāba qawsayn aw adnā* (two bows'-length away, or nearer'; 53:9).

And it is our self-seeking character and our abandoning of *qiyām* for God's sake that has made us see these black days, allowing all the world's people to dominate us and subjecting the Islamic countries to the influence of foreigners. It is our *qiyām* for the sake of personal interests that has strangled the spirit of solidarity and brotherhood in the Islamic Ummah. It is the *qiyām* for the carnal self that has scattered us and separated from one another more than ten million Shi'is (i.e. Iranians) so that they have become the prey of a handful of debauched functionaries. It is *qiyām* for one's person that has given power to an illiterate man from the Mazandaran province (i.e. Reza Khan) over a group of several millions, that he may make their generations the prey of his lusts. It is *qiyām* for personal benefit that has allowed, even now, some delinquents to rule over the property, life and honour of Muslims throughout the country. It is *qiyām* for the sake of the carnal self that has handed over our educational institutions to a group of juvenile simpletons and converted the centres of Qur'ānic learning into houses of ill-fame. It is *qiyām* for the sake of self-seeking that has allowed a handful of dishonourable delinquents to take over the endowments of madrasahs and religious institutions as a free gift, without so much as a murmur of protest from anyone. It is *qiyām* for the self that allowed the *chador* to be snatched away from the heads of chaste Muslim women, and even now this anti-religious and illegal practice is in vogue in the country and no one

speaks out against it. It is *qiyām* for the sake of personal interests that has made the newspapers the means of corruption of morals. Today also they pursue the same plans as conceived by the feeble-minded brains of the dishonourable Reza Khan and propagate them amongst the masses. It is *qiyām* for one's sake that has given the chance to some of these illegitimate deputies to say anything they like against religion and the clergy without anyone so much as murmuring out a protest.

O clergy of Islam, O learned in the knowledge of God, O scholars who are pious, O orators who love the faith, O pious seekers of God, O seekers of God who are committed to the Truth, O honourable seekers of the truth, O honourable patriots, O patriots with a sense of honour! Read the admonition of the Lord of the world and accept the sole remedy of reform suggested by Him. Abandon personal interests, that you all may attain to felicity in both the worlds and achieve an honourable existence in both the worlds:

Verily, there are times in your life wherein God sets gusts of spiritual opportunity going. Look out, and place yourself in their way.

Today is the day when the Divine spiritual breeze has begun to blow. Today is the best day for making a *qiyām* for the sake of reform (*iṣlāḥ*). Should you let this opportunity slip and should you fail to stand for the sake of God and revive the rites of the faith, tomorrow will be the day when you will be overwhelmed by a handful of lustful delinquents who will make your entire religion and dignity the victim of their vicious aims.

Today what excuse do you have to offer before God? You all have seen how a boor from Tabriz has insulted your entire sanctities in his books and was guilty of those affronts against al-'Imām al-Ṣādiq (A) and the Hidden Imam — may my soul be his ransom — in the very centre of Shi'ism and there was no protest from your side? What excuse have you to offer today before the Divine tribunal? What is this weakness and impotence that has taken hold of you?

You, honoured gentleman, who have collected these leaves and brought them to the notice of the 'ulamā' of different towns and orators, you will do good to prepare a book that would bring them together on the path of Islamic goals and end their division. You should collect therein signatures from all of them (under a declaration) that should there be an assault on the faith in any part of the country, all will make a united country-wide *qiyām* aimed at a single goal and purpose. It would be good if you learn from the Bahā'īs how to work to defend our religion. If there is a single person out of them in a village, their sensitive centres maintain

contacts with him. Should a minor violation be committed against him, they all rise to his defence.

However, you do not stand up even to defend your own legitimate rights. Irreligious blockheads rose from every quarter and began to strike the note of irreligion. Soon they will so overwhelm you — who are divided amongst yourselves — that harder times than the days of Reza Khan await you.

Whoso goes forth from his house an emigrant to God and His Messenger, and then death overtakes him, his wage shall have fallen on God. (4:100)

Sayyid Rūḥullāh Khumaynī
11 Jamādi al-'Awwal, 1363
(4 May, 1944)

An Era of Disaster:

The rule of Reza Khan marked the beginning of a period of catastrophe in the history of Iran, in that it led to the establishment of the Pahlavi dictatorship, whose basic assignment was to obliterate the country's Islamic identity, culture and traditions. An illiterate, uncultured, coarse and ambitious corporal, entirely ignorant of the great religious, intellectual, philosophical, mystical, juristic, literary and cultural traditions of Iran, was made by the British imperialists the master of its destinies. Nationalism (as an ideology opposed to Islam, not imperialism), corruption, cosmetic Westernization, destruction of the country's resources, and totalitarian dictatorship constituted the hallmarks of this disastrous period, which awaited the emergence of such a mighty power as represented by the Islamic Revolution to bring an end to it.

The anti-Islamic crusade instituted by Western imperialism was continued by Reza Khan's successor, Mohammad Reza, until the ignominious Pahlavi family was forced to flee the country by the sacred revolution of the Muslim people of Iran. Iran had passed through one of the most difficult periods of his history when Imām Khumaynī wrote the *Kashf al-'asrār*. The anger, resentment, regret and bitterness felt by the Iranian people in regard to the disasters that befell Iran during Reza Khan's rule are clearly reflected in the *Kashf al-'asrār*, which, despite the popular relief felt at Reza Khan's exile, views the future with great anxiety, because there was no powerful popular movement at the time that could stop the Pahlavi dictatorship from pursuing its policies against Islam and Iran or put an end to its existence in near future.

The Iranian people led by the 'ulamā' had staged the massive Constitutional Movement against the arbitrary rule of the Qājārs two

decades earlier. But the fruits of that movement had been lost when Westernized secular intellectuals grabbed power and leadership, while the 'ulamā', with few exceptions, withdrew from active, day-to-day politics. This power soon passed into the hands of Reza Khan in the aftermath of the coup of 1919.

After consolidating his power, Reza Khan started his campaign against Islam, the 'ulamā', and institutions of religious education. It gradually intensified, reaching unprecedented dimensions towards the end of his ignominious reign. According to a statistical report, there were 282 *madrasahs* in Iran with 5984 students in 1925, the year of the beginning of the black days of Reza Khan's rule. When the dictator was forced to abdicate by the British in 1941, the number of *madrasahs* had dwindled to 206, with 249 teachers and 784 students in all. There were, of course, protests against the pressures of the regime and its anti-Islamic moves by the 'ulamā' in Mashhad, Tabriz, Isfahān and Qumm. But as the massacre at the Gawhar Shād Mosque indicated, the regime was prepared to silence brutally any voices of protest. Āyatullāh Mudarris, who put up a heroic defiance against Reza Khan's dictatorship, was strangled in prison by his executioners. Other figures who dared to speak out against the regime's illegal moves were silenced through such repressive measures as propaganda, imprisonment, exile and assassination.

Āyatullāh Hā'irī, whose strategy vis-à-vis the dictatorial regime was silence and maintenance of a low profile, died in 1355/1936. After him the centre of religious learning (*hawzah*) at Qumm that he had founded was headed for some 8 years by a triumvirate of his senior associates: Āyatullāhs Ṣadr, Hujjat and Khwānsārī. In 1364/1945 Āyatullāh Burūjerdī came to Qumm and assumed the leadership of its *hawzah*. Imām Khumaynī was active in promoting the candidacy of Āyatullāh Burūjerdī, whom he expected to utilize the potentialities of the position of Shī'i *marji'iyyah* (supreme religious and juristic authority) in order to combat Pahlavi dictatorship and its anti-Islamic plots. The Imām remained close to Āyatullāh Burūjerdī until his death in 1380/1960, but other influences prevailed on Burūjerdī which did not allow him to carry out the responsibilities of an uncontested religious leader that Imām Khumaynī had expected him to fulfil. However, the great prestige and position of Burūjerdī had checked the regime of Mohammad Reza Khan, who had been reinstated in power following CIA coup of 28 Murdad (August 19, 1953) which overthrew the government of Dr. Muṣaddiq.

The coup of 1953, which marked the Shah's return to power, now as an American stooge, signified the beginning of a new black era in Iran's history: America's domination over the political, economic and cultural life of Iran — a role enjoyed by the British earlier.

After the death of Āyatullāh Burūjerdī, no single successor to his position emerged. Imām Khumayni, always reluctant to allow his own name to be canvassed, yielded to the urging of close associates and pupils that a collection of his *fatwās*, or religious rulings, be published, thus implicitly declaring his availability as a religious leader and juristic authority. The Imām, however, had already been one of the prominent *mujtahids* in Qumm when Āyatullāh Burūjerdī had arrived there in 1945. By this time he was one of the leading *mujtahids* of the Shī'i world.

It was not, however, through the 'politics of scholarship' that the prominence of Imām Khumayni spread first within Qumm and then throughout the country. It was his *qiyām lillāh* and his willingness to confront the Shah's regime at a time when few dared to do so that raised him in stages to the heights of prominence and earned him a place in the depths of the hearts of the Iranian people. Despite all the efforts by the regime of the Shah to deny him popular recognition as a religious authority — and the Imam's own extreme reluctance to engage in the politics of religious authority — the very confrontation with the regime that resulted from his *qiyām* for the sake of Allāh and his un-intimidated adherence to the duty of *al-'amr bi al-ma'rūf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar* brought him into unequalled prominence. From the beginning he showed acute sensitivity to matters of social relevance towards which the other scholars were either indifferent or insensitive. For instance, the Imām was alone among the religious scholars of Qumm in extending support publicly to the students of the *hawzah* who were campaigning against the opening of liquor stores in the city.

The Making of a Revolutionary Movement:

The first step towards the creation of a popular Islamic movement came in October 1962, when the regime, reassured by the death of Āyatullāh Burūjerdī, thought that time was ripe to resume its illegal and anti-Islamic policies in full swing. Without even bothering for an approval by its rubber-stamp parliament, the Shah's government, headed by Dr. Amini, promulgated a decree abolishing the requirement that candidates for election to local assemblies (*anjumanhā-ye ayālatī va wilāyatī*) be Muslim and male. The candidates elected would take an oath by a 'heavenly scripture' instead of by the Holy Qur'an. Imām Khumayni, joined by religious leaders elsewhere in the country, protested vigorously against the measure, which was aimed by the regime to gauge the alertness and sensitivity of the 'ulamā' and the people. A wave of protests all around the country forced the regime to formally retract its unconstitutional move.

The measure itself was not intrinsically important, because elec-

tions to local assemblies were invariably corrupt and their functions were purely formal. But the campaign against it provided a point of departure for more comprehensive agitation against the regime, as well as an opportunity to build a coalition of religious forces that might be mobilized for more fundamental aims in the future.

From Protest to Confrontation:

The next step was taken in 1963 when the Shah began to promulgate a series of measures dictated by America to the Shah for reshaping the political, social, and economic life of Iran that were collectively designated the "White Revolution." The appearance of popular approval was obtained by a fraudulent referendum held on January 26, 1963. The measures were correctly perceived by a large segment of Iranian society as being imposed on the country by the United States and designed to bring about augmentation of the Shah's power and wealth, as well as intensification of American dominance, which had been instituted with the CIA coup d'état of August 1953. Imām Khumayni moved immediately to denounce the fraudulent "revolution" and to expose the motives that underlay it, preaching a series of sermons from Madrasah Fayḍiyyah in Qumm that had a nationwide impact.

There was a country-wide agitation against the measures. Demonstrations in Tehran and Qumm were attacked by the Shah's security forces and a reign of terror was released by the regime. However, a turning point in the confrontation came when the Shah sent his paratroopers to attack 'ulamā' and religious students who had assembled in Madrasah Fayḍiyyah to hold a ceremonial gathering on the occasion of the anniversary of the martyrdom of al-'Imām Ja'far al-Ṣādiq (A) on 25 Shawwāl (March 22, 1963). A number of students were killed and the madrasah was ransacked, its doors and windows broken, and Qur'āns as well as other books and belongings were piled up in the courtyard and set on fire. This event, far from intimidating Imām Khumayni, marked the beginning of a new period of determined struggle that was directed not only against the errors and excesses of the regime, but against its very existence. The attack on the madrasah had a symbolic value, exemplifying as it did both the hostility of the regime to Islam and Islamic institutions and the ruthless, barbaric manner in which it expressed that hostility. If hitherto the Shah had skillfully concealed his hostility to Islam, the attack on Madrasah Fayḍiyyah unmasked his real face. March 22, 1963 marked, as Imām Khumayni forecasted on the very day of the tragedy, the beginning of the end of the ignominious regime of the Pahlavis. After the massacre in the Gawhar Shād Mosque, this was the second event that had profoundly injured the people's religious sensitivities, reminding them that the anti-Islamic policies

instituted by Reza Khan were being pursued with fresh vigour by the U.S.'s protégé, the Shah. On the occasion of the fortieth day after the assault on Madrasah Fayḍiyyah, Imām Khumaynī issued the following declaration:

Forty days have now passed since the beating, wounding and killing of our dear ones. It is now forty days that the survivors left behind by the victims of the slaughter at Madrasah Fayḍiyyah have been plunged in mourning. Yesterday the father of Sayyid Yūnus Rūdbārī (may God have mercy upon him) came to see me, with his back bent and his face deeply marked by the great tragedy he has suffered. What words are there to console these mothers who have lost their children, these bereaved fathers?

Indeed, we must offer our condolences to the Prophet of Islam (S) and the Imam of the age (may God hasten his appearance) for it is for the sake of those great ones that we have endured these blows and lost our young men. Our crime was defending the laws of Islam and the independence of Iran. It is because of our defence of Islam that we have been humiliated and brought to expect imprisonment, torture, and execution. Let this tyrannical regime perform whatever inhuman deeds it wishes — let it break the arms and legs of our young men, let it chase our wounded from the hospitals, let it threaten us with death and the violation of our honour, let it destroy the institution of religious learning, let it expel the doves of this Islamic sanctuary from their nests!

During these past forty days, we have been unable to obtain a precise count of the dead, the wounded, and those whose property has been plundered. We do not know how many people have been buried, how many are languishing in dungeons, how many have gone into hiding. In fact, all these years after the event, we still do not know the exact number of people killed in the Mosque of Gawhar Shād, when the bodies were carried away loaded on trucks.

The problem we confront is that whatever authority you address will tell you: "Whatever was done, was on the orders of His Imperial Majesty; we had no choice in the matter." Everyone, from the Prime Minister down to the police chief and the governor of Qumm, tell us in effect: "We received orders from His Imperial Majesty. The crimes at Madrasah Fayḍiyyah were committed on his orders. The wounded were expelled from the hospitals on his orders, and it was he who commanded us to attack your homes with commandos and whores and plunder your homes if you attempted to do anything in response to Āyatullāh Ḥakīm. It is also His Imperial Majesty's command that we seize and forcibly draft the *ṭullāb* (students of religious sciences), without the

slightest legal justification. Furthermore, it is the command of His Imperial Majesty that we attack the university and assault the students.”

Government officials attribute all these violations of the law to the Shah. If this attribution is justified, we must recite funeral prayers for Islam, Iran, and legality. If it is not, and they are lying in attributing all these crimes, violations of the law, and inhuman acts to the Shah, then why does he not defend himself, so that the people may know how they should treat the government and punish it for its deeds at the appropriate time?

I have repeatedly pointed out that the government has evil intentions and is opposed to the ordinances of Islam. One by one, the proofs of its enmity are becoming clear. The Ministry of Justice has made clear its opposition to the ordinances of Islam by various measures like the abolition of the requirement that judges be Muslim and male. Henceforth, Jews, Christians, and the enemies of Islam and the Muslims are to decide on affairs concerning the honour and person of the Muslims. The strategy of this government and certain of its members is to bring about the total effacement of the ordinances of Islam. As long as this usurpatory and rebellious government is in power, the Muslims can have no hope for any good.

I don't know whether all these uncivilized and criminal acts have been committed for the sake of the oil in Qumm, whether the religious teaching institution is to be sacrificed for the sake of oil. Or is it all this being done for the sake of Israel, since we are considered an obstacle to the conclusion of a treaty with Israel directed against the Islamic states? In any event we are to be destroyed. The tyrannical regime imagines that through these inhuman acts and this repression it can deflect us from our aim, which is none other than the great aim of Islam — to prevent oppression, arbitrary rule, and the violation of the law; to preserve the rights of Islam and the nation; and to establish social justice.

But it causes us not the least concern that the sons of Islam should be drafted into the army. Let our young men enter the barracks, educate our troops, and raise their level of thinking; let a new enlightened and freedom-loving people appear among our troops so that, by the grace of God Almighty, Iran may attain its dignity and freedom. We know that the commanders of the great Iranian army, its respectable officers, and its noble members share our aims and are ready to sacrifice themselves for the sake of the dignity of Iran. I know that no officer with a conscience approves of these crimes and acts of brutality, and I am aware of (and deplore) the pressures to which they are subject. I extend a

fraternal hand to them in the hope of obtaining the salvation of Islam and Iran. I know that their hearts are troubled by this subordination to Israel, and that they do not wish Iran to be trampled by the boots of the Jews.

I declare to the heads of the Muslim states, whether Arab or non-Arab: The 'ulamā' of Islam, the religious leaders and pious people of Iran, together with its noble army, are the brothers of the Muslim states and share their interests. They abhor and are disgusted with the treaty with Israel, the enemy of Islam and Iran. I say this quite clearly: if you wish, let the agents of Israel come put an end to my life.

It is fitting that the Muslim nation, whether in Iran or abroad, should commemorate the great tragedy suffered by Islam and the disasters inflicted on the religious teaching institution on the fortieth day after their occurrence. If they are not prevented by the agents of the government, they should hold ceremonies of mourning and curse those responsible for these atrocities.

Rūḥullāh al-Mūsawī al-Khumaynī

Throughout the spring of 1963, Imām Khumaynī continued to denounce the Shah's regime. He concentrated his attacks on its tyrannical nature, its subordination to the United States, and its expanding collaboration with Israel. The confrontation reached a new peak in June with the onset of Muḥarram, the month of commemoration of the martyrdom of al-'Imām al-Ḥusayn (A), the greatest symbol of struggle against tyranny and un-Islamic rule. On the afternoon of 'Āshūrā', the Imām delivered a historic speech at Madrasah Fayḍiyyah in Qumm, repeating his denunciations of the Shah's regime and warning the Shah not to behave in such a way that the public would rejoice when he should ultimately be forced to leave the country:

It is now the afternoon of 'Āshūrā'. Sometimes when I recall the events of 'Ashūrā', a question occurs to me: If the Umayyads and the regime of Yazīd ibn Mu'āwiyah wished to make war against al-Ḥusayn, why did they commit such savage and inhuman crimes against the defenceless women and innocent children? What was the offence of the women and children? What had al-Ḥusayn's six month-old infant done? It seems that the Umayyads had a far more basic aim: they were opposed to the very existence of the family of the Prophet. They did not wish the Banū Hāshim to exist and their goal was to root out this "blessed tree".

A similar question occurs to me now. If the tyrannical regime of Iran simply wished to wage war on the *marāji'* (the religious authorities), to oppose the 'ulamā', what business did it have

tearing the Qur'āns to shreds on the day it attacked Madrasah Fayḍiyyah? Indeed, what business did it have with the madrasah or with its students, like the eighteen year-old sayyid who was killed? What had he done against the Shah, against the government, against the tyrannical regime? We come to the conclusion that this regime also has a more basic aim: they are fundamentally opposed to Islam itself and the existence of the religious class. They don't wish this institution to exist. They do not wish any of us to exist, the great and the small alike.

Israel also does not wish the Qur'ān to exist in this country. Israel does not wish the 'ulamā' to exist in this country. Israel does not wish a single learned man to exist in this country. It was Israel that assaulted Madrasah Fayḍiyyah by means of its sinister agents. It is still assaulting us, and assaulting you, the nation; it wishes to seize your economy, to destroy your trade and agriculture, to appropriate your wealth. Israel wishes to remove by means of its agents anything it regards as blocking its path. The Qur'ān is blocking its path; it must be removed. The religious scholars are blocking its path; they must be eliminated. Madrasah Fayḍiyyah and other centres of knowledge and learning are blocking its path; they must be destroyed. The *ṭullāb* might later come to block their path; they must be killed, pushed off the roof, have their heads and arms broken. In order for Israel to attain its objectives, the government of Iran has continually affronted us in accordance with goals and plans conceived in Israel.

Respected people of Qumm! On the day that mendacious, that scandalous referendum took place — that referendum contrary to all the interests of the Iranian nation and conducted at bayonet point — you witnessed a gang of hooligans and ruffians prowling around Qumm, on foot and riding in cars, going down the streets and thoroughfares of this centre of religious learning that stands next to the shrine of Ḥaḍrat Ma'ṣūmah — peace be upon her. They were shouting: "Your days of parasitism are at an end! Your days of eating *pulao* are over!"

Now, these students of the religious sciences who spend the best and most active part of their lives in these narrow cells, and whose monthly income is somewhere between 40 and 100 tumans — are they parasites? And those to whom one source of income alone brings hundreds of millions of tumans are not parasites? Are the 'ulamā' parasites — people like the late Ḥājj Shaykh 'Abd al-Karim (Ḥā'irī), whose sons had nothing to eat on the night that he died, or the late Burūjerdī, who was 600,000 tumans in debt when he departed from the world? And those who have filled foreign banks with the wealth produced by the toil of our poverty-

stricken people, who have erected towering palaces but still will not leave the people in peace, wishing to fill their own pockets and those of Israel with our resources — they are not parasites!

Let me give you some advice, Mr. Shah! Dear Mr. Shah, I advise you to desist from this policy and acts like this. I don't want the people to offer up thanks if your masters should decide one day that you must leave. I don't want you to become like your father.

Iranian nation! Those among you who are thirty or forty years of age or more will remember how these foreign countries attacked us during World War II. The Soviet Union, Britain and America invaded Iran and occupied our country. The property of the people was exposed to danger and their honour was imperilled. But God knows, everyone was happy because the Pahlavi (i.e. Reza Khan) had gone!

Shah, I don't wish the same to happen to you; I don't want you to become like your father. Listen to my advice, listen to the 'ulamā' of Islam. They desire the welfare of the nation, the welfare of the country. Don't listen to Israel; Israel can't do anything for you. You miserable wretch, forty-five years of your life have passed; isn't it time for you to think and reflect a little, to ponder about where all this is leading you, to learn a lesson from the experience of your father? If what they say is true, that you are opposed to Islam and the religious scholars, your ideas are quite wrong. If they are dictating these things to you and then giving them to you to read, you should think about it a little. Why do you speak without thinking? Are the religious scholars really some kind of impure animal? If they are impure animals, why do the people kiss their hands? Why do they regard the very water they drink as blessed? Are we really impure animals? I hope to God that you did not have in mind the 'ulamā' and the religious scholars when you said, "The reactionaries are like an impure animal," because if you did, it will be difficult for us to tolerate you much longer; you will find yourself in a predicament. You won't be able to go on living; the nation will not allow you to continue this way. The religious scholars and Islam are Black Reaction! And you have carried out your White Revolution in the midst of this Black Reaction! What do you mean, a White Revolution? Why do you try to deceive the people so? Why do you threaten the people so?

I was informed today that a number of preachers and speakers in Tehran were taken to the office of SAVAK and were threatened with punishment if they speak on three subjects. They were not to say anything bad about the Shah, not to attack Israel, and not to say that Islam is endangered. Otherwise, they can say what they like! But all of our problems and all our differences with the

government comprise exactly these three! If we overlook these three subjects, we have no dispute with the government. Even if we do not say that Islam is endangered, will that mean that Islam is not endangered? Or if we do not say, "The Shah is such-and-such," will that mean that he is not in fact such-and-such? And what is this tie, this link, between the Shah and Israel that makes SAVAK consider the Shah an Israeli? Does SAVAK consider the Shah a Jew?

Mr. Shah! May be those people want to present you as a Jew so that I will denounce you as an unbeliever and they can expel you from Iran and put an end to you! Don't you know that if one day, some uproar occurs and the tables are turned, none of these people around you will be your friends? They are friends of the dollar; they have no religion, no loyalty. They are hanging responsibility for everything around your miserable neck!

You know that vile individual — I'll mention his name at the appropriate time — who came to Madrasah Fayḍiyyah and whistled to signal for the commandos to gather, then ordered them to attack, to assault, to plunder all the rooms in the madrasah and destroy everything. When he is asked, "Why did you commit these crimes?" he replies, "The Shah told us to do it. It was his royal command that we destroy Madrasah Fayḍiyyah and slaughter these people."

There is much to be said, far more than you can even imagine. Certain things are happening to this nation and those that are about to happen fill me with anxiety and sorrow. I feel anxiety and sorrow at the state of Iran, at the state of our ruined country, at the state of this cabinet, at the state of those running our government. I pray to God Almighty that He remedy our affairs.

Two days later, the Imām was arrested at his residence and taken to confinement in Tehran.¹

To be continued — in shā'Allāh

NOTES:

1. The account of Imām Khumayni's movement given here is partly based on Dr. Hāmid Algar's Introduction to *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imām Khumayni*. The translations of Imām Khumayni's declarations and speeches given here are also, except for slight changes here and there, Dr. Algar's.

Mudarris' Conflict with Reza Khan

by Forough Jahanbakhsh

Almost all accounts and analyses regarding the Persian Constitutional Revolution (1906) discuss the basic fact that the 'ulamā' had a leading role in the movement; but after its success, they gradually withdrew from the political scene. It is generally held that this political passivity of the Iranian 'ulamā', except the brief involvement of Āyatullāh Kāshānī in Oil Nationalization Movement in 1940s, extended until the 1963 uprising and the emergence of Āyatullāh Khumaynī. Among a variety of reasons provided by the scholars for this withdrawal of the 'ulamā' it is a very commonly cited view that the constitutionalist 'ulamā' in spite of large concessions given to them in the Constitution, withdrew their support from the revolution because of the force of secularism that started to make itself felt strongly.

This paper, however, aims to indicate that the political thought and activities of Āyatullāh Sayyid Ḥasan Mudarris (1870-1938) was an exception to these general statements. He not only remained active on the scene but became so deeply involved in politics that we can say he was second only to Āyatullāh Khumaynī among the 20th century Iranian 'ulamā' in this respect.

Sayyid Ḥasan Mudarris began his political career with the outbreak of the Persian Constitutional Revolution when he was a pupil and the close associate of the two eminent Shī'ī *marāji'* of the time and the leading figures of the Revolution, namely Āyatullāh Mullā Muḥammad Kāzīm Khurāsānī, Āyatullāh Sayyid Muḥammad Kāzīm Yazdī, and Āyatullāh Mirzā Muḥammad Ḥusayn Nā'īnī. After finishing his study in Iraq and upon his arrival in Iran Mudarris continued his political activities

*This paper was presented by the author, a Ph. D. student at the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal, at the 33rd International Congress of Asian and North African Studies, Toronto, August 1990.

in Iṣfahān. Then, he joined the Second Majlis (1909-1911) as one of the representatives of the 'ulamā'. He played an important role in the migrant cabinet of Iran during the First World War. After the war to the end of his life he was elected several times to the Majlis (legislative assembly).

Mudarris found the period after the constitution very crucial. On the one hand he witnessed the hegemony of secular Western oriented thinkers and their superficial imitation of the West; on the other hand from a long time before, Mudarris, like other reformist 'ulamā', had come to believe that the traditional complexion of Iranian society should undergo certain changes in its social, political, military, and economic aspects if the country was to survive in the modern world. In fact, if we categorize the 'ulamā' involved in the revolution into two types, 1) conservative religious reformers such as Shaykh Faḍlullāh Nūrī, who at last rose against the constitutional reform and declared it heresy; and 2) religious compromisers such as the leading constitutionalists, Khurāsānī, Māzandarānī, Nā'inī, and others who tried to reconcile the concept of constitutionalism with Islam; we can put Mudarris in the second group. But there is a great difference between him and others in this group. Mudarris was the only member of the group who did not stop at the theoretical stage. Rather than being satisfied with mere theory he extended his reconciliatory role into the practical aspects of the struggle for constitutionalism; that is, he participated in day-to-day politics. Mudarris, unlike the first group of the 'ulamā', did not condemn the constitution itself because of the penetration of secular ideas and did not, like the second group, remain simply a bystander in the combat between the old traditions and the new attractive ideals imported from the West. He believed now that the main goal of the revolution, i.e., establishment of a legislative assembly and putting an end to despotism, had been achieved, it would not be proper to abandon the revolution because of the domination of the secularists.

Mudarris' importance as a popular religious and political figure increased enormously after World War One with his campaign against foreign domination in Iran, particularly his stand against the 1919 Anglo-Persian agreement and his leading role in its failure. The coup d'état on February 21, 1921 engineered by Sayyid Diyā' al-Dīn Ṭabāṭabā'ī, a journalist, and Reza Khan, a Cossack Officer, brought Reza Khan into the political scene of Iran as the commander-in-chief of the army and the Minister of War. Mudarris' relation with Reza Khan can be divided into two phases: 1) the first two years when Reza Khan held the post of War Minister, 2) the period when Reza Khan became the Prime Minister and then achieved the throne as the absolute supreme power.

From the coup of 1921 until October, 28, 1923 when Reza Khan

became the Prime Minister, Mudarris, as the head of the majority in the Parliament, supported Reza Khan and his activities as the Minister of War. During this period that Reza Khan embarked on reconstruction of the army and consolidating the power of the central government, he received the full support of the Majlis. The only remarkable objection to Reza Khan at this stage occurred during the 4th term of the Majlis. In the session No. 148, one of the deputies protested against certain unconstitutional activities committed by the military under the command of Reza Khan, illegal treatment of journalists, and continuation of martial law. He warned the parliament about the consequences of the increase of military despotism and its domination over the government. In response Mudarris, then the Majlis speaker, ensured his colleagues that in the constitutional regime the power of the Majlis would be above the military power, and stated that the merits of Reza Khan as the Minister of War were fundamental while his faults were minor matters. He then asked the parliament to attempt to eliminate the negative points of Reza Khan in order that the country could benefit from his positive achievements.¹

After the premiership of Reza Khan until the end of Mudarris' life (1923-1938), the major theme of conflict between the two was Mudarris' resistance against the unconstitutional acts of Reza Khan and his government. As the Prime Minister and the Minister of War, Reza Khan had exerted some influence on the elections for the Majlis, particularly in small cities and provinces under martial law. From the Fifth Majlis onward, through rigged elections, Reza Khan succeeded in having the majority under his control. Then he managed to manipulate this majority support in suppressing and disarming the opposition. On different occasions he put the opposition's newspapers under ban, arrested their editors, announced martial law, organized mob demonstrations, and entertained the thought of creating a Republican regime in Iran modelled on neighbouring Turkey. All these examples mentioned above, whose detailed accounts are beyond the scope of this paper,² constitute the history of Mudarris' conflict with Reza Khan and demonstrate its root cause, namely: Mudarris' strong belief in, and his respect for the hard-gained achievements of the Revolution and its democratic institutions, the parliament, freedom of speech, execution of law, etc., which all were quite contrary to Reza Khan's dictatorial tendency.

Mudarris, unlike the reactionary group of the 'ulamā' who tried to preserve the status quo, did not condemn reforms under the new regime such as the establishment of schools, formation of a unified central army, and military conscription.

Mudarris is often misjudged in the passing remarks available about him in English sources. For example, Abrahamian in his book *Iran*

Between Two Revolutions, when talking about the opponents of Reza Khan's bill to introduce compulsory military conscription, misplaces Mudarris among landed magnates and the reactionary 'ulamā':

For many landed magnates, such conscription would erode their patrimonial authority and draw essential labourers from their villages. And for the 'ulamā', especially Mudarres, two years of indoctrination in a secular institution administered by anticlerical officers would corrupt social morality and public religiosity.³

On the contrary Mudarris always supported formation of a strong national army and declared military conscription a legitimate law. Because he had supported the bill in the Majlis he was criticized by certain 'ulamā' and other religious people who were against the bill. While the bill was proceeding through the Majlis, Mudarris made a visit to Isfahān where some 'ulamā' particularly his teacher, Āyatullāh Khātūnābādī, complained about his support of the bill and asked him to propose in the Majlis that theological students be exempted from military service. Mudarris answered:

My dear teacher, if we do this, a number of incapable persons will use theological studies as a cover to escape from doing military services. Moreover, if our theological students become familiar with military affairs and learn about modern weapons, it would be useful for them.⁴

Sayyid Jalāl al-Din Lankarāni, one of the clergy who met Mudarris at that time and asked him to withdraw his support from the conscription bill, writes in his notes that Mudarris told him:

These 'ulamā' who oppose the military conscription do not understand the situation. Let our young generation learn about military science and be informed of military discipline. These people are Muslim, they should learn how to defend their country. We need to have enough trained soldiers to defend the country against the enemy's penetration.⁵

Also Hājj Āqā Nūrullāh and a number of 'ulamā' from Qumm and Isfahān insisted on nullification of the bill. Mudarris called their request illogical and maintained: "Doing military service is a legitimate matter (*amr-e Sharī*) and something necessary for the country."⁶

Amin Banani in his book *The Modernization of Iran*, discussing Reza Khan's activities during the term of the Fourth Majlis states:

The fourth session of the Majlis was elected in the summer of 1921....Its membership was made up of a minority of well-meaning liberals and a majority of selfish, jealous, reactionary, and defeatist landlords and clergy, and it was dominated by Modarres of Isfahan, an egotistical mulla who had no aims

beyond self-aggrandizement and the acquisition of power. For no other reason than to test his personal power he pitted himself against Reza Khan in political combat.⁷

There are two points to be made here. First of all Banani has made a great historical mistake. Contrary to what he says, in the Fourth Majlis, Mudarris and his majority in the Parliament supported the appointment of Reza Khan to the post of War Minister. As mentioned above, during the Fourth Majlis Mudarris' only opposition to Reza Khan did not go further than reminding him that the Majlis had the power to question anybody's activities including those of ministers. Secondly, it seems very strange to conclude that Mudarris' only aim and his sole motivation in his life-time struggle did not go beyond self-aggrandizement and testing his personal power. Although other opponents to Mudarris, such as Yahyā Dawlatābādī and Sayyid Ya'qūb Anwār, his two contemporary politicians, as well as Khwājah Nūrī, the journalist and biographer, charge Mudarris with the weakness of being very stubborn and very proud of his own thought, it is remarkable that in their writings this criticism neither overshadows Mudarris' struggle against Reza Khan's absolutism nor devalues his motivations.⁸

In the writings of some scholars, including Nikki Keddie, one of the 'ulamā's reasons for opposing Reza Khan's reforms is said to be the educational reforms and the introduction of modern state schools which ultimately broke down the 'ulamā's monopoly over the educational system and decreased their power. For example, see Keddie, *Religion and Politics in Iran*, introduction and chapter four.

Sometimes, in the statement of these generalities Mudarris is included among those 'ulamā' who wished to preserve their own power at the price of the nation's illiteracy and ignorance. But such an assertion is quite untrue about Mudarris. Although Mudarris himself enjoyed a top position among the clergy and administered the Sipahsalār theological school in Tehran, he sent his son to Dār al-Funūn, a state school, and then to a medical school. Moreover, in the Majlis it was Mudarris who not only supported the establishment of new schools but also demanded a greater budget for the Ministry of Education. In the Sixth Majlis he asked for a greater budget to be allocated for establishing schools for the training of the elderly in the villages.⁹

Unfortunately most of the Western accounts which claim to examine the modernization of Iran under the Pahlavis do not depict the position of the 'ulamā' properly. Both pro-Pahlavis and anti-Pahlavi leftists have employed a cliché pattern: backward, reactionary, superstitious, fanatic, and mammonish to describe the 'ulamā'. Such a description does not fit a number of them in general and Mudarris in particular. As a detailed study of Mudarris' life indicates, the most significant

motive which caused him to remain active in politics when he could have enjoyed a good position and great popularity in the religious field, was preservation of the achievements of the Constitutional Revolution which were endangered by such threats as the 1907 Anglo-Russian Treaty, the 1911 Russian Ultimatum, the invasion of Iran by the great powers during the First World War, and the 1919 Anglo-Persian agreement. And from 1921 until the end of his life he challenged the increasing plague of Reza Khan's dictatorship. As one of the most prominent upholders of the constitution, he stood firmly against the return of autocracy; and as one of the greatest nationalists opposed any form of subservience to foreign powers.

Concerning foreign relationships, Mudarris is known among Iranians as one of the pioneers of the negative equilibrium policy in Iran. Mudarris' time was the climax of great powers' struggle — Russia and Britain — over Iran. Weak Iranian governments during the years before the Revolution (1906) and even for some years after that, particularly before 1919, used to give equal concessions to the two powers in order to achieve a balance between their respective influences in Iran, and avoid the resentment of one or the other. But after World War I and from the time of the Fourth Majlis onward, particularly on the issue of the 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement, Mudarris supported cooperation with a third power to break down the monopoly of the Russians and the British with respect to projects in Iran. To show Mudarris' position in opposition to foreign influence it may suffice to examine the British and Russian understandings of him. Because of his anti-British campaign, and his later opposition to Reza Khan, the British called him a reactionary, anti-reform and pro-Russian clergyman. On the other hand, the Russians called him pro-British, a fanatic, and an opponent of national democratic reform, particularly because of his anti-republican campaign.

In sum, Mudarris' great practical effort of reconciliation between the various and often contradictory values of constitutionalism, nationalism, and Islam marked him as a nationalist *mujtahid* among the later 19th and early 20th centuries 'ulamā' who had given Iranian nationalism a religious colouring. The thesis that Mudarris was practically trying to prove was that devotion to Islam and participation in politics not only are not contradictory, but complementary to each other and can co-exist in the same individual.

NOTES:

1. Turkamān, Muḥammad, *Mudarris dar panj dawreh-ye taqnīniyyeh-ye Majlis-e Shūrā-ye Milli*, Tehran: Daftar-e Nashr-e Farhang-e Islāmi, 1367 H. Sh., vol. I.

2. Detailed account of the events and the position of Mudarris with regard to them are available in "Sayyid Hasan Mudarris (1870-1938)" an unpublished master thesis by Forough Jahanbakhsh, Institute of Islamic studies, McGill University, Montreal, 1989.

3. Abrahamian, Ervand, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1982, p. 131.

4. Mudarrisi, 'Ali, *Mudarris*, Tehran: Bunyād-e Ta'rikh-e Inqilāb-e Islāmi-ye Īrān, 1366 H. Sh., vol. II, p. 340.

5. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 333.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 202.

7. Banani, Amin, *The Modernization Of Iran 1921-1941*, Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1961, p. 41.

8. Dawlatābādī, Yaḥyā, *Ta'rikh Mu'āsir yā ḥayāt-e Yaḥyā*, Tehran: Ibn-e Sīnā, 1331 H. Sh; Anwār, S. Ya'qūb. Unpublished *Personal Notes*; Khwājah Nūrī, Ibrāhīm. *Bāzīgarān-e 'aṣr-i talā'ī*, Tehran: Sāzmān-e Kitābhā-ye Jībī, 1340 H. Sh.

9. Turkamān, *op. cit.*

The End of Islamic Spain: Dates, Names and Places

by Dr. T. B. Irving

Foreword:

Each year crowds of tourists visit Spain, generally with the object of seeing the great monuments of Granada, Cordoba and Seville. More than anything else, the Spanish Muslims left posterity a fairyland, especially the Alhambra that sits on its hill facing the city of Granada down below, the last capital of Arab and Muslim Spain. The Moroccan globetrotter Ibn Baṭṭūṭah visited it in the year 1350, while the gypsies, whom Washington Irving found there in the 1830s, did not manage to destroy it.

An insolent church is built into the Great Mosque of Cordoba, which the Cordobese still affectionately call *la Mezquita*. Yet a Muslim cannot pray the Sunset prayer nor the late Evening prayer there because the heavy doors are closed at sundown. Charles I of Castile (Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire of Germany) remarked when he saw it: "You have destroyed something irreplaceable with a church one can find anywhere," as he chided the builders for their barbarity.

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The Fall of Granada:

1491 is the date for the Castilian and Aragonese seizure of Granada, on the 2nd of January, ten months before Christopher Columbus "discovered" America (or was it the Bahamas, and the Caribbean coast?; certainly not the United States as we know them today). Much water has flowed under our bridges since then and into the broad Atlantic that Columbus and his three ships crossed that same year.

The city and kingdom of Granada in southeastern Spain represented Islam's last stronghold on the Iberian peninsula. Washington Irving (no kin of mine, but an excellent writer) during his service of the United States legation in Madrid, interested himself in this period of Spanish history, and rescued the Alhambra from the horde of gypsies he found encamped there. Then in Lindaraja, the beautiful two-windowed room overlooking the courtyard and city, he wrote his *Tales from the Alhambra* and went on to chronicle that fascinating period in Spanish history. He also wrote an excellent biography or *Sirah* of the Prophet that we should rescue today from the strange spellings of that early age of Orientalism.

The Treaty of Granada, which had been drawn up in the previous year, 1491, between representatives of the crowns of Castile, Aragon and Granada, conceded this last city and its kingdom to Castile. In this treaty, the Granadines were guaranteed their religious liberty. The Philadelphia Quaker Henry Lea has written on the subsequent history when that solemn treaty was broken by a Catholic churchman, Cardinal Francisco Ximénez de Cisneros.

At the end of the 15th century, the five kingdoms of the Iberian peninsula, or what we now call Spain and Portugal, were: Castile, Aragon, Granada, Navarre and Portugal. Aragon actually had three capital cities, two of which, Valencia, and Zaragoza, were known for their active Muslim citizenry. Barcelona in Catalonia, was not so famous, although it is named after Hannibal's uncle Hamilcar Barca and his family, another Semitic influence that left this place name on the Peninsula. Navarre, south of the Pyrenees, was taken by Ferdinand of Aragon in 1512.

1610 and not 1492 should be our cut-off date for Muslim power in Spain, even though that last century and a quarter saw Islam in clear decline, fighting a losing, rearguard action. We need rather to follow the fate of the remaining Spanish Muslims, not only in the defeated kingdom of Granada, but also in Castile, Aragon and Valencia, where talented and industrious Mudéjar artisans were active.

Abrogation of the 1491 Treaty of Granada:

In 1499, seven years after the fall of Granada, Cardinal Francisco Ximénez de Cisneros, who was Queen Isabel of Castile's confessor and founded the University of Alcalá, now the Central (or Complutense) University of Madrid, decided to force its inhabitants to be baptized. This demand sounds like a trivial procedure, but under Catholic and Inquisitorial law, it entailed serious legal consequences for its victims.

In the first place, the church and state could then jail or even condemn to be burned at the stake any "lapsed" Catholic, in a real abuse of human rights. The victims in Granada had been unwilling converts who received baptism *en masse*, just as fire hoses and tear gas "baptize" protesters on city streets today. The "Holy" Office of the Inquisition thus showed it was a blasphemous institution before God and men; it endangered the lives of anyone it touched, as well as their loved ones who were heartlessly deprived of their property and livelihood.

Cisneros ruthlessly burned books of great value in a bonfire in the city centre in 1501, two years later, books that were seized from private collections and had gold and silver bindings, as well as from public libraries, simply because they were written in Arabic on Islamic history, religion and culture. It is those aspects of Islam that our contemporary tourists want to see, and which had brought Spain its greatest glory and thinkers. Some apologists try to relieve Cisneros of this responsibility, but the atmosphere of terror that the cardinal created simply added to the flames. Diego de Deza helped him as an ecclesiastical assistant.

The year following these autocratic actions, in 1502, all Muslims or Mudéjars in the kingdom of Castile were arbitrarily subjected to the same treatment of forced conversion. Yet stringent conditions were set on exile from Castile that year, so that "conversion" was actually forced and therefore invalid, yet potentially lethal (our Mancebo, whom we shall meet shortly, must have been subject to this decree, which explains his reticence at revealing his name).

These "Moriscos" as they were now called by other Spaniards, were Muslims at heart because the conversion of rational believers in the *tawhīd* or 'Oneness' of God, as the Granadines were, to trinitarian and dogmatic Christianity is absurd. Torture and jail became routine and mandatory; beggary resulted as whole families were ruined through the arbitrary confiscation of property to pay for the victim's lodging in jail, a quasi-judicial action that showed no regard for the fate of families or dependents. All victims were routinely tortured to bring out the last bit of misinformation and slander. *Heart of Jade*, a novel by Salvador de Madariaga, tells of a Jewish woman called Isabel Manrique who is

cruelly tortured at the end in this routine manner, so that she slowly dies from this judicial and ecclesiastical abuse. Xuchitl, the Aztec princess, in the same novel remarked that it was a waste of good meat if the victim's flesh were not eaten, as it was in Mexico! Leonor, 12 years old, was a "Moorish" maid who was sent as a chattel to the Manrique household by the archbishop of Granada. What arrogance, what absolute *tughyān* or 'arrogation', the third deadly sin of Islam, and what misery this involved for helpless children who did not understand what was happening to them! The story is fiction, but reflects the horrible reality of Inquisitorial Spain.

These practices were ironic, but they underline the heartlessness of the era in Spanish history. These unfortunate victims were driven from their homes, and had to live on the streets and roads of Spain, without visible means of support. The Spanish writer Cervantes in his *Coloquio de los perros* ('A Talk Between Dogs'), a *novela* or early short story from his *Exemplary Novels* has a caricature (if it were not too real) of one of these "Moriscos" who lived as a gardener near Granada a century later. The dog in the tale starved in a garden; his owner was so tight-fisted because of the constraints that had been foisted upon his people during the past hundred years. The Inquisition confiscated property arbitrarily, and forced many of its victims to wear the *sambenito*, a ludicrous "Hallowe'en costume," for life.

Subject to the ecclesiastical authorities and malicious testimony gleaned from inquisitive neighbours called *familiares*, because of the veil of secrecy laid over these transactions, able-bodied men were flogged and sent to the galleys; often they received a life sentence where life was shortened through hard labour, for the simple and pious act of praying to God alone. The Inquisition was a law unto itself, and therefore abnormal and deviant in its very nature, its officials living off the confiscated property of its victims, few of whom were even proven guilty for the "offences" for which they had been arrested. Honourable women and girls were sold as slaves, like Leonor in Granada, and for what purposes, might we ask?

The same procedure took place in Málaga in 1487, where citizens became slaves. This mistreatment of matrons, young girls and respectable men by Castilian soldiers and officials was and is reprehensible, as was that of boys who were picked up by priests who tried to catechize them. Granada was ablaze with resentment and fury: thousands of people were uprooted and massacred, while southeastern Spain was ruined economically and intellectually. Literature and philosophy flickered out where they had flourished, except for the documents of our Aljamiado writers; these last Spanish Muslims compiled poems and precepts for their children, and to express themselves in their agony. Even this expression declined visibly as the 16th century proceeded. Spain's

good name and fame abroad slumped internationally, just when American gold and silver was bringing the country wealth; this money disappeared into the coffers of German bankers, to pay for the costly wars of religion in the Low Countries. In 1499 and 1502 insurrections followed against these tyrannical conditions. They were so stringent on emigration from Castile in 1502, as we have seen, that "conversion" was really farcical, and therefore invalid.

A Second Wave of Oppression:

In 1525, a generation later, a second wave of oppression began. In that year Charles V (Charles I of Spain) ordered all Muslims in Aragon to become Christians even though most of them received little or no instruction in Catholic dogma and catechism. As the years went on, we can understand that most Muslims in Spain remained Muslims in their hearts.

In 1526, the following year, the Inquisition was moved from Jaén to the city of Granada in order to do its job more efficiently. In the Albaicín (*البيازين*), the upper town where most Granadine Muslims were now forced to live, midwives could no longer be Muslims: they might circumcize baby boys or whisper Islamic prayers in the ears of the little babies they brought into the world. We hear of brave women who defied the ban, women like the Qur'anic expert Noceita Kalderan (or Calderón?), and the enigmatic *Moratica* of Ubèda. There in 1212, three hundred years before, following the battle of the Navas de Tolosa, the *Muwahhidin* (or "Almóhades" as the Europeans deformed this otherwise meaningful name) were decisively defeated; 70,000 Muslims were slaughtered at the order of the bishops of Toledo and Narbonne, who were present at this battle scene.

So in 1525 the second wave of oppression began. The Mudéjars (*al-mudajjanin* or 'the tamed' ones) were Muslims who had submitted to Christian rule in the northern kingdoms centuries before. In the city of Toledo in central Spain, they were told that they had to leave or become Christians (many Muslims had fled there recently from Granada); after that date, they could be summarily jailed and tortured for refusing to eat pork or drink wine, practices that were suspect in the eyes of Spanish Christians, especially churchmen and neighbourhood gossips. Such despicable surveillance ruined a previously prosperous and hard-working community.

These laws are much like Jewish legislation in occupied Palestine today: they destroyed houses and mosques just as Jewish businesses were torched during *Krystalnacht* in Germany, without due judicial procedure. Now this action has been reproduced in Palestine by blowing up Palestinian homes and businesses arbitrarily in towns like Bayt

Sahūr and in the Gaza strip. These Muslim artisans in Spain practised the crafts and agriculture which had brought her to a high level of prosperity, especially in the Mediterranean trade. These craftsmen lived in northern and northeastern Spain, in the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon, and they contributed greatly to the national economy. The silk industry which had been brought by Muslim merchants from China centuries before was destroyed in Granada, Seville and Pastrana to the east of Madrid through the harassment of these skilled workmen (Pastrana is the town where the Princess of Eboli was imprisoned).

In 1521 a *Germanía* or brotherhood of Christian workmen in Valencia had raised an urban revolt of the Commoners in that city which led to similar suppression of Islam in and around Valencia on the east coast. Luther's Edict of Worms, we might note, was pronounced in that same year in Germany, as the Protestant Reformation took root in central and northern Europe. Ablerich and Alcócer were "Moorish" wards in Valencia which suffered in this movement. In 1526 the Muslims in and around Valencia (and in Castile, as we have seen) were forcibly baptized, or made subject to civil penalties that went with this official campaign. Those who chose to remain Muslims in Valencia and Aragon were expelled in that same year; from then on, no Arabic could be spoken or written there, and Muslims had to give up their arms. The harsh *Pragmática* of 1529 took effect, a civil code regulating the public and private conduct of Muslims, even their behaviour at home. The attempts to catechize and convert the Muslims were absurd since they seldom addressed the essential differences between the two faiths nor explained them rationally.

Under the *Pragmática* of 1529, a sweeping and arbitrary royal decree that attempted to govern Muslim behaviour both in public and in private, cities and towns were brutalized; the practice of thought control is not new. Cleanliness was no virtue in Catholic Spain, but led to the suspicion that a clean and neat person might be a Muslim who regularly performed his "ablutions" (another ugly missionary and Orientalist word). Second-class citizenship then prevailed for Muslims (as it did for Indians in the overseas colonies), and eventually meant expulsion for "Moriscos" or baptized Catholics, who were really Muslims at heart, as well as immediate expulsion or death for practising Muslims, either sincere ones who did not submit to brainwashing, or "lapsed" Catholics, who were then legitimate prey to the "Holy" Office.

The victims sometimes wasted their money on taxes called *acofres* (or *zofres*) and bribes which dissolute priests solicited from them to feed their own pleasures. The crippled Guatemalan poet Simón Bergaño y Villegas was jailed early in the last century by the "Holy" Office in that country because of his "French" books and ideas; these books and

his scanty furniture were sold over his head to pay for his "board and room" in prison, just as happened with the 16th-century Muslims. Later this poor victim was shipped off to Cuba, where he worked as a printer's devil.

Three native heads of state were executed in America during this same period, using similar brutality and the same narrow mentality. Cuauhtémoc, the last emperor of Anáhuac or pre-colonial Mexico, had his feet burned off to make him disclose the location of the Aztec national treasure, which he never revealed; finally Hernán Cortés, his conqueror, hanged him by the legs so the blood rushed to his head, during the long march to Honduras through the Petén, the jungle area of northern Guatemala, in order to spare a horse for their transport. Nicarao, the spirited last king of Nicaragua, whose name that country still bears, was fed to a pack of dogs which had been deliberately starved for the occasion. Caupolicán in Chile was made to sit on a sharpened stake, and thus impaled, a sentence which he accepted nobly, to the disgrace of his executioners. Such were the customs of the overseas conquerors during their looting of Mexico, Central and South America; the results took three centuries of colonialism to eliminate, and in many ways are still shown in their political habits today.

Bishops Juan de Zumárraga and Diego de Landa, in Mexico City and Yucatán respectively, burned the Aztec and Mayan books and codices under the same inquisitorial laws, although de Landa later tried to make up for his vandalism by writing his *Cosas de Yucatán* ('Things from Yucatán'). Thus Mexican history had to be rewritten by prejudiced churchmen. A half-Inca and half-Spanish noble in Peru, Garcilaso de la Vega Inca (1535-1616) wrote his *Royal Commentaries* to preserve the history of his mother's country. She was an Incan princess, and her circle taught him the traditions of ancient Peru, which he copied down.

The anti-Islamic campaign (as well as that in Meso-America), actually occurred at the same period as the Reformation in Europe, and might be considered as an early phase of the Counter-Reformation in Spain, sponsored eventually by the Council of Trent (1645-63). Miguel Servet, a Catalan Unitarian from the district of Huesca, was burned at the stake in Geneva by John Calvin in 1553 for the "crime" of believing (and refusing to recant) that God was One, and not a trinity.

Shortly afterward an anonymous "Mancebo de Arévalo" or 'Young Man from Arévalo', a town on the highway running from Madrid to Valladolid and lying in the northern part of the province of Avila in New Castile, began to interest himself in the fate of his people. Barring some archival discovery, he remains anonymous, aware of the legal consequences of his forced baptism; this despite the excellent docu-

ments that he drew up in *Al jamiado* or Spanish written in Arabic script, just as Persian or Urdu are written today. These *Al jamiado* writings that the Mancebo de Arévalo and others tried to furnish to their children and posterity, provide us with knowledge and information as authentic literature for the new Muslims who are appearing today in Latin America and Spain.

Was the Mancebo a muleteer in the peninsular transport business? The muleteers and transport people in Spain were largely "Moriscos" or Muslims; they were mistrusted because they carried news as well as merchandise from one end of Spain to the other. The Mancebo's great dream was to make the Pilgrimage to Mecca, which he probably achieved by crossing over from Aragon into southern France, and from there to Italy, and then by ship from Genoa or Venice to the Holy Land.

One can sense the further dissent in the Spanish body politic and in society at large in *Lazarillo de Tormes*, a realistic picaresque novel that was published in the following decade, in 1535. The author himself remains unknown, like our Mancebo or 'Young Man' from Arévalo, although his dissidence is clear. Philosophy and medicine had been Islamic specialties during Muslim rule. The Inquisition and petty surveillance killed off Muslim leadership and their upper classes; only the artisans and field hands were left, but without leadership, since these persons had been picked up and jailed, exiled or killed. The quality of Islamic literature deteriorated in Spain; the malice of denunciations in the universities and learned circles, as we witness in the cases of even talented Christians like Fray Luis de León, disrupted true teaching and research throughout Spain, whether Catholic or Islamic.

The East and Northeast: Aragon and Valencia

The richest remaining region to be ruined was the Spanish east coast or *Levante* as it was called and which was ruled under the milder Crown of Aragon. Ferdinand had been its king, while Isabel was queen of Castile. The crowns fused under Charles I (Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire). For us, the areas around the cities of Valencia and Zaragoza are what interest us particularly.

The Ebro and Jalón valleys near Zaragoza had been known for their mosques and learned Muslims like Ibn Bājjah or "Avempace", a philosopher of the 12th century. Much of this material was rescued through the efforts of Professor Julián Ribera during the last century. The Banū Hūd were an Arab clan who had lived on this "Upper Frontier" along the Ebro valley since the days of Roland and Charlemagne, French invaders whom they (and the Basques) defeated. They intermarried with the Visigothic nobility who had been Arians or Unitarian Christians when Ṭāriq ibn Ziyād and Mūsā ibn Nuṣayr invaded Spain in

711.

These Visigothic nobles lived in three principal areas: around Murcia in southeastern Spain under Count Theodomir; around Seville with Princess or Countess Sara the Goth, *al-Quṭiyya* as she was called in Arab chronicles, including her great-grandson Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Quṭiyya, who honoured her by using her surname; and in the Zaragoza region of what the Arabs called their "Upper Frontier" in the Ebro Valley facing France. Those in Aragon hired the Cid as a mercenary in the 12th century.

The ever-tightening of the screw by the Spanish state and church thus came at generational or approximately thirty-forty-year intervals—in 1499-1502, seven years after the fall of Granada and Cardinal Cisneros' intrusion into prostrate Granadine society; then in 1525-26, with the extension of these regulations into Castile and Valencia; and then again in 1568, forty years later with the second Alpujarras campaign; and finally towards the end of the first decade of the following century, in 1609-1614. Hundreds if not thousands of Spaniards, both Muslim and Protestant, were burned at the stake all up the East coast of Spain or its *Levante*; thriving towns in and around Zaragoza and Valencia were ruined economically and culturally by these official abuses. The Sierra de Espadán west of Valencia was one set of mountains where these poor souls took refuge, as they did in the Alpujarras, all to no avail. The Inquisition was relentless in its "holiness" under Philip II and his priestly advisors, who followed the decrees of the Council of Trent.

Desperate stands occurred in the mountains west of Valencia like the Muela de Cortes and the Sierra de Espadán; others took place also in Murcia in the valley of Ricote, a community of six towns in the hills northwest of the city of Murcia. Thousands of peaceful Muslims were butchered by troops up and down the East coast, and by Catholic civilians, as they had been twice previously in the Alpujarras mountains southeast of Granada. Muslims were disarmed, and rendered helpless so that any criminals who wished to, might rob or kill them, just as shipmasters did on the Mediterranean if any refugees tried to sail to North Africa or further east. Violence was by no means one-sided, and Christians generally possessed the weapons. The oppression was devastating in its effects as able-bodied men were hanged on the gallows, burned at the stake, and banned to the galleys. Muslim women and girls suffered other forms of abuse.

This policy led to a desperate state in Spanish defences. King Henry IV of France became aware of this and was ready to take advantage of it. He had been a Protestant from Navarre, the northern part of that kingdom lying in southern France which King Ferdinand had not taken in 1512, and the fourth of the five Spanish kingdoms. Henry

became a Catholic to win the French throne when he declared that "Paris is worth a mass!" His intervention into this Spanish quarrel had a dismal effect that hastened the wholesale expulsion of the Spanish Muslims.

The whole land was again ablaze as thousands of people were uprooted and killed, the peninsula ruined. Tax returns fell; two-fifths of Valencia's tax revenues had been collected from Muslims, especially as rent from the farmers in the Huerta, the irrigated district around Valencia. The taxes of feudal payments that the lords of Valencia and Aragon collected were levied generally on Muslim farmers and Mudéjars or craftsmen. Absurd and humiliating regulations were promulgated against the Moriscos, who were really harassed Spanish Muslims whose sincere faith could not be subverted, except for a few perhaps who had been obliged to attend Catholic schools from childhood: they could not truly believe in the Christian trinity and the arcane dogma of the catechism that was rarely explained clearly to them, nor in saints' worship, as the valiant Hornacheros showed. Watched and denounced as they were, their constant irritation can be understood.

The Second Alpujarras Campaign:

By 1566 conditions in and around the city of Granada had become so oppressive that a fresh Alpujarras campaign broke out in the mountains southeast of that ancient city and capital. In 1567 the promulgation of a revised *Pragmática* for Granada brought things to a head; the region was again devastated, this time by don Juan de Austria, Philip II's half-brother. Muḥammad ibn Umayyah (or Humeya — Fernando de Valor in Spanish), as a descendant of the illustrious house of Umayyah from previous centuries of glory, was proclaimed king of Granada and Cordoba. He made a brief appearance on the stage of history before he was captured and hanged in 1569, at the start of the revolt.

In 1566 Diego de Deza, a "malignant spirit" as he has been called, from the "Holy" Office of the Inquisition, revised the arrogant *Pragmática* of 1529 forty years later. This revision was the underlying cause of the great uprising of 1569, the so-called second "Alpujarras War" because Deza emphasized the worst features of this edict with its vulgar invasion of family privacy so sacred to Muslims, by public authorities and busy-body neighbours. The next year, in 1570, the expulsion of all "Moriscos" or crypto-Muslims from Granada was decreed. Pedro de Deza hunted them down brutally; families were split up and dispersed into other parts of Spain, where they were not received too hospitably. "Give him a bishopric and get him out of Granada!", Philip II was

advised by persons who witnessed the results of this inhuman and un-Christian policy.

These fanatic churchmen and royal princes ruined Spain at the very moment of her glory in the Indies, and thus wasted the silver and gold they looted in their overseas colonies on these religious campaigns in Spain and Flanders, without counting their wars against Turkey and England, which likewise had a religious aspect. Another ecclesiastical assistant of Philip II, Diego de Espinosa, worked with the king on matters of the Counter-Reformation and the suppression of the Alpujarras revolt. Protestants were also jailed and executed under the same laws, especially in the city of Valladolid.

The "Moriscos" or "baptized" Muslims were expelled, while those who remained as "Christians" had to leave their doors and windows open on Fridays and Islamic feast days, just in case they still prayed to God alone in the Islamic manner. They were also forbidden to hold Islamic-style weddings, funerals and similar festivities, as well as their *zambras* or parties that the incoming gypsies have since taken over for the benefit of tourists. Their baths were banned and torn down, so that no one could wash themselves in the old manner in them. The town of Hornachos, southeast of Mérida in Extremadura, refused to allow images in their mosque, which had been converted into a church with subsequent saints' worship introduced there. That town consisted mostly of muleteers, like our "Young Man" from Arévalo; the men were flogged and sentenced to the galleys for their sincerity of belief. Thus Spanish commerce on the highways was disrupted by their disappearance. In the final expulsion in 1610, the Hornacheros who lived in western Spain (Extremadura), chose Morocco as their destination.

After 1582 the "Moriscos" were not allowed to live by the sea, for fear that they might communicate with alien ships along the coast. Thefts and murders became common as Muslims were deprived of their property and means of livelihood. This led to enforced ignorance, not only of Muslims, but also of many Catholics, especially as to their dogma and history. Prejudice and propaganda reigned instead which crippled the spirit of Spanish society. It is amazing that the Spanish people themselves have remained so lighthearted and friendly, ignoring their priests and church even till this century in the Civil War of the 1930s (and the Mexican Revolution two decades before, that followed Benito Juárez' *Reforma* of 1857). The Spanish Civil War half a century ago, saw non-Catholics summarily labelled "Communists" and subject to arrest, jail and possible execution in the same arbitrary fashion, as happened with the poet Federico García Lorca, who was shot one night in 1936 in his beloved city of Granada.

The battle of Lepanto against the Turks off western Greece in 1571 when Cervantes lost the use of his left hand, is rarely contrasted

in Spanish histories with the defeat of the Invincible Armada in 1588, seventeen years later. This battle is ignored in Spain but flaunted in England, because it led to national confidence and glory in the latter country. The Spanish version of this defeat generally says that the fleet was dispersed by a storm, not by Sir Francis Drake and his English sailors.

The Final Expulsion:

King Philip III and his corrupt prime minister, the Duke of Lerma, were the principal actors in the final expulsion of 1609-1614. By any standards, they were fanatics while the havoc they created throughout Spanish society still demands redress. Fray Jaime Bleda, a Dominican priest who is called "infame" in some reports, was another of these mass-murderers; he had grown up among Muslims around Valencia, and worked with Philip III to arrange the final expulsion. Bleda favoured a general massacre of these Spanish citizens. The Inquisition thus continued its nefarious labours under Philip III, the new king.

September 1609 marks the final Edict of Expulsion that was promulgated. Many refugees escaped to Tunis in this period, since they generally came from the East coast rather than from Granada and Seville, and settled mainly in the capital and Testour. French ships, whose masters often robbed their passengers, took them to Oran and other ports along the North African coast (if they did not previously give them "burial at sea" after they had seized their possessions). In any case, the refugees could not carry much with them, and that little was easily stolen. In 1614 they came from Murcia, ancient Tudmir which had been named after the Visigothic and Arian Count Theodomir who set up the entity under the Arabs in the 8th century.

Forty thousand Muslim children were said to live in Valencia. This may be a high figure, but orphans were made by the thousands as the departing Muslims were forced to leave their offspring behind to the uncharitable care of Inquisitors and policemen. How could these youngsters be treated humanely, deprived in this manner of their parents' love? They were snatched even at the port of embarkation, to be raised as Catholics (and probably as house servants, to "earn their keep", like Leonor in *Heart of Jade*). They had been deprived of Islamic schools and books for their education for over a century.

So in September 1609 the final decree of expulsion was promulgated, and the Spanish fleet was summoned from Naples in Italy where it watched the Turk, to transport these hitherto useful citizens to foreign parts. The port of Alfaques on the coast near Tortosa was where most of the Aragonese Muslims were told to embark. The expulsion from Aragon and Catalonia took place principally during 1609 and 1610, and

continued until 1614 in the case of Murcia. Spain was emptied of Muslims from all parts. Many fled to France where the Reformation was still in progress; but to stay there, they had to become Catholics, just as in Spain. So they plodded on when and where they could, many to the port of Agde on the Mediterranean coast, and others to Genoa, Venice and other Italian ports, to sail to Turkey, North Africa or the Middle East as the Mancebo of Arévalo apparently did on his Pilgrimage to Mecca.

The End of Islamic Spain:

This grim series of events marks the conclusion of nine hundred years of active Islamic life in Spain (711-1610), which had brought that country glory and prestige. The great universities or *jawāmi'* and *madrasahs* which had inspired Western Europe to expand in this line during the 12th and 13th centuries, had been wiped out: Granada was the last of these schools which Ibn Baṭṭūṭah, the Moroccan globetrotter, visited at the end of his travels in the mid 14th century. They now give us a different date for the founding of the University of Granada, after its Christian conquest in the 16th century. And of course it was a different school with different objectives.

The French confiscated college endowments in similar fashion in 19th century Algeria, as the Italians did in Libya in this present one, and forbade Libyan Muslims from enrolling in them. Thus the five *madrasahs* or Islamic colleges in pre-colonial Algeria were reduced to the *Université d'Alger*, where students had to speak French in order to enroll in this by then the only institution of higher learning in that colony. This anti-Islamic system has thus continued till this century and the Algerian revolt, which the policy in part motivated. How different from the city of Montreal with its distinct institutions in both French and English, Catholic, Protestant and secular!

Ironically, a shipful of books sent by the emperor of Morocco, Mulay Zidān, to the Ottoman sultan in Istanbul in Turkey was intercepted in 1611 by Spanish pirates off the port of Salé under Philip III, the king of the final expulsion. This collection or library is now lodged in the Escorial, the 'slag heap' as the name means, that gloomy palace and monastery in the hills northwest of Madrid where Philip II withdrew to spend his last years (like the *Pedregal* or 'Lava Field' south of Mexico City where UNAM, the renewed university of Mexico is located). The Escorial now constitutes the basis of the holdings of Arabic books which have been preserved in Spain, plus those which had been reappearing during the past century, especially in Aragon around Zaragoza, and are now housed in the National Library in Madrid, thanks to the labours of don Julián Ribera and don Eduardo Saavedra. Ironically,

this Escorial collection, as we have noted is of Moroccan origin and was seized by Spanish pirates. The 18th century Maronite librarian Miguel Cassiri could not read the Maghribi script, and therefore catalogued many of these books and manuscripts as of "Turkish and Persian" origin.

The monuments of Granada, Seville and Cordoba now attract the tourists to visit Spain, though often without understanding their full significance and underlying tragedy. Their beauty alone sustains them. The wholesale expulsion of Muslims inflicted havoc and misery everywhere; it cost the Spanish people one of the most productive sectors in their society, and the best agricultural workers: fruit (peaches, apricots, oranges and other citrus fruit) came to Spain through their husbandry; so did rice and sugar from southern Asia, as did silk and paper. These industrial processes, not articles of trade, had been brought by Muslim merchants or travellers from China via Persia and Central Asia, as well as porcelain where we see the Chinese blue reappear in Majolica ware. All these were technical processes which had been introduced under Muslim rule.

The economy suffered penury when the country lost its productive workmen in this wanton fashion, Muslim artisans who had laboured diligently in the crafts and agriculture. Hardworking and thrifty shopkeepers, bakers and butchers, water carriers were forced out of business and faced restrictive legislation on their activities everywhere. The arts and crafts of Spain truly suffered: Mudéjar mechanical and technical methods in tile-making, for both floors and walls, which require different processes; carpenters and cabinetmakers (who developed their trade in the high wooden ceilings of the Andean countries, to which some Mudéjar workmen were exiled, and whose skill elaborated this safeguard against the earthquakes of that southern continent); blacksmiths and coppersmiths, all suffered exile and penury.

The manufacture of textiles lagged as well, especially cotton and silk weaving in Granada, Seville and Pastrana. The making of woollen blankets and rugs also declined. The silk industry was brought centuries before by Muslim traders from China, as was that of paper, whose raw material was esparto grass grown around Valencia. Hundreds of silk works and countless tile factories are said to have gone out of business in the Seville region alone. Irrigation engineering, especially in and around Valencia's *Huerta*, suffered from the expulsion of its best workmen. Farms and fields lay abandoned in the Alpujarras mountains southeast of Granada. Generally trade was stifled in those parts of Spain where Muslim or "Morisco" workmen, the busy and talented Mudéjars, had plied their trade.

Many Spanish names and words are Arabic in origin, and alive today (but seldom "Moorish" ones — the only truly Berber words in

modern Spanish are *jinete* from the Zanata tribe, for 'horseman', 'rider'; and *zanahoria* for 'carrot'). *Alfarero* for 'potter'; *albañil* meaning 'mason' or 'builder' in Spanish, from *al-Bannā*' (whose name appears in that of Ḥasan al-Bannā' of Egypt, the founder of the Muslim Brethren in this century); *alcalde* from *al-qādī* ('judge') but now meaning 'mayor' in Latin America; words like *azulejo* from *az-zulayj* for 'tile', so important for Islamic decoration on floors and walls with its ongoing, "endless" patterns that seek the pure infinity of God; *almohada* from *al-mukhaddah* for 'pillow'; *azúcar* for 'sugar' which comes ultimately from Indian and Sanskrit.

The havoc which these murderers and sadists created throughout Spanish society still demands redress. The great Spanish genocides should be named and condemned for their vandalism and murder of peaceful Spanish citizens; the arch criminals were: Ximénez de Cisneros, to begin with, who started the unholy action; Pedro de Deza who assisted him in these crimes; Diego de Deza (two of them), and Diego de Espinosa, who worked with Philip II, that gloomy monarch, reflecting perhaps the madness of his grandmother Jane; and Jaime Bleda, that last great genocide in the employ of Philip III. These men were fanatics of the first order whose zeal ruined their native country for two centuries.

The laws that sustained these abuses should be formally rescinded: these breaches of human rights need to be redressed in this more liberal age of human history. Some were in effect as late as this century, notably as regulations against Protestant chapels and mosques, like the one in the Ceuta market; any Protestant church in Spain was forbidden to show what it was outwardly, and had to be disguised till after the Franco era. The mosque in Ceuta lies downstairs next to the public toilets in the market, for the country folk who come there to pray. These ugly laws need to be revoked formally, and, if possible, the property seized restored to the international Islamic community.

In Argentina today, the only Muslim name that is permitted by the public registry offices is Omar. The present president, Carlos Menem, although born a Muslim of Syrian descent, was obliged to declare himself a Catholic before he could run for president of that country. The Tatars in Poland in this century were similarly forced to become Catholics if they wanted to remain in that country. This does not represent religious freedom, but reflects the Counter-Reformation of Europe that drove the Protestants and Socinians from Poland, whereas they survived in Hungary because the Ottoman government there protected all Christian sects.

This struggle for religious freedom is not over if we consider how the Turks are treated in Bulgaria today, or the Muslims in Central Asia. Since these laws and their effects remain until this day, it is not an

internal Spanish matter but an international problem which still demands solution not subject to internal jurisdiction. Islamic centres of authority and worship were all destroyed in Spain; these should be reconstituted wherever possible as they were during that country's greatest glory. The ongoing holocaust of the Palestinians witnesses the continuation of such illegal practices till this day.

On the other hand, the Muslim actors in this tragedy are too often anonymous, like our Young Man from Arévalo, or bore "Christian" names they were forced to assume. The Granadines had squabbled among themselves; they were not entirely innocent victims, but to some extent deserved their fate, especially the quarrelling upper classes. This verdict applies to the royal family and the nobles, not the industrious citizenry: the Zagirs and Avencerrajes (*banū Sarrāj* or 'Saddlers') carried on feuds that ruined the kingdom in the last half of the 15th century before the Christian conquest, quarrels which the Castilians and Aragonese were more than happy to take advantage of. Boabdil (*Abū 'Abdillāh*), the last ineffectual sultan or king, as his mother said, "wept like a woman over what he could not defend as a man" at the Moor's Last Sign on the highway going up the hills leading to the south coast, where he would embark for exile in Morocco. In his train Leo Africanus may have gone, but as a young boy.

Sadly they recall other Spanish exiles: Ibn 'Arabī, the mystic from Murcia in the 13th century who is buried in Damascus; and Ibn Khaldūn from a distinguished Sevillian family which was exiled in 1248 by Ferdinand III. The latter scholar wrote a philosophy of history centuries before Spengler and Toynbee, and founded sociology long before August Comte ever thought of it. Likewise we should recall the now nameless people who died at their own expense in the Inquisitorial prisons by the hundreds, or were roasted at the stake all up the East coast of Spain so the civil authority cynically would not "have blood on their hands."

Maqqari, the Algerian historian wrote *Nafḥ al-Ṭīb* or 'The Fragrant Breath' in the 17th Century to record Andalusian history. This vast field needs study. This is history that we Muslims should know, five hundred years after the fact, and not the myths and legends that tourists half learn about Spain's decline into religious and political intolerance. Américo Castro's book on *España en su historia* which Professor Edmund King of Princeton translated into English as *The Structure of Spanish History* (Princeton University Press 1954) likewise challenges the official version of Spanish history.

Spain thus became a closed society in the 17th century, suffering a general intellectual depression that was so different from the glorious Umayyad caliphate of the 10th century or the philosophic decades that followed. Most Spaniards now lived in ignorance of real theological

issues except that they knew that they were Catholics, although they did not know how to discuss these issues with outsiders.

The "Holy" Office was finally abolished by the Cortes or Spanish parliament in 1813 after the Napoleonic wars (but Simón Bergaño never returned from his Cuban exile). Islam has never been so ruthless nor abusive of human rights in its age of glory in Spain, except possibly for the so-called "martyrs" of Cordoba who persistently sought their "martyrdom" in the 9th century under 'Abdurrahmān II. Under constant pressure the authorities were finally obliged to punish them under the prevailing law of blasphemy. The Turks in the Balkans protected the churches of Byzantium and Rome which had oppressed the Bogomils, ancestors of the contemporary Bosnian and Albanian Muslims. The Hungarian Protestants survived as well because the liberal Ottoman religious policy protected them from the suppression they encountered in Poland, Lithuania, and we might add, Hapsburg Austria. The Greek Patriarchate remains in Istanbul, or as they prefer to call it, Constantinople, and not in Athens or Moscow. These facts of religious freedom need to be remembered in this age of freedom.

A rise in highway robbery had resulted from the general oppression and loss of livelihood, although the robbers were not always Muslims or Moriscos. If a "Morisco" were met on the high road away from home, he could be searched, taken prisoner and even killed by any Christian neighbour (or *vecino*). The state no longer protected Muslims in their lives, property or beliefs. This lack of responsibility on the part of Spanish public authorities for the general welfare of all citizens, and the suffering by the generally peace-loving public lay like a pall over Spanish society for the next two hundred years.

More than one hundred thousand peaceful and valuable Muslim citizens are estimated to have been expelled from Old and New Castile alone in 1610. A figure of 200,000 has been suggested as the number expelled from all Spain by some persons desirous of making the havoc seem minor but this is low; while the official version of 300,000 is uncertain as well. Perhaps as many as two million were exiled or displaced. Certainly it was enough people to disrupt both industry and agriculture, which suffered drastically, especially in the prevailing climate of fear; the whole economy of Spain was stifled in important sectors for decades if not for two centuries at least.

Overseas:

We encounter another aspect of this tragedy in the Mudéjar workmen who were indentured for service in the Spanish overseas colonies. These Spanish Muslim artisans, generally without their women-folk, were transported to Mexico or New Spain, Colombia or New

Granada, and Bolivia or Upper Peru, to decorate the new public buildings in those overseas colonies. Thus Mudéjar decoration is found on public buildings in those and other countries and can be easily recognized by the generally geometric and floral ornament found on floor and wall tiles (each of which requires a different industrial process) and that bears no images or *tamāthil* which are so repugnant to Muslims, as we found with the Hornacheros. We likewise find geminated or twinned windows as in Washington Irving's *Lindaraja*; vaulted cloisters as with the Universidad de San Carlos in Antigua, Guatemala.

Few women came with these exiles, so these workmen married local girls and quickly blended into the general population, and much sooner than the Catholic *conquistadores* who could bring their womenfolk from Spain. However the Mudéjars trained grandsons who carried on their crafts in many centres in Latin America, and whose wares are still found in marketplaces today like Taxco, Puebla, Antigua and Bogota.

Manuel Toussaint of Mexico has written *El arte mudéjar en América* to document this work (published by Porrúa Hermanos in Mexico City, 1946). The black-and-white photography of this volume needs to be redone in colour, with a more thorough survey of this heritage in every country of Latin America. The lovely Mudéjar cloister in the Colonial Museum in Antigua Guatemala was built as the Universidad de San Carlos in the mid 18th Century, when they knew they should keep the building low because of the danger of earthquake from nearby volcanoes. It resembles a Mogul mosque from India or Pakistan. This style can be revived for use in the new mosques and schools that Muslims will need in North and South America where Islam is now spreading, largely because of the ongoing Palestinian diaspora and holocaust which ironically is fostering this contemporary revival of our Islamic heritage.

The dry rot in political institutions in America was introduced through this immoral policy and the autocratic governments and church which were brought to the Spanish overseas colonies. Fanatic kings and priests led Christian Spain to its downfall, even as late as the 1930s and the Civil War.

Results of the Expulsion:

The architectural glory of Islamic Spain can still be seen and appreciated, as today's tourists recognize: the great monuments of Seville, Cordoba, Toledo and Granada stand as silent witnesses of past splendour. Judgments vary, according to whether the narrator is liberal in his outlook, or conservative and Catholic (as occurs with don Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo's 6-volume *Historia de los heterodoxes españ-*

oles, Madrid 1911). This phase of human history has been rarely assessed dispassionately by Muslims, except possibly by Sir Muḥammad Iqbāl, the philosopher and poet of Lahore, and the Egyptian poet Aḥmad Shawqī, both of whom made their pilgrimage to Cordoba. The Spanish scholars of the past century, Pascual de Gayangos, Julián Ribera and Eduardo Sasvedra, tried to recover this heritage in the last century, but more research remains to be done, and by scholars sympathetic to the Islamic cause.

Two future dates are worth mentioning now: in 1999 we shall celebrate the half millennium of Ximénez de Cisneros' brash intrusion into Granadine affairs that sealed Spain's good fame in international circles for three centuries. This is a date by which these cruel laws and decrees should be formally rescinded. Then in 2009-2014, ten full years later, we shall celebrate (or deplore) the four hundredth anniversary of the final Expulsion practised by Philip III, the Duke of Lerma and the "infamous" Jaime Bleda. By that date, we should see what can be salvaged from these ruins, especially in places like Ceuta on the African continent, which should never have been affected by such tyranny.

The holocaust of the Palestinians shows the continuation of such illegal practices even in this century. Another example we have in the imams we meet from Central Asia, who are so happy to have their mosques back, and to be able to build new ones. Their statistics sound like those from another century. The *New Jersey* off the Lebanese coast in 1982 continued this anti-Islamic policy when it shelled Druze and Shi'ah villages but spared the Maronite or Catholic ones. Who inspired this policy? Was it an expression of malice, or did it occur through prejudice and ignorance?

I have been a "Moor on the coast" for more than half a century in the North American academic environment, without visiting Spain too often, but observing it from the coast of Morocco and Algeria, where so many of these refugees landed and founded families who often hold the keys to their long abandoned homes in Andalusia. But Islam is alive and well once more, and its heritage reviving.

Review Article

The Covenant of Ghadīr Khumm

by *Shahīd Naqawī*

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Last year, 1410 of Hijrah, signified the fourteenth hundredth anniversary of the event of Ghadīr Khumm and this event was commemorated widely around the Islamic world. *Turāthunā*, one of the most scholarly journals, in Arabic, to be published from Iran, issued on this occasion a special number extending over 450 pages.

In the tenth year after the Hijrah while returning from his last Hajj pilgrimage to Makkah, when the Prophet (S) reached a place called Ghadīr Khumm, before al-Juhfah on the way back to al-Madinah, the Archangel Gabriel (A) descended with the following verse of the *Sūrat al-Mā'idah*:

يَأَيُّهَا الرَّسُولُ بَلِّغْ مَا أُنزِلَ إِلَيْكَ مِنْ رَبِّكَ وَإِنْ لَمْ تَفْعَلْ فَمَا بَلَغْتَ رِسَالَتَهُ وَاللَّهُ يَعْصِمُكَ
مِنَ النَّاسِ إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يَهْدِي الْقَوْمَ الْكَافِرِينَ ﴿٦٧﴾

O Messenger, deliver that which has been sent down to thee from thy Lord; for if thou dost not, thou wilt not have delivered His Message. God will protect thee from the people. God guides not the unbelievers. (5:67)

This verse is considered by all Shi'i and many non-Shi'i exegetes as having been revealed concerning 'Ali ibn Abī Ṭālib (A).¹ There are certain matters suggested by this noble verse. Firstly, it refers to something that the Prophet (S) had been encharged to deliver and communicate to the people, which was so significant that failure to communicate it would amount to the failure of his prophetic mission. Secondly, the matter to be communicated was of such a sensitive nature that the Noble Prophet (S) was apprehensive of violent reaction or dissent from at least a significant section of his followers, for whom the matter to be communicated was unpalatable. Thirdly, the Prophet (S) was personally reassured that the defiant would not be able to harm him or challenge him with a massive defiance. Fourthly, that which the Prophet (S) was

to communicate would be accepted by sincere believers, and as to the dissenters, the Prophet (S) was not to worry about their defiance, because defiance vis-à-vis Divine commands is nothing but a manifestation of the lack of faith and God does not guide those who do not place their good faith in Him and His Messenger.

On the revelation of this verse, the Holy Prophet (S) made the entire caravan consisting of at least 70,000 pilgrims, who were from al-Madinah as well as from all around Arabia, stop in the middle of the journey. Then he ordered the ground to be swept and cleared for the people to sit down. Then he had a platform erected out of branches and saddles. When all this was done he climbed over it and in the course of a sermon made the famous declaration which is without doubt the most widely narrated (*mutawātir*) ḥadīth of the Prophet (S) known as Ḥadīth al-Ghadīr. The following is one of its versions from Ibn Mājah's *Ṣaḥīḥ*, "Bāb faḍā'il Aṣḥāb Rasūl Allāh (S):"

عَنِ الْبَرَاءِ بْنِ عَازِبٍ قَالَ: أَقْبَلْنَا مَعَ رَسُولِ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ فِي حَجَّتِهِ الَّتِي حَجَّ فَنَزَلَ فِي بَعْضِ الطَّرِيقِ فَأَمَرَ الصَّلَاةَ جَامِعَةً فَأَخَذَ بِيَدِ عَلِيٍّ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ فَقَالَ: أَلَسْتُ أَوْلَىٰ بِالْمُؤْمِنِينَ مِنْ أَنْفُسِهِمْ؟ قَالُوا: بَلَىٰ، فَقَالَ: أَلَسْتُ أَوْلَىٰ بِكُلِّ مُؤْمِنٍ مِنْ نَفْسِهِ؟ قَالُوا: بَلَىٰ، قَالَ: فَهَذَا وَلِيُّ مَنْ أَنَا مَوْلَاهُ، اللَّهُمَّ وَالِ مَنْ وَالَاهُ. اللَّهُمَّ عَادِ مَنْ عَادَاهُ.

(Ibn Mājah reports with his chain of transmission) from Barā' ibn 'Azib that he said: "When we were returning with the Messenger of Allāh — may God's peace and benediction be upon him — from the Ḥajj pilgrimage that he performed, he got down in the middle of the journey and ordered congregational prayer to be held. Then he took 'Alī by the hand and declared: 'Don't I have a greater authority (*alastu awlā*, *awlā* is a derivative of *walī* and *mawlā*) over the faithful than they over their own selves?' The people said, 'Yes, (you do).' Then he (S) said: 'Don't I have greater right over every believer than he has over his ownself?' The people said, 'Yes, (you do).' Then he declared, 'This one here (i.e. 'Alī) is the master (*walī*) of whomever I am his master (*mawlā*). O God, befriend whoever befriends him and be the enemy of whoever is hostile to him.' "

Among other Sunnī authorities of ḥadīth who have narrated this tradition with lesser or more details and in different wordings from various Companions of the Prophet (S) are: al-Tirmidhī in *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ii, 248; al-Ḥākim, *Mustadrak al-Ṣaḥīḥayn*, iii, 109, 110, 116, 129, 371; al-Suyūṭī in *al-Durr al-manthūr*, under verse 6:33; Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, iv, 372, iv, 368, i, 84, 88, 118, 119, 152, 320, iv, 270, v, 307, 350, 366, 419; al-Fakhr al-Rāzī, *al-Tafsīr al-kabīr* under verse 5:67; Abū Nu'aym, *Ḥilyat al-'awliyā'*, v, 26; al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, *Ta'rikh Baghdād*, vii, 377, viii, 290, xii, 343; al-Nasā'ī, *Khaṣā'is*, 21, 22, 23, 25,

26; Ibn Hajar al-Haythami, *al-Şawā'iq al-muḥriqah*, 25; 'Alī al-Muttaqī, *Kanz al-'ummāl*, i, 48, vi, 153, 154, 390, 397, 398, 399, 403, 405, 406; Ibn Hajar al-'Asqalāni, *al-'Isābah*, i, 319, ii, 57, iii, 29, iv, 14, 16, 143, 169, 182, vii, 156; Ibn al-'Athīr, *Usd al-ghābah*, i, 308, ii, 307; Ibn Qutaybah, *al-'Imāmah wa al-siyāsah*, 93; al-Ṭahāwī, *Mushkil al-'āthār*, ii, 307; al-Munāwī, *Fayḍ al-Qadīr*, vi, 218; al-Haythami, *Majma' al-zawā'id*, vii, 17, ix, 105, 106, 107, 108; etc. Sayyid Ḥāmid Ḥusayn in his great work *'Abaqāt al-'anwār*, mentions 162 leading and major Sunni traditionists and scholars from the 2nd/8th to the 13th/19th century who have narrated the tradition or recorded it in their works. To mention here only a sample of the names, they include such celebrities as: Muḥammad ibn Ishāq (d.c. 151/768), Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi'i (d. 204/819), 'Abd Allāh ibn Muḥammad ibn Abī Shaybah al-'Absī (d. 235/849), Ishāq ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Rāhwayh (d. 238/852), 'Uthmān ibn Muḥammad ibn Abī Shaybah (d. 239/853), Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā al-Balādhuri (d. 279/892), Ibn Qutaybah (d. 276/889), Muḥammad ibn 'Īsā al-Tirmidhī (d. 279/892), 'Abd Allāh ibn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 290/902), Aḥmad ibn 'Amr al-Bazzāz (d. 292/904), Aḥmad ibn Shu'ayb al-Nasā'i (d. 303/915), Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabari (d. 310/922), Abū al-Qāsim al-Baghawī (d. 317/929), al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, al-Ṭahāwī (d. 321/933), Ibn 'Abd Rabbih al-Qurtubī (d. 328/939), Ibn 'Uqdah (d. 332/943), Muḥammad ibn Hibbān al-Bustī (d. 354/965), Sulaymān ibn Aḥmad al-Ṭabarānī (d. 360/970), 'Alī ibn 'Umar al-Dārquṭni (d. 385/995), Ibn Buṭṭah (d. 387/997), al-Ḥakīm al-Nayshābūri (d. 405/1014), Aḥmad ibn Mūsā ibn Mardawayh (d. 410/1019), Abū 'Alī Miskawayh (d. 421/1030), Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Tha'labī (d. 427/1035), Abū Nu'aym al-'Iṣfahānī (d. 430/1038), Aḥmad ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Bayhaqī (d. 458/1066), Ibn 'Abd al-Barr al-Qurtubī (d. 463/1070), al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī (d. 463/1070), 'Alī ibn Aḥmad al-Wāḥidī (d. 486/1093), Ibn al-Maghāzili (d. 483/1090), Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālī (d. 505/1111), al-Ḥusayn ibn Mas'ūd al-Baghawī (d. 516/1122), Maḥmūd ibn 'Umar al-Zamaksharī (d. 537/1142), 'Abd al-Karīm ibn Muḥammad al-Sam'ānī (d. 562/1166), Akḥṭab Khwārazm (d. 568/1172), Ibn 'Asākir al-Dimashqī (d. 571/1175), Mubārak ibn Muḥammad Ibn al-'Athīr al-Jazari (d. 606/1209), 'Alī ibn Muḥammad ibn al-'Athīr (d. 630/1232), Diyā' al-Maqdisī (d. 643/1245), Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī (d. 654/1156), al-Kanji al-Shāfi'i (d. 658/1260), Yaḥyā ibn Sharaf al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277), Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Ṭabari (d. 694/1294), Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad al-Juwaynī (d. 722/1322), 'Alā' al-Dawlah al-Simnānī (d. 736/1335), Yūsuf ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Mizzī (d. 742/1341), Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1347), Ibn Kathīr (d. 774/1372), al-Maqrizī (d. 845/1441), Ibn Hajar al-'Asqalānī (d. 852/1448), Ibn al-Şabbāgh al-Mālikī (d. 855/1451), Faḍl Allāh ibn Rūzbahān al-Khanjī al-Shirāzī,

al-Samhūdi (d. 911/1505), al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505), Ibn Ḥajar al-Haythamī al-Makki (d. 973/1565), ‘Alī ibn Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Muttaqī (d. 975/1567), ‘Alī ibn Sulṭān al-Qārī (d. 1014/1605) al-Munāwī (d. 1031/1621), Muḥammad Ṣadr al-‘Ālam, Walī Allāh Aḥmad ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥīm al-Dehlawī (d. 1176/1762), Rashīd al-Dīn Khān, Ḥaydar Alī al-Fayḍābādī.

To this list, the Arabic translator of the *‘Abaqāt*, ‘Allāmah ‘Alī al-Ḥusaynī al-Mīlānī, has added 189 more illustrious names in the world of Sunnī scholarship, names derived from the *‘Abaqāt* itself as well as al-‘Allāmah al-‘Aminī’s *al-Ghadīr*.

Among Sunnī authors, those who have written independent works on the chains of transmission (*ṭuruq*) of Ḥadīth al-Ghadīr are: Ibn ‘Uqdah, Ibn al-Maghāzīlī, Abū Ja‘far al-Ṭabarī, al-Ḥaskānī, Abū Sa‘īd al-Sijistānī, and al-Dhahabī. Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī is reported to have seen a work in the binders’ shops in Baghdad mentioning 208 chains of transmission of this ḥadīth.²

This is not surprising, because the Prophet (S) made this declaration at Ghadīr Khumm in front of tens of thousands of people. According to al-‘Allāmah al-‘Aminī’s research in *al-Ghadīr*, the Ghadīr tradition has been narrated in extant ḥadīth literature by 116 Companions and 84 Ṭābi‘ūn.³

During the years of his own reign al-‘Imam ‘Alī, as borne witness by *Nahj al-balāghah* and many works of history, tirelessly propagated the idea of the Imamate of the Ahl al-Bayt (A). A famous incident of this period is the episode of al-Raḥbah, at Kūfah, where he asked the witnesses who had heard the Prophet’s declaration at Ghadīr to stand up and testify. According to certain traditions mentioned in Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal’s *Musnad* and other works, 12 or 30 Companions stood up and bore testimony.

When the caliphate passed into the hands of the Umayyads and later into the hands of the ‘Abbāsids, the denial of the right of the Imams of the Ahl al-Bayt (A) to the Prophet’s successorship formed the corner-stone of the propaganda of these regimes. On the other hand, since the Imamate of ‘Alī (A) and his designation by the Prophet (S) as his successor formed the basis of the claims of the Imams of the Prophet’s family to the comprehensive leadership of the Ummah, the Umayyads and the ‘Abbāsids had to uphold the legitimacy of the first three caliphs and to distort the meaning of the Prophet’s statements in ‘Alī’s favour. Moreover, under state patronage an effort was made by fabricating traditions to make the personalities of the early caliphs as well as their relations with ‘Alī (A) in particular and the Banū Hāshim in general appear in a different light.⁴

To return to the event of Ghadīr, after the Prophet (S) made the declaration regarding ‘Alī (A), the following verse was revealed to the

Prophet (S):

... الْيَوْمَ أَكْمَلْتُ لَكُمْ دِينَكُمْ وَأَتَمَمْتُ عَلَيْكُمْ نِعْمَتِي وَرَضِيْتُ لَكُمُ الْإِسْلَامَ دِينًا ...

Today I have perfected your religion for you, and I have completed My blessings upon you, and I have approved Islam for your religion (5:3)

Among the non-Shi'i authors those who have recorded traditions conceding that this verse was revealed on 18 Dhū al-Hijjah at Ghadir Khumm in the year 10 H. are: Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, in *al-Durr al-manthūr*, Egypt, ii, 259 and *al-'Itqān*, i, 31; al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, *Ta'rikh Baghdād*, Egypt, vii, 290; Ibn al-Maghāzili, *Manāqib 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib*, Tehran, 19; al-Ḥaskānī, *Shawāhid al-tanzīl*, i, 157, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 250; Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr*, ii, 14; al-Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, ii, 350; Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī, *Tadhkirat al-khawāṣṣ*, 30; Ibn 'Asākir, *Tarjumat al-Imām 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib min Ta'rikh Dimashq*, Beirut, ii, 75; al-Khwārazmī, *Maqatal al-Ḥusayn*, i, 47; al-Qundūzī *Yanābī' al-mawaddah*; Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāyah wa al-nihāyah*, Cairo, v, 213, vii, 349; al-'Ālūsī, *Rūḥ al-ma'ānī*, vi, 55; al-Tha'labī, *al-Kashf wa al-bayān*, MS.; and al-Badakhshī, *Miftāḥ al-najā*, MS.

* * *

Since it was impossible to deny the fact of Ghadir, non-Shi'i scholarship affiliated with the Umayyad and 'Abbāsīd regimes denied that the word *mawlā* or *walī* in the Prophet's declaration in 'Alī's favour meant 'leader', 'master' and 'guardian'. It interpreted the word *mawlā* in the sense of 'friend,' or 'the nearest of kin' and 'confidant.' The circumstances which necessitated the Prophet's exhortations regarding 'Alī, it explained, were that some people complained against 'Alī due to his harsh treatment in the distribution of the spoils of the expedition of Yaman, which had taken place under 'Alī's leadership, and from where he, along with those who had participated in the expedition, directly came to Makkah to join the Prophet (S) at the Ḥajj. The Prophet (S) spoke in this manner, it explained, to dispel these ill-feelings against his son-in-law and cousin.

Such an explanation may have served the Umayyads and the 'Abbāsīds the purpose of shielding their illegitimate rule in face of the claims of the Imams of the Ahl al-Bayt (A), but they hardly serve the purpose of a sincere follower of Islam in his search for the truth. To accept such inane interpretations of this great event is to pass by lightly an event of such unparalleled significance in the history of Islam, a matter whose understanding is the key not only to the history of Islam but also its doctrinal basis. And Ghadir itself is not understandable without understanding the role, station and character of 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib (A), who is the greatest personality in the history of Islam after

the Holy Prophet (S). The Ṣūfī and mystical tradition in Islam, away from the claims of those in power, has recognized the preeminence of 'Alī (A) among the Prophet's companions. Of the scores of Ṣūfī orders that have existed in the history of Islam, almost all orders, with the exception of one or two, trace their *isnād* or chain of Ṣūfī masters to the Prophet (S) through al-'Imām 'Alī (A). For the non-Shī'i Ṣūfis — non-Shī'i in the sense that they followed non-Shī'i schools of law, such as Shāfi'i, Mālikī and Ḥanafī schools — the Prophet's declaration at Ghadir Khumm has almost the same significance and meaning that it has for the Shī'is.

* * *

There are in all eight articles in this issue. The first, "al-Ghadir fi ḥadith al-'Itrat al-Ṭāhirah" by al-Sayyid Muḥammad Jawād al-Shabbiri, first studies the traditions from Shī'i works of the Imams of the Ahl al-Bayt (A) concerning the various details of the event of Ghadir Khumm. The first part of this article is devoted to the Prophet's declaration and sermon on the day of Ghadir as narrated by some of the Imams (A). The second part studies the various Shī'i and non-Shī'i narrations regarding the day and place of the revelation of verse 5:3. The third section relates to the dates relating to the events of the last days of the Prophet's earthly life. After studying the various narrations, the author reaches the following conclusions: The Prophet (S) left al-Madinah most probably on Thursday, the fourth day before the end of Dhū al-Qa'dah in 10 H. He entered Makkah on 4 Dhū al-Ḥajjah, after an eight days' journey. The day of *Tarwiyah* that year was Tuesday; the day of 'Arafah, Thursday. The event of Ghadir took place on 18 Dhū al-Ḥijjah, Friday. Chronological collation shows that the Prophet's demise occurred on Monday, 2 Rabī' al-'Awwal, as is also confirmed by several traditions narrated from al-'Imām al-Ṣādiq (A), al-'Imām al-Riḍā and al-'Imām al-'Askarī (A). The author points out that the date popularly accepted by the Shī'ah, 28 Ṣafar, is the one that was first adopted by al-Shaykh al-Mufid, whom subsequent scholars followed uncritically in this matter. However, he remarks, research does not disclose a single tradition — even a weak one — from any of the Imams that supports 28 Ṣafar as the date of the Prophet's demise. Some Sunnī authors also mention 2 Rabī al-'Awwal for the date, although 12 Rabī' al-'Awwal is the popular date amongst Sunnīs.

The fourth section concerns the reflections of Ghadir in the traditions relating to the Prophet (S), Fāṭimah (A) and each of the Twelve Imams (A). The fifth section of this article deals with Ghadir as the greatest festival (*īd*) of Islam.

The second article, "Ḥadith al-Ghadir, al-tabligh al-'ākhir li imāmat al-'Amir," by al-Sayyid 'Alī al-Ḥusaynī al-Milānī, deals with Ghadir as

the culmination of the Prophet's efforts throughout the 23 years of his ministry in building 'Ali's image as his qualified successor. The author cites some instances of al-'Imām 'Ali's repeated references to Ghadir that have been recorded in history: before the members of the six-man council (*shūrā*) appointed by the second caliph; during the battles of al-Jamal and Şiffin, and al-Raḥbah in Kūfah. He refers to the different attitudes of the Companions concerning Ghadir and those of the traditionists and theologians who came later. At the end he deals with semantic doubts that have been raised regarding the Ghadir tradition.

Al-Sayyid Ja'far Murtaḍā al-'Amili, in the third article, points out that a most remarkable thing about the event of Ghadir is that the passage of time has consistently increased its significance, and that is due to the critical role of authentic leadership in Islam. He then discusses the vital role of leadership in the life of human societies and points out that the issue of Ghadir is not a matter merely concerning a certain historical figure, but a vital issue that relates to the very principles that lie at the base of Islamic teaching. Then he cites some statements of the opponents of 'Ali's leadership from the Quraysh, explaining their motives for defying the Prophet's designation. The gist of the whole tragic affair has been well put in a sentence by 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb himself addressed to Ibn 'Abbās, mentioned by al-Ya'qūbī in his history:

إِنَّ عَلِيًّا لَأَحَقُّ النَّاسِ بِهَا ، وَلَكِنْ قَرَشًا لَا تَحْمِلُهُ .

Indeed, of all people 'Ali had the greatest right to it (i.e. the Caliphate), but the Quraysh would not tolerate him.

The author then cites a series of statements of al-'Imām 'Ali (A) reflecting his resentment of the malice, enmity and envy of the Quraysh in regard to the Prophet (S) as well as himself. These are followed by the remarks of Ibn Abi al-Ḥadīd in his *Sharḥ Nahj al-balāghah* regarding what 'Ali (A) had to face at the hands of the Quraysh. The author then cites 14 traditions from Qur'ānic exegeses and other works which show that the Prophet (S) was well aware of the stubborn resistance with which his designation of 'Ali's successorship would be met, and that he was greatly anxious and perturbed when he received the Divine command to proceed with the designation immediately. He knew that the vestiges of the Jāhiliyyah with its envies and rivalries had not been fully eradicated from the character of his followers and his kinship with 'Ali rather aggravated than solved the difficulties arising from a public designation. The future events proved that the Prophet (S) was entirely justified in his misgivings. During the Ḥajj, at 'Arafāt, he had already made the declaration of *Ḥadīth al-Thaqalayn*, pointing out that he (S)

would be succeeded by twelve *khulafā'* or imams. The author cites eight narrations of the tradition regarding the twelve *khulafā'* or imams from *Musnad Aḥmad*, *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*, *Sunan Abī Dāwūd* and *Musnad Abī 'Awwānah*.

The fourth article, "al-Ghadīr fī al-turāth al-'Islāmī" (Ghadīr in the Islamic Heritage) by al-Sayyid 'Abd al-'Azīz al-Ṭabāṭabā'ī is a bibliographical study of the works written since the 2nd/8th century concerning the topic of Ghadīr and the *wilāyah* of al-'Imām 'Alī (A). This study, extending over 150 pages, mentions 125 works on the topic. The earliest work mentioned is a work of al-Khalīl ibn Aḥmad al-Farāhīdī (100 — 175/718 — 791), which, as mentioned by Abū Ghālib al-Rāzī (d. 368/978), contained the text of the Prophet's sermon at Ghadīr Khumm. Two works of the 3rd/9th century are mentioned: *Kitāb al-wilāyah* by 'Alī ibn al-Ḥasan al-Ṭāṭarī and *Kitāb fī Ḥadīth al-Ghadīr* by Abū Ja'far al-Baghdādī. Ten works pertaining to the 4th/10th century are mentioned; they are: *Kitāb al-wilāyah* by the famous historian and exegete Abū Ja'far al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/922), *Khaṣā'is al-Ghadīr* by the great Shī'ī traditionist Abū Ja'far al-Kulaynī (d. 328/939), *Kitāb al-wilāyah wa man rawā Ghadīr Khumm* by Ibn 'Uqdah, *Ṭuruq Ḥadīth al-Ghadīr* by al-Ḥasan ibn Ibrāhīm al-'Alawī al-Nasībī, *Kitāb al-Ghadīr* by 'Alī ibn Bilāl al-Baṣrī, *Ṭuruq Ḥadīth al-Ghadīr* by Muḥammad ibn 'Alī al-Shaybānī al-Kūfī, *Kitāb man rawā Ḥadīth Ghadīr Khumm* by Abū Bakr al-Ji'ābī (d. 355/966), *Ṭuruq Ḥadīth al-Ghadīr* by Abū Ṭālib al-'Anbārī (d. 356/967), *Ṭuruq Ḥadīth al-Ghadīr* by al-Dārquṭnī (d. 385/995), and *Man rawā Ḥadīth Ghadīr Khumm* by Abū al-Faḍl al-Shaybānī (d. 387/997).

Next is the fourth instalment of a bibliography in alphabetical order of Shī'ī works on the subject of Imamate. This list, until the letter *rā'*, has listed 649 works.

The ninth article by al-Sayyid Muḥammad Jawād al-Shabbīrī is a research study concerning al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī's ascription of two books, *Kitāb Ḥadīth al-Shūrā* and *Kitāb masā'il al-Yahūdī* to 'Amr ibn Maymūn. Al-Ṭūsī, moreover, has identified 'Amr ibn Maymūn with 'Amr ibn Thābit, known as Ibn Abī al-Miqdām. The author's conclusion at the study is that the second book belongs to 'Amr ibn Abī al-Miqdām, who is different from 'Amr ibn Maymūn. Also, the first book pertains to 'Amr ibn Shimr, not to 'Amr ibn Maymūn, whose father's *kunya* was not Ibn Abī al-Miqdām, as suggested by al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī.

At the end, three manuscripts have been published for the first time. The first one is *Ghadīriyyah*, a long poem on Ghadīr by al-Ḥurr al-'Āmilī (d. 1164/1750), the great Shī'ī traditionist and author of *Wasā'il al-Shī'ah*, from the manuscript of his *dīwān* in his own hand. The next two are short tracts "al-'I'lām bi ḥaqīqat islām Amir al-Mu'minin 'alayhi al-salām" and "Dalīl ' al-naṣṣ bi khabar al-Ghadīr 'alā

imāmat Amir al-Mu'minin ṣalawāt-Allāh 'alayh", by al-Karājaki.

The Mu'assasat Al al-Bayt (A) li Iḥyā' al-Turāth (The Al al-Bayt Institute for the Revival of Islamic Heritage), based in Qumm, which publishes this quarterly, has made valuable contribution to the Shī'i heritage since its inception after the Islamic Revolution. It is hoped that the work of such institutions in Iran and abroad will be instrumental in introducing to the world the greatest source of human liberty and salvation, the great spiritual and intellectual heritage of the Imams of the Ahl al-Bayt (A), the foundation of whose leadership and Imamate was laid at Ghadir Khumm by Prophet Muḥammad (S).

NOTES:

1. Following are some of the non-Shī'i exegetes and authors who mention in their works that this verse was revealed on 18 Dhū al-Hijjah, 10 H. at Ghadir Khumm: Ibn 'Asākir, *Tarjumat al-'Imām 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib min Ta'rīkh Dimashq*, Beirut, ii, 586, ḥadīth no. 586; Sayyid Siddīq Ḥasan Khān, *Fath al-bayān fī maqāsid al-Qur'ān*, Cairo, iii, 63; al-Ḥākim al-Ḥaskānī, *Shawāhid al-tanzīl*, i, 187, 244-250; al-Wāhidī al-Nayshābūrī, *Asbāb al-nuzūl*, Egypt, 115; Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, *al-Durr al-manthūr*, Beirut, ii, 298; al-Shawkānī, *Fath al-Qadīr*, ii, 60; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Razī, *al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, Egypt, xii, 50; Ibn Ṭalḥah al-Shāfi'i, *Maṭālib al-sa'ūl*, Najaf, i, 44; Ibn al-Ṣabbāgh al-Mālikī, *al-Fuṣūl al-muhimmah*, 25; al-Qundūzī, *Yanābī' al-mawaddah*, Istanbul, 120, 249; al-Shahristānī, *al-Milal wa al-niḥal*, Beirut, i, 163; al-Ḥamawī, *Farā'id al-simṭayn*, Beirut, i, 158; Badr al-Dīn al-Ḥanafī, *Umdat al-qārī fī sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, viii, 584; al-'Ālūsī, *Rūḥ al-ma'ānī*, ii, 348; Muḥammad 'Abduh, *Tafsīr al-manār*, vi, 463; etc. See al-'Amīnī, *al-Ghadīr*, Beirut, i, 214 for further references.

2. See *Khulāṣat 'Abaqāt al-'anwār fī imāmat al-'A'immat al-'Aṭhār*, Tehran: Mu'assasat al-Bi'thah, 1404 H., vii, 225-420.

3. See *al-Ghadīr*, Beirut, i, 62-72.

4. However, this attempt failed to expunge all factual reports regarding the early Islamic era, and there are innumerable bits of evidence scattered throughout the non-Shī'i literature from which a consistent Shī'i picture of events can be reconstructed.

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